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COMMENTS OF 1997 LEO GOODWIN SCHOLAR
Nina Totenberg

I was pleased to have been invited to the Nova Southeastern University
Shepard Broad Law Center to participate in the Law Center's 1997 Leo
Goodwin Sr. Visiting Scholar Program.
As National Public Radio's Supreme Court correspondent, the
subject-The Rehnquist Court-has been my beat for some time. But
covering the Court is much different from listening to law students and
attempting to answer their questions about the Court, the Justices, their
decisions and the process by which they airive at those decisions.
It was not surprising that the students at the Law Center were
inquisitive. The law faculty at Nova Southeastern has a tradition of
litigating cases in the Supreme Court, and many of the students have assisted
the faculty in preparing Supreme Court briefs and arguments.!
In addition the faculty have been co-counsel in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972), and have filed Supreme Court Amicus briefs in several
cases. Other Florida lawyers who are to appear in the Supreme Court
regularly come to the Law Center for moot courts to prepare them for their
arguments in Washington. Nova Southeastern students have accompanied
faculty to Washington to watch their Supreme Court arguments. Thus, the
Supreme Court is not a remote institution to Fort Lauderdale law students.
My task was not to parse the cases of the Rehnquist Court, but to parse
the personalities of the Justices and the lawyers who attempt to persuade the
Court that their answers are the better answers to the nettlesome legal and
social issues presented by the cases the Court agrees to hear. Those cases,
the honestly arguable, difficult to decide ones which admit of no single right
answer are capable of being influenced by a single Justice's view of life and
law. And unless a lawyer is steeped in a sense of who each Justice is, that
1. Nova Southeastern Law Center faculty members have argued Beach v. Ocwen Fed.
Bank, 118 S.Ct. 1408(1998); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Florida Bar v.
Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1994);
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr. Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991); INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990);
Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Francis v. Henderson,
425 U.S. 536 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407

U.S. 25 (1972).
Nova Southeastern alumni have argued Farragher v. City of Boca Raton, argued Mar.,
1998 (awaiting decision); United States Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991); Spaziano
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
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lawyer may miss the opportunity to find an answer which resonates with the
"swing vote."
Of course each Justice creates his or her own written record of their
views-their opinions, concurrences, and dissents. But behind those pages
are nine engaging people, who while similarly law conditioned, have also
been shaped by forces which form all of us: education, family, religion,
geography, and gender. I was not asked to "spill the beans" about my view
of the Justices, not that I could or would do so, but the questions I was asked
to answer made me realize how little even law students know about the
human side of the Supreme Court. The grand rituals of the Supreme Court,
its refusal to allow its proceedings to be seen other than in person, the
remoteness of the Justices as compared to executive and legislative branch
officials, combine to make the Court a mystery to most of the citizenry.
Perhaps the mystique created by that aura serves the country well, for respect
for the Court's authority is its only armament. However, those who seek to
persuade the Court need to have it de-mystified a bit, and I did try to do that
for the law students.
And I did try to share with them the strengths and shortcomings I have
.een in Supreme Court advocates; the attributes and deficiencies which
likeiy affect all lawyers at all levels of practice. Knowledge of the facts and
knowledge of the law are only starting points. Knowledge of history,
sensitivity, to societal needs, desires, and dilemmas of the day, and society's
hopes for the future must be melded into a lawyer's arguments. And finally,
the most-important skill-listening-pervades the process of advocacy.
Listening to the client, listening to the witnesses, listening to the law, and
listening to the Court's questions lead to the decisions which are the
Supreme Court's only products: the law of the case and the law of the land.
I hope the thoughts I shared with the students left them with a sense of
respect for the effort of the Justices to decide the hard cases in a way
consistent with sound legal, social and economic principles. And I hope I
imparted to them the intellectual challenge of Supreme Court practice, and a
desire to follow the Nova Southeastern faculty and alumni to the Court's
lectern.
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Professorof Law
Nova Southeastern University
Bruce Rogow has been a professor of law at NSU Law since 1974 and served
as Acting Dean in both 1978-79 and 1984-85. He was Supreme Court
counsel in Seminole Tribe v. State of Florida, FloridaBar v. Went For It,
Inc. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, Argersinger v. Hamlin, Gerstein v. Pugh,
Ingraham v. Wright, Mathews v. Diaz, and Davis v. Scherer, co-counsel in
Fuentes v. Shevin, and appointed by the Court to represent the petitioner in
Francisv. Henderson.
Professor Rogow has served as President of the Legal Aid Society of
Broward County, General Counsel for the American Civil Liberties Union
Foundation of Florida, Special Counsel to The Florida Bar, and as Special
Assistant Attorney General. He successfully defended the Chief of the
Seminole Tribe of Florida against federal and state Endangered Species Act
charges for killing a Florida panther on the Reservation, represented 2 Live
Crew in their federal and state obscenity trials and appeals, and successfully
represented the Cuban Museum against the City of Miami's attempt to evict
it. In 1992 he obtained the first federal court appellate decision declaring
that a musical work was not obscene; his 1994 Supreme Court success in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose established copyright and constitutional protections
for commercial parodies.
Professor Rogow has been listed in The Best Lawyers in America for the past
ten years and is one of the few lawyers in the United States to be named in
two separate categories: Criminal Law and First Amendment Law. He is
one of two lawyers in Florida to be Board Certified in both civil and criminal
appellate law and is one of twelve practicing Florida lawyers elected to the
American Academy of Appellate Lawyers.
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COMMENTS ON THE 1997 LEO GOODWIN SR
VISITING SCHOLARS PROGRAM:
THE REHNQUIST COURT
Professor Bruce Rogow

I had the pleasure of hosting the 1997 Leo Goodwin Sr. visiting
Scholars and attending their presentations to the Law School community.
Our Scholars have different perspectives on the Rehnquist Court, and on the
individual justices. Drew Days and Kathleen Sullivan are academics, but
with a twist; both are Supreme Court advocates. Drew, as Solicitor General,
argued seventeen cases before the Rehnquist Court. Kathleen, as a public
interest litigation lawyer has argued before the Court, and has been
mentioned as a potential Solicitor General, in addition to authoring articles
on the Court. Their lawyer/academic commentaries on the Court fused
advocacy and legal philosophy and provided our students with valuable
lessons regarding the Court's work.
Nina Totenberg and Tim O'Brien are journalists, although Tim is also a
lawyer. They report on the Court and its cases, seeking to inform the public
about how this small and elegant institution affects the daily lives of us all.
Tim must do that in television time cadences, while Nina has the luxury of
National Public Radio segments. They read the Court differently from Drew
and Kathleen, and they have each developed social relations with individual
justices which provide for personality insights unavailable to most advocates
and academics.
Peter Irons' law degree is an aid to his primary work: historian. His
work, in an odd way, combines advocacy, academics, journalism and
personality analysis. He is a Drew Days without court appearances; a
Kathleen Sullivan without a future government portfolio; a Nina Totenberg
and a Tim O'Brien without a radio or television station. Peter challenges the
Court and the Government, and he informs and educates the public with his
written and oral chronicles of the Court's great cases.
We brought these five people to the Law School because no law school
education is complete -without developing an appreciation of the Supreme
Court and the justices who speak for the Court. The Law School's
commitment to educating students about the Court is an ongoing process. In
1995, we presented a month long program focusing on the Florida lawyers
who had argued in the Court over the proceeding twenty-five years: "Florida
Lawyers In the Supreme Court of the United States 1969-1994." Some of
those lawyers related stories of their cases-the incidents which led to the
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6

674

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 22:671

cases being filed, their clients' hopes, fears, frustration, and the lawyers'
own experiences in briefing and arguing a case in the Supreme Court. That
program included a compilation of the cases and their holdings as well as a
collection of documents from the Florida lawyers' cases and tape recordings
of arguments in some of those cases. This introduction to the Court and the
lawyers who appear before it has been reinforced by the opportunities many
students have had to attend Supreme Court arguments and to work with the
lawyers preparing for those arguments.
Thus when the 1997 Goodwin Scholars joined us to discuss the
Rehnquist Court they had an audience eager to learn how these uniquely
placed viewers perceived the Court, its personnel, and its opinions. The
Court is not easy to know or to predict, despite the fact that unlike any other
national institution, its decisions are always accompanied by written
explanations. Those explanations - its opinions - allow for critiques which
are often unrestrained. Indeed, the justices themselves, in dissents or
concurrences, sometimes use language which academic criticism would
abhor.
We eagerly anticipated how an historian, journalists, law
professor/advocates would assess the Rehnquist Court.
We were not disappointed. The Scholars painted vibrant pictures of the
Court, its decisions and the justices. The pictures of the Court were
enhanced by Peter Irons ability to bring to life the people whose names, as
parties, grace some of the Court's most controversial decisions. The articles
which follow are, in my view, not as interesting as the discussions which
occurred in the classes and informal gatherings our Visiting Scholars hosted,
but they do give the reader some idea of the provocative exchanges the
scholars had with students and faculty.
Professor Days' article, drawn from his address to the Law Center,
entitled "Executive Branch Advocate v. Officers of the Court: The Solicitor
General's Ethical Dilemma" describes the dual obligations which inhere in
the position of Solicitor General. His article uses real case examples to
provide a sense of the difficulties a Solicitor General faces in discharging his
duties. Though tensions arise given the duality of the Solicitor General's
unique position as the government's voice in the Supreme Court, Professor
Days is optimistic about the long term benefits accruing due to the office's
independence. He writes: "When the Solicitor General acts in ways that may
present a short-term problem for the government in the courts, it is a
reflection of the tradition of the independence that has grown up around the
office of the Solicitor General over the past 127 years."
Peter Irons asks, "What do opticians in Oklahoma have in common with
pregnant women in Texas?" In his article "Opticians and Abortion: The
Constitutional Myopia of Justice Rehnquist," Irons explores the Chief
Justice's use of the Lee Optical decision in his Roe v. Wade dissent; a use

Published by NSUWorks, 1998

7

Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 1

1998]

Rogow

designed to defend the position that the Constitution does not imply a "right
of privacy" which extends to the right to an abortion.
Irons posits that the use of Lee Opticalwas expressly a device to avoid
the difficulty of finding an actual "rational basis" to support the Rehnquist
view in Roe, and opines that Justice Blackmun's "strict scrutiny" was the
proper standard. Irons' case for strict scrutiny is buttressed with the
practical view that when public officials are aware their decisions will face
such scrutiny they will be inhibited from enacting potentially
unconstitutional legislation.
Another author, rather than focusing on a particular Justice, places the
spotlight on the Court as a whole. In "The Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist
Court," Kathleen Sullivan explores why the so-called "conservative" Justices
have sometimes voted for "liberal" or "moderate" results. Sullivan provides
several explanations for these occurrences: a President's inability to predict
the judicial orientation of his nominees and more importantly, the
institutional structure of the Court which constrains or systematically
moderates ideological tendencies. The Justices' commitments to accepted
norms of jurisprudence may limit their ideological orientation.
Further, Sullivan believes that an apparently "liberal" result sometimes
only represents the dominance of one strand of conservatism. Sullivan
briefly traces some of the Court's decisions and also illustrates the
significance of the approaches used by the Justices in tailoring legal rules or
tests. In addition, Sullivan describes the complex relationship among the
many strands of Constitutional Conservatism. The strands, Sullivan
proposes, may often pull the Justices in competing directions. Through
institutional, jurisprudential, and ideological explanations, Sullivan manages
to shed some light on why a "Court moving generally rightward might
nonetheless be characterized occasionally by surprising judicial
moderation."
In "The Rehnquist Court: Holding Steady on Freedom Speech," Tim
O'Brien comments that the early First Amendment apprehensions about the
Rehnquist Court were unjustified, demonstrating how the Rehnquist Court
holds steady in its solicitude for freedom of speech. The concerns that
O'Brien notes originated in part because prior to becoming Chief Justice,
Justice Rehnquist authored or joined in Supreme Court opinions which had
the effect of limiting press freedoms. Furthermore, in clashes between
government power and individual rights, then Justice Rehnquist was among
the Justices most consistently siding with the government.
The change in the Chief Justiceship from Warren E. Burger to William
Rehnquist was accompanied by changes in the composition of the Court.
Those changes, with the single exception of Justice Ginsberg replacing
Justice White, have been perceived to represent a succession less
sympathetic to First Amendment values. O'Brien believes the perception has
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proved to be false because on the politically charged and socially sensitive
issues (flag burning, internet indecency, hate speech) the Rehnquist Court
has shown allegiance to First Amendment issues. O'Brien notes that
commitment and concludes that "there has been a consistent majority of the
Supreme Court on the side of a broad right to free speech."
Nina Totenberg's reflections on her visit underscore the optimism that
she conveyed about the Court's efforts to decide hard cases "correctly"
while acknowledging that many of these cases do not have a "single right
answer." Her enthusiasm for the Court, the Justices, the Court personnel and
many of the lawyers who appear before the Court is apparent.
These articles provide a sense of the institutional respect for the Court
and individual admiration for the justices which permeated the classroom
discussions. One may disagree with Supreme Court decisions, and one may
find the justices' arguments to be forced or foundationless, and history may
prove that some of the outcomes were wrong, but all of our scholars
imparted a sense of optimism about the Court and its work. The
premonitions and predictions which accompany a change in the Court must
be tempered by a faith in the nine people who try to "get it right." As I
wrote in the introduction to the program for our 1997 Visiting Scholars:
Our diverse and contentious democracy looks to the Supreme Court to
resolve disputes about life and death, race and religion, speech and politics,
criminal law and business law. The cases are not easy; generally they admit
of no single right answer. The Court's decisions are "right" because they are
final. The Court's decisions are followed because of our respect for the
institution and the Justices.
This edition of the Law Review, and the presentations of the 1997 Leo
Goodwin Sr Visiting Scholars will impart to our students and readers the
reasons why that respect is well founded.
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FormerSolicitor General of the United States
Alfred M. Rankin Professorof Law, Yale Law School
Professor Drew S. Days, III, recently returned to the Yale Law School as the
Alfred M. Rankin Professor of Law after serving three distinguished years as
Solicitor General of the United States during President Clinton's first
term. As Solicitor General, Professor Days was the Government's lawyer
before the United States Supreme Court.
No stranger to government service, Professor Days served as President
Carter's Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in the U.S. Department
of Justice. A decade earlier, General Days worked as a Peace Corps
Volunteer in Honduras. From the late 60s through the nid-70s, he litigated
school desegregation, police misconduct, and employment discrimination
cases as a staff lawyer with the prestigious NAACP Legal Defense Fund.
At Yale, Professor Days' teaching and scholarship have focused on civil
procedure, federal jurisdiction, Supreme Court practice, -anti-discrimination,
comparative constitutional (Canada and the United States), and international
human rights laws. During decades of human rights activism, he has served
organizations such as the Congressional Black Caucus, the National
Conference on Education for Blacks, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil
Rights Under Law, the Board of Helsinki Watch, the Urban League,
America's Watch, the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, the Petra
Foundation, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.
Professor Days is a 1963 honors graduate in English Literature from
Hamilton College. He received his LL.B. degree from Yale in 1966. Today
his name appears on almost every pundit's "short list" of potential Supreme
Court nominees.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss3/1

10

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

Executive Branch Advocate v. Officer of the Court: The
Solicitor General's Ethical Dilemma
Drew S. Days, III
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I. INTRODUCTION

It is truly a pleasure to be with you at Nova Southeastern this week. I
want to thank my friends, Dean Joseph Harbaugh and Professor Bruce
Rogow, for all their efforts in making my visit possible. For those of you in
your first year at the Law Center, let me explain how complicated those
efforts were. You see, I was originally scheduled to spend several days here
last March. A funny thing happened to me, however, "on my way to the
forum." A disc in the lumbar region of my spine decided to herniate, break
off, and put significant pressure on a nerve running to my left leg, producing
excruciating pain. As a result, rather than enjoying the wonderful
companionship and climate Nova Southeastern had to offer, I spent late
March and early April going through surgery and recuperation.
Consequently, I am especially gratified to be here and to be able to stand
before you pain free and ambulatory.
I must admit, an additional reason for my finding this task so enjoyable
is that I am the former Solicitor General-not the current incumbent.
Consequently, I stand before you with no government crises on the horizon
to which I have to respond, no court filing deadlines bearing down on me, no
hours of preparation ahead of me for oral arguments, and no anxiety-ridden
weeks until the end of the term when the most important decisions of the
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Supreme Court are usually announced. I do not mean to suggest that my
over three-year stint as the Solicitor General was partially unrewarding; it
was far from it. I believe that being the Solicitor General is the best lawyer's
job in the country.
While I was in Washington, the Legal Adviser to the State Department
and I debated the question of who had the better job. The only concession I
was willing to make to him was that the Legal Adviser gets better travel. He
goes to London, Paris, The Hague, and Beijing. For the most part, the
Solicitor General's travel entails a five-minute car ride from the Department
of Justice to the Supreme Court and an equally short return trip. On my side
of the ledger, of course, is the fact that the Solicitor General dresses better
than the Legal Adviser. No other lawyer in America has the opportunity, as
does the Solicitor General, to don striped pants, a cutaway dark vest, and
silver and black tie for a "day at the office."
But, on a more serious note, the rewards of the Solicitor General's job
come from his being able to survey the entirety of federal government
litigation throughout the United States and to control the flow of that
litigation up through the lower federal courts to the Supreme Court. Once
cases reach the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General plays an important role
in the development of American law and can have an impact upon the
establishment of constitutional and other principles that will affect our lives
for years to come. This is because the Solicitor General has responsibility
not only for representing the United States in the Supreme Court, but also for
authorizing all appeals from federal trial courts to the courts of appeals, for
all amicus filings in appellate courts, and for interventions by the
government where the constitutionality of federal laws is drawn into
question.
In order to give you some sense of the magnitude of this undertaking,
during my tenure I argued seventeen cases before the Supreme Court and one
before a federal court of appeals. I also personally reviewed over 3000
recommendations with respect to petitions for certiorari, appeals, amicus
briefs, and interventions. My staff and I filed roughly 100 certiorari
petitions, over 200 merits briefs, and presented oral argument to the Supreme
Court in about two-thirds of all the cases the Court heard during the three
terms I served as Solicitor General.
I have entitled my talk "Executive Branch Advocate v. Officer of the
Court: The Solicitor General's Ethical Dilemma" in an effort to capture an
inherent tension in the Solicitor General's role that I am certain all those
who preceded me experienced. It is, I believe, a creative tension that, on
balance, produces more responsible government advocacy before the
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Supreme Court than otherwise. However, it also provides a Solicitor
General with some of the loneliest and most difficult moments of his tenure.
I had more than a few such moments during my time as Solicitor General,
but I will not attempt to provide you this afternoon with a catalogue in that
regard. Rather, I am going to discuss four occasions where this tension
appeared to me particularly acute.
II. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS EXECUTIVE BRANCH ADVOCATE
Although the Solicitor General is appointed by the President and serves
in the Justice Department headed by the Attorney General, identifying the
Solicitor General as an Executive Branch advocate does not begin to explain
the position's true function. One of the first questions that a new Solicitor
General has to ask is: "Who am I representing?" The Solicitor General
finds, before much time has passed, that the answer to that question is rather
complicated. Indeed, the American Bar Association Model Rules of
Professional Conduct note cryptically in the section on the "'Organizationas
Client," defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the
resulting obligations of such lawyers may be more difficult in the
government context." The Solicitor General may, at any given point,
conclude that the client is: 1) the people of the United States; 2) the federal
government; 3) the administration in which he serves; 4) the President; 5)
the Attorney General; 6) the Executive Branch departments and agencies; 7)
individual federal employees; 8) independent regulatory agencies; and 9) the
Congress.
A.

The SolicitorGeneraland the National Rifle Association

One of the apparent surprises on my list was more than likely
independent regulatory agencies because they are, as any basic course on
administrative law or civics would reveal, supposed to be substantially
independent of Executive Branch control. For that reason, independent
regulatory agencies have bipartisan memberships and terms that often extend
beyond the four years of any administration. Nevertheless, with few
exceptions, Congress has entrusted the Attorney General and the Solicitor
General with the responsibility for representing such agencies before the
Supreme Court. As my encounter in the spring of 1994 with the Federal

1. MODELRuIEs OFPROFESSIONALCoNDuCr Rule 1.13 (1995).
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Election Commission ("FEC") made clear, the agencies themselves are not
always amused by this arrangement.
Of all the agencies that one would think deserved to be free of any
Executive Branch control, it would be the FEC, a body with responsibility
for investigating and prosecuting both civil and criminal violations of the
federal election laws. The FEC does things like investigating activities of
the major political parties and congressional and presidential election
committees. FEC litigation matters probably qualify better than most as
political "hot potatoes" for Executive Branch officials and are unlikely to do
much good for one's career if mishandled.
This dynamic probably contributed to the general conclusion accepted
by both the FEC and the Solicitor General's office for over twenty years that
the FEC had independent litigating authority in the Supreme Court. Indeed,
a short written description of the Solicitor General's responsibilities that I
found upon taking office explicitly singled out the FEC as one of the very
few agencies with such authority. However, I was prompted by a
notification from the FEC in 1994 that it intended to seek certiorari in a case
involving the National Rifle Association ("NRA") to sit down and read the
FEC's enabling legislation. I concluded from my research that the FEC had
no independent litigating authority in that type of controversy. At issue was
whether, as the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit had held, the FEC's composition violated separation of powers. 2 At
that time the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of
3
Representatives were included as nonvoting members of the Commission.
Moreover, on the merits, I believed, contrary to the FEC's position, that the
FEC's makeup was unconstitutional.
The FEC decided that it would file its own petition, without my
authorization, but subsequently accepted a letter from me to the Supreme
Court to the effect that, if the FEC were wrong on that point, it had my post
hoc authorization. I then filed a brief challenging the FEC's independent
litigating authority and arguing that its makeup was unconstitutional. After
certiorari was granted, and full briefs and oral argument had taken place on
the merits of the constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court dismissed the
case on the grounds that the Commission lacked independent litigating

2. See Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
3. Id. at 823.
4. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA
Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88 (1994) (No. 93-1151).
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authority and that the Solicitor General's authorization came after the time
for filing the petition had expired. 5 The Supreme Court provided no
guidance on the merits, whatsoever. At issue was the authority of the
Solicitor General to represent independent agencies in the Supreme Court
unless Congress directed otherwise. But also at stake was the ability of the
Executive Branch to challenge consistently and effectively any efforts by
Congress to enlarge its powers unconstitutionally. As curious as it may
seem, I was, in a sense, both defending and attacking Congress at the same
time.
B.

The Case of the Speedway Bomber

A second example of the Solicitor General's difficulty in identifying the
client arises in the context of what are called Bivens actions, in which
federal government officials are sued for allegedly violating another person's
constitutional rights. If the plaintiffs in such cases are successful, they may
be able to recover money damages directly from the officials. The Justice
Department usually provides federal officials with legal representation in
Bivens actions. However, officials facing suit must devote significant time
and energy to defending themselves, even if they are ultimately vindicated.
Over a number of years, the Supreme Court has attempted to ensure that
frivolous Bivens actions are identified and dismissed at the earliest possible
stage in the litigation. But there are occasions where the interests of the
to be true
individual official and those of the government diverge, as proved
• 7
during the 1994-95 Term in a case called Kimberlin v. Quinlan.
Although the name of the case may not be familiar, the facts have been
the subject of significant media attention in recent years. Kimberlin had
been convicted and was serving a fifty-one-year sentence for federal drug
and explosive offenses when the events of importance here allegedly took
place. He had been convicted for, among other things, a series of bombings
in and around Indianapolis for which he gained the name "The Speedway
Bomber." 9 Kimberlin alleged that, shortly before the 1988 presidential
election, he was placed in administrative detention by Quinlan, Director of
the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and other federal officials, in order to prevent
5. See FederalElection Comm'n, 513 U.S. at 98.
6. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.

388 (1971).
7. 6 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated,515 U.S. 321 (1995).
8. Id. at 791 n.3.
9. Kimberlin v. White, 7 F.3d 527, 528-29 (6th Cir. 1993).
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him from communicating with the media. 10 The story that the defendants
wanted squelched, according to Kimberlin, was that he had sold marijuana
during the 1970s to a law student named Dan Quayle, the Republican vicepresidential candidate in 1988.11
Kimberlin sued the federal officials, alleging a violation of his First
Amendment free speech rights. 12 Department of Justice lawyers defended
Quinlan in the trial court, but were unsuccessful in getting the case thrown
out. 13 On appeal, the federal defendants wanted to argue that the case should
have been dismissed by the trial court because Kimberlin had introduced no
"direct evidence" of unconstitutional motivation on their part, as precedent
required.14 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia had
determined that where government officials acted in a manner that might be
perfectly legal-for example, a prison official's placing an inmate in
administrative detention-but for the claim of unconstitutional motivation,
the plaintiff must make more than conclusory allegations with respect to
motivation. 15 My predecessor, Ken Starr, had, in an earlier case,16 rejected
that "direct evidence rule" as a government position, and I concurred with
his view.
Consequently, on appeal, the government withdrew from
representing Quinlan and the other officials and authorized them to obtain
private counsel at taxpayer expense. As a result of pressing that argument,
the defendants
won on appeal 17 and Kimberlin sought Supreme Court
18
review.
As it does from time to time, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor
General, even though the government was no longer involved in the case, to
advise it as to whether it should grant Kimberlin's petition for a writ of
certiorari. 19 In so doing, the Supreme Court placed me in a rather awkward
position. I could urge it not to take the case, thereby, if the Supreme Court
agreed, ending the case and rendering final the federal officials' lower court

10. Kimberlin, 6 F.3d at 791-93.

11. Id. at 791.
12. Id.
13. Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 774 F. Supp. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd, 6 F.3d 789 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
14. Kimberlin, 6 F.3d at 793-94 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
15. Kimberlin, 774 F. Supp. at 6.
16. See Brief for Respondent at 11-12, Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1990) (No. 9096).
17. Kimberlin, 6 F.3d at 798 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
18. Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 513 U.S. 1123 (1995).
19. See id.
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victory. Alternatively, I could recommend that the petition be granted and
argue that the dismissal by the court of appeals of Kimberlin's suit based
upon the "direct evidence rule" was erroneous and should be reversed. The
former approach would underscore the Attorney General's commitment to
vigorous defense of federal officials in Bivens actions. Such an approach
would be consistent with the Supreme Court's concern that baseless suits
with their threat of personal liability and burdens of litigation, unless
"nipped in the bud," may discourage talented individuals from entering
public service or drive others from office. The latter, setting to one side the
fact that it might produce headlines reading, in effect, "Government Joins
Speedway Bomber in Constitutional Suit Against Federal Officials," would
be consistent with the Attorney General's responsibility for ensuring that
persons with legitimate civil rights claims do not have their cases, against
either federal or nonfederal officials, dismissed prematurely. For the
Supreme Court's prior rulings in Bivens cases, although involving suits
against federal officials, had been readily applied to civil suits against state
and local officials.20
After extensive consultation with the Attorney General, I concluded
that my duty was not to the specific federal defendants but to ensuring that
unreasonable barriers were not placed in the path of the civil rights plaintiffs.
No distinction is made anywhere else in the law between the probativeness
of "direct evidence" on the one hand and "circumstantial evidence" on the
other,21 and I saw no reason to do so in Bivens actions. The "direct evidence
rule" would require the plaintiffs in such cases to produce a "smoking gun,"
something tantamount to a defendant's confession of unconstitutional
motivation, in order to avoid having their suits summarily dismissed.
I must say that this decision was rendered especially difficult; first,
because those of us involved in determining the government's position knew
we were present or potentially future defendants in Bivens actions where the
direct evidence rule might prove very handy. Second, we were also aware
that anything other than all-out defense of government officials in such
cases, even if not fully justified, has an unavoidably depressive effect upon
employee morale. One may hear from other federal officials in this context:
"Am I going to be left to hang out to dry by the Attorney General when a
20. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (rejecting a distinction between
state and federal government officials' liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) and Bivens,

respectively).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Hatchett, 31 F.3d 1411, 1421 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that
"circumstantial evidence is not less probative than direct evidence, and, in some cases is even
more reliable") (citing United States v. Rose, 12 F.3d 1414, 1417 (7th Cir. 1994)).
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groundless suit is brought against me?" But here, my client turned out to be,
perhaps, the citizenry at large, not the federal defendants.
I should report the weeks of "sturm and drang" over what position the
government would take in Kimberlin ultimately went for naught. The case
was accepted for review, oral arguments took place, and the Supreme Court,
in a paragraph per curiam opinion, vacated and remanded the case back to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for
reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's decision announced earlier
that week in another Bivens case raising a related, but not identical,
question. 22
III. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS OFFICER OF THE COURT
The Solicitor General's role as Executive Branch advocate, with all the
complexity I have just described, is complicated further by the position's
responsibilities as an officer of the Supreme Court. In this regard, the
Solicitor General cannot hope to discharge these responsibilities unless he
laq established a reputation before the Supreme Court for absolute candor
and fair dealing. One would like to think that anyone charged with
representing the United States in the Supreme Court would have acquired
those characteristics prior to assuming that post. But were that not the case,
certain pragmatic considerations would lead a Solicitor General to acquire
them rather quickly. For, as I mentioned earlier, the Solicitor General and
the staff are involved in approximately two-thirds of the cases the Supreme
Court hears each term. Moreover, the Solicitor General files literally
hundreds of briefs each term responding to certiorari petitions by others
seeking review of lower court decisions in the government's favor. The
Solicitor General also periodically seeks extraordinary relief, such as a stay,
from the Supreme Court or one of its Justices in lower court litigation.
The Solicitor General's traditional success in obtaining review in the
Supreme Court of adverse decisions, and of resisting petitions filed against
the government by others, can be attributed, I think, to the fact that the
Justices believe the Solicitor General when the Solicitor General says that a
matter warrants or does not warrant their attention; they rely upon the
Solicitor General's reputation for telling the truth and for not hedging or
distorting to gain a short-term advantage. Indeed, the Supreme Court looks
to the Solicitor General to serve as a "gatekeeper" with respect to the flow of
22. Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 515 U.S. 321, 322 (1995) (remanding for further
consideration in light of Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995)).
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government litigation to the Court. As the Supreme Court stated only a few
terms ago:
[T]he practice [of concentrating the litigating authority in the
Solicitor General] also serves the Government well; an individual
Government agency necessarily has a more parochial view of the
interest of the Government in litigation than does the Solicitor
General's office, with its broader view of litigation in which the
Government is involved throughout the state and federal court
systems.... The Government as a whole is apt to3 fare better if
these decisions are concentrated in a single official.2
By the same token, once a Solicitor General's word can no longer be
trusted by the Supreme Court and the justices begin to think that the
government briefs need to be double checked, the special relationship is
likely to suffer significantly. Furthermore, to the extent that the Justices'
fears are borne out, retribution may be swift and certain. Unlike most
lawyers appearing before the Supreme Court who may argue there only once
in their lives, the Solicitor General and staff-proverbial "repeat players"-are there on almost a daily basis during the Term. They must answer
tomorrow for today's misrepresentations, if they occur. But, telling the truth
is not always a painless activity, as the following two examples reflect.
A. AIDS, AZT, and PatentLaw
During the 1995-96 Term, the Supreme Court was asked to review a
dispute over patent rights to the drug azidothymidine ("AZT"). 24 Burroughs
Wellcome's patent was being challenged by a manufacturer of generic drugs,
Barr Laboratories.2 Barr Laboratories contended that it had a right to share
in the patent based upon a license to it granted by the United States
Government. 26 In short, at an early stage in Burroughs Wellcome's
development of the compound that became AZT, scientists at the National
Institutes of Health ("NIH") conducted tests of the drug on mice at the
company's request.2 7 Barr argued that it was only after the NIH tests, and in
reliance upon their results, that Burroughs Wellcome determined that AZT
23. Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 96 (1994).
24. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
25. Id. at 1225-27.

26. Id. at 1226.

27. Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 1998

19

Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 1

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 22:677

was worth patenting. 28 Burroughs Wellcome asserted that, on the contrary,
AZT was sufficiently patentable before the NIH tests. 29 The lower courts
had held for Burroughs Wellcome. 30 If the former scenario was correct, the
federal government had a right to share in the patent and to license Barr
Laboratories to exploit that interest.
Once again, the Supreme Court asked for the views of the Solicitor
General. 31 Here, the tension over what position to take was caused by the
administration's concern that Barr Laboratories' failure to prevail in its
challenge would leave intact Burroughs Wellcome's monopoly over the
production and sale of AZT. Those responsible in the government for policy
on acquired immunodeficiency syndrome ("AIDS") along with public
interest groups urging aggressive AIDS research and treatment believed that,
were the challenge successful, the monopoly would be broken. As a result,
there would be a drop in the price of AZT and a greater availability to those
carrying the virus or suffering from full-blown AIDS.
But my job as Solicitor General was, while keeping those policy
concerns in mind, to decide what the best legal answer was to the patent law
question presented to the Supreme Court by Barr Laboratories' petition for
certiorari. After a great deal of research and thought, my staff and I
concluded that Burroughs Wellcome's position, not Barr Laboratories', was
the correct one as a matter of patent law.32 Moreover, we also identified an
important public policy interest consistent with our legal analysis. There
was good reason to fear that the government's claim to patent rights under
circumstances like those presented by this case might discourage
pharmaceutical companies from seeking federal assistance altogether. 33 As a
consequence, once on the market, the costs of research and of the drugs
themselves might increase, as might the delay in the process, and the
government might find itself denied an opportunity to have any impact on
the development of valuable new pharmaceutical products.34 I informed the

28. Id. at 1228.
29. Burroughs, 40 F.3d at 1227.
30. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (E.D.N.C.
1993), aff'd in part, vacatedin part,40 F.3d 1223, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
31. Barr Lab., Inc. v. Burroughs Wellcome Co., 515 U.S. 1130 (1995) (inviting the
Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States).
32. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 990, Barr Lab., Inc. v. Burroughs
Wellcome Co., 116 S. Ct. 771 (1996) (No. 94-1527).
33. Id. at 15-17.
34. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae,BarrLab., Inc.(No. 94-1527).
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view of the law and urged the Court to
Supreme Court of the government's
36
35
deny certiorari. It did so.
B.

Ivan the Terrible

Here is my final example. Early in my tenure, I found myself wrestling
with questions growing out of the government's handling of the case of John
Demjanjuk, thought to be "Ivan the Terrible," an executioner in the Nazi
death camp at Treblinka, Poland. The Justice Department determined that
Demjanjuk had lied on his immigration papers by omitting his Nazi
affiliation, and thereafter successfully obtained court orders denaturalizing
him and directing his deportation. 37 But before his deportation, the Israeli
government sought his extradition so that he could stand trial for genocide.
Demjanjuk was tried in Israel, convicted, and sentenced to death. While his
case was on appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court, however, materials from
newly uncovered Soviet archives raised serious doubts about whether
Demjanjuk was, in fact, "Ivan the Terrible."38
Meanwhile, the federal court of appeals that had affirmed the
denaturalization and deportation orders in Demjanjuk's case, upon hearing
about the new Soviet records, appointed a district court judge as a special
master to take evidence and to report back on the question of whether Justice
39
Department lawyers had acted improperly in their handling of the case.
Perhaps, reinforcing the court of appeals' resolve in this regard, the Israeli
Supreme Court reversed Deimanjuk's conviction and ordered him freed
based upon this new evidence.
The special master, after conducting an extensive review, concluded
that government lawyers had not violated any ethical or professional
standards with respect to Demjanjuk's case, although he did identify certain
instances of oversight that he found unfortunate in retrospect.41 The court of
appeals, however, rejected the special master's determination, holding
35. Id.
36. BarrLab.Inc., 116 S. Ct. at 771.
37. See In re Extradition of John Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Ohio 1985)
(deporting Demjanjuk); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981)
(denaturalizing Demjanjuk).
38. See Clyde Haberman, Soviet Files Presented in Appeal of War-Crimes Verdict in
Israel, N.Y. TIMEs, June 2, 1992, at A3.
39. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 339 (6th Cir. 1993).
40. Id. at 342.

41. Id. at 348.
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instead that the government lawyers were guilty of what could be called
"good faith fraud"-an offense previously unknown to the law. 42 This
finding represented a devastating blow to the reputations of three highly
regarded federal prosecutors and damaged the credibility of the entire
government program to identify, denaturalize, and deport Nazi war
criminals. Under the circumstances, although the odds were against us, I
decided that a certiorari petition should be filed to vindicate those interests.
While I awaited the Supreme Court's action on our petition, a lawyer on
my staff walked into my office and asked to talk to me about a matter that
was troubling him. I invited him to sit down. His area of responsibility
among the assistants to the Solicitor General was handling tax cases, but he
said that he had taken a look at our petition in the Demjanjuk case just out of
curiosity and found himself recalling a conversation he had some fourteen
years earlier. Although he admitted his memory was somewhat hazy, the
conversation was with another lawyer who, at the time, had just left the
Solicitor General's office to join the "Nazi Hunter" unit in the department.
According to my assistant, that lawyer mentioned in passing that he was
involved in an important case in which the government team had some
information that might be conflicting as to the Nazi camp where the person
targeted for denaturalization and deportation had served. When asked by my
tax assistant whether that was information that should be provided to that
person's lawyer, the new member of the "Nazi Hunter" team said that he did
not believe so.
After hearing him out, I was faced with the question of what to do with
this report. I could do nothing, for after all, the tax assistant did not recall
any mention of Demjanjuk's name, or of "Ivan the Terrible," or of
Treblinka; the conversation might have been about an entirely different case,
even if my tax assistant's memory was accurate as to what he did recall. But
I was struck by the fact that the court of appeals had come down hard on the
government lawyers primarily because it felt that they had withheld critical
information from witnesses and defense counsel in Demjanjuk's case.
Moreover, whether John Demjanjuk was at Treblinka or another Nazi camp
was central to establishing that he was "Ivan the Terrible." Failure to make
complete disclosure to the Supreme Court of the report I had received might,
in retrospect, compound damage done by the earlier charges against the
Department of Justice.
I decided, therefore, to file a supplemental brief with the Supreme
Court, and to advise defense counsel by letter of my conversation with my
42. Id. at 354.
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assistant, fully aware of the fact that such a filing was unlikely to improve
our chances of having certiorari granted. I filed the brief, and shortly
thereafter certiorari was denied. 43
IV. CONCLUSION

I have discussed four instances during my tenure in which I took
positions in the Supreme Court that might appear to be inconsistent with the
Solicitor General's role as Executive Branch advocate, and other instances
exist that I have not mentioned. But I do not want to leave you with the false
impression that Solicitors General spend most of their time devising legal
arguments likely to undermine governmental programs and policies. In most
cases, the Solicitor General's client is not hard to find. Indeed, were I to
spread out my entire record, you might well conclude that there were too few
occasions when I acted in the long term, rather than the short-term interests
of the United States. My purpose here, however, was not necessarily to
convince you of the wisdom of my decision-making process. Rather, it was
to give you a sense of the difficulties a Solicitor General faces in carrying
out his responsibilities.
Difficulties though they may be, when the Solicitor General acts in
ways that may present short-term problems for the government in the courts,
it is a reflection of the tradition of the independence that has grown up
around the office of the Solicitor General over the past 127 years, respected
with few exceptions by presidents and attorneys general alike. To quote
from a 1977 Justice Department statement on the role of the Solicitor
General:
It was a Solicitor General, Frederick W. Lehman, who wrote that
"the United States wins its point whenever justice is done its
citizens in the courts"; and the burden of history is that justice is
done most often when the law is administered with an independent
and impartial hand. The Nation values the Solicitor General's
independence for the same reason that it values an independent
judiciary.44
So be it. Thank you.

43. See Rison v. Demjanjuk, 513 U.S. 914 (1994).
44. John M. Harmon, Memorandum-Opinionfor the Attorney General,21 LoY. L.A.
L. REv. 1089, 1092 (1988).
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I. INTRODUCTION

What do opticians in Oklahoma have in common with pregnant women
in Texas? On the surface, the answer would seem to be very little, aside
from a shared state border. Before I explain why the question is posed in this
fashion, let me ask what pregnant women in Texas have in common with the
following: men who watch dirty movies in their homes; suspicious men who
"case" jewelry stores; men who place bets from telephone booths; people
who import window glass; parents who want their children to study German
in public schools; and convicted murderers who seek new trials? Again, the
answer would seem to be very little.
The answers to both questions are: very little and a great deal. Both the
Oklahoma opticians and the mixed bag of other people are connected to
pregnant women in Texas by the common bond of involvement in the United
States Supreme Court cases that were cited as precedent on both sides in Roe
v. Wade.' Justice (now Chief Justice) William Rehnquist cited in his
dissenting opinion a case involving opticians in Oklahoma as his one and
only precedent for the argument that the Constitution does not provide a right
of "privacy" that would protect women seeking abortions from criminal
prosecution. 2 On the other side, Justice Harry Blackmun, writing for the
majority in Roe, cited the cases described above among those he utilized to
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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argue that the Constitution does include-or at least implies-a right to
privacy "broad enough to3encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy."
It may seem a far stretch to analogize between opticians and abortion, or
between abortion and such issues as pornography, bookmaking, language
instruction, murder trials, and "stop and frisk" practices. If the use of
precedent is thought of as a search for cases "on point," there is little that
appears "on point" in these cases. But judges in general-and Justices of the
Supreme Court in particular-are not bound by any rules in citing
precedent. They often cite as precedent cases that are factually dissimilar to
those at issue, looking for a broadly stated principle of law that could add
some authority to the argument they are constructing, or to the conclusion
they have reached.
On occasion, as illustrated by the Roe opinions of Justices Rehnquist
and Blackmun, the search for precedent becomes creative and imaginative. I
do not mean this in a pejorative way, because legal reasoning is not simply a
process of stacking up cases that are factually similar. Argumentation can
and should be creative and imaginative; that is why we have such terms as
metaphor and simile, apposition and juxtaposition. In some situations,
comparing apples to oranges may prove to be fruitful; they are both fruits,
roughly spherical, and grow on trees. They have more in common than
opticians and abortion.
Let me start with Justice Rehnquist and the case he cited as precedent in
his Roe opinion, Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. 4 He cited this 1955 decision
for the following proposition: "'[T]he test traditionally applied in the area of
social and economic legislation is whether or not a law such as that
challenged [in Roe] has a rational relation to a valid state objective.' 5 That
sentence provides a good, brief statement of the so-called "rational basis" test
applied by the Court to determine the constitutionality of "social and
economic" legislation. In contrast, the "strict scrutiny" test is applied to
legislation that is alleged to infringe on fundamental rights or to create
suspect classifications. This latter jurisprudential test derives from the
famous "Footnote Four" in Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's 1938 opinion in
United States v. Carolene Products.6 The "rational basis" test has earlier
roots, but over the past six decades the competing tests have essentially
3. Id. at 153.

4. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
5. Roe, 410 U.S. at 173 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491
(1955)).
6. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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polarized the debate over the proper level of judicial scrutiny in
constitutional cases.
There is nothing illegitimate in Justice Rehnquist's citation to Lee
Optical in his Roe dissent. His search for precedent led him to a rather
obscure, and certainly not momentous, case. However, his statement of its
central principle is misleading; in fact, it is flatly wrong. The Court's
opinion in Lee Optical did not state that the "rational basis" test applied to
"social and economic legislation," as Justice Rehnquist wrote. It limited the
use of that highly deferential test to state laws that regulated "business and
industrial conditions," hardly the same thing as "social and economic"
legislation.7 The case Justice Rehnquist actually should have cited in his Roe
opinion was not Lee Optical,but the Court's 1979 decision in Dandridge v.
Williams,8 in which Justice Potter Stewart put the Lee Optical decision into
totally new frames, so to speak. It was Justice Stewart who cited Lee Optical
for the proposition that in "deal[ing] with state regulation in the social and
economic field, not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights," the
Court would apply the "rational basis" test.9

II. A CLOSER LOOK AT LEE OPTICAL
Let us take a closer look, through the corrective lenses of hindsight, at
the Lee Optical case, to find out why it has become Justice Rehnquist's
favorite precedent in cases dealing with issues such as abortion, nude
dancing, and the rights of illegitimate children, among others. This case
stemmed from a political battle over the eyeglass business in Oklahoma. The
state's opticians (who grind lenses and fit them into frames) were pitted
against optometrists (who have doctoral degrees and measure vision) and
ophthalmologists (who are medical doctors and treat eye diseases). The
Court's opinion in Lee Opticaltells us nothing about this political battle, but
it is fair to assume that Oklahoma's optometrists and ophthalmologists (call
them the eye doctors) complained to state legislators that opticians (call them
the grinders) were cutting into their business by duplicating eyeglass lenses
without sending their clients to the doctors for prescriptions. Opticians are
capable of duplicating lenses without prescriptions; this is a fairly simple
task, as the many "one-hour" optical shops illustrate. However, the eye
doctors argue vigorously (as my optometrist recently did to me) that new eye
examinations and prescriptions are essential to correct vision changes and
7. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 488.
8. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).

9. Id. at 484.
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detect possible eye diseases such as glaucoma. Having a lens duplicated
without a prescription could endanger one's vision and eye health. That, at
least, is what the eye doctors claim.
That claim persuaded the Oklahoma legislature to pass a law providing
(in pertinent part, as lawyers like to say) that "it [shall be] unlawful for any
person.., to duplicate... [any] lenses... [without a] written prescripti[on]
[from an] ophthalmologist or optometrist."'
The Lee Optical Company
challenged the law in federal district court, filing suit against Oklahoma's
Attorney General, Mac Q. Williamson. The opticians won a judgment that
the law violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
restricting their "liberty" to practice their profession. Williamson appealed to
the Supreme Court on the state's behalf, and won a reversal of the lower
court's decision.1
This was a fairly simple case for the Justices. A long line of precedent,
stretching back to the nineteenth century, proclaimed the principle-as stated
by the Court in Munn v. Illinois12 in 1877-that "[f]or protection against
abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the
courts. 13 In other words, if Oklahoma's opticians did not like the new law,
they should set up a political action committee (EYE-PAC, perhaps) and
lobby for its repeal or revision. In many other cases, including Carolene
Products, the Court had upheld state and federal laws that regulated
"business and industrial conditions" against Due Process Clause
challenges. 14 In most of these cases, the Justices found a "rational basis" for
the law in statements by its sponsors, either in committee hearings or during
floor debate, recorded in the legislative history of the statute.
The Court faced a slight problem in the Lee Optical case. Apparently,
the Oklahoma legislature made no record of its hearings or debates. The
legislative history of the challenged statute did not exist. That did not faze
Justice William 0. Douglas, who wrote for the Court. He simply imagined,
or invented, possible "reasons" the legislators may have advanced for the
law.1 5 Justice Douglas began with an admission that "[t]he Oklahoma law
may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in many cases. But it is for the
legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the
new requirement" that opticians cannot grind lenses without a

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Lee Optical,348 U.S. at 485 (citation omitted).
Id. at 491.
94 U.S. 113 (1876).
Id. at 134.
United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
Lee Optical,348 U.S. at 487.
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prescription. 16 How had the legislature reached that judgment? Justice
Douglas filled in the gaps with speculation. "ITihe legislature might have
concluded," he wrote, that prescriptions were necessary in enough cases to
justify the law.1 7 He used the words "might" and "may" at least a dozen
times in his opinion, with absolutely no support from any record.
What is the relevance of this repeated supposition and speculation to
Justice Rehnquist's citation of Lee Opticalin his Roe opinion? It saved him
the trouble of finding an actual "rational basis" for the Texas law that
criminalized abortions.18 This law, first enacted in 1854, had no recorded
legislative history. 9 The possible reasons for the criminal abortion statute,
advanced by the state's lawyers during oral argument before the Supreme
Court, were totally speculative. The lawyers guessed that "protection of the
mother, at one time," may have been the Texas legislature's intent. 20 The
lawyers also speculated that "when this statute was first passed, there was
some concern for the unborn fetus." 21 Needless to say, the state's lawyers
did not have the faintest support for their speculations. This hardly
constitutes, in my mind, any "rational basis" for the Texas criminal abortion
statute, since no reasons were proffered in any record. Guessing the intent of
long-dead legislators cannot manufacture a "rational basis" for any statute,
unless Madame Blavatsky is sitting next to the judge.
Should this reliance on speculation make any difference to the
legitimacy of the "rational basis" test as applied by Justice Douglas in Lee
Optical and Justice Rehnquist in his Roe opinion? I suggest that it does, by
allowing judges to relieve legislators from their duty to articulate, in some
record, sufficient reasons for their decisions that can be examined for
possible bias or error. Justice Douglas may well have been correct in
imagining what the Oklahoma legislators "might have" intended in passing
their law, but he might equally have been wrong, and the statute may have
suffered from serious defects. We simply have no way of knowing, and the
"rational basis" test does not require that judges know anything about the
"real" reasons any law was adopted. Further, it implies that judges do not,
and should not, care about those reasons.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-19 (1973) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§
1191-1194 (1911)).
19. Id. at 119 (citing 3 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OFTEXAS 1502 (1898)).
20. LANDMARK BREFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, Vol. 75, 802-03 (P. Kurland and G. Casper, eds. 1973).

21. Id. at 803.
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This reliance on the "rational basis" test is the logical extension of legal
positivism. This is the jurisprudential philosophy that any law that is duly
enacted by a legislature is, ipsofacto, constitutional. By his own admission,
Justice Rehnquist is a committed legal positivist. Laws "take on a form of
moral goodness because they have been enacted into positive law," he argued
in the most elaborated statement of his judicial philosophy. 22 Exceptions to
this jurisprudential rule would be hard to find, and would be limited to those
laws that on their face violate an explicit provision of the Constitution. The
"rational basis" test, as applied by Justice Rehnquist, is virtually impossible
to flunk.
I. A QUICK SLAP AT JUSTICE STEWART
It is not entirely fair to blame Justice Rehnquist for his misreading of the
Lee Optical decision, in which Justice Douglas limited the application of the
"rational basis" test to laws that regulated "business and industrial
conditions."23 Of course, Justice Rehnquist (or his clerks) should have
carefully read the Lee Optical opinion and quoted it correctly for the
principle he purported to find in it, that his favored judicial test applied to a
broader range of "social and economic" legislation. For this misreading of
precedent, whether deliberate or not, Justice Rehnquist deserves censure.
However, the real blame for this unwarranted expansion of the Lee Optical
principle rests with Justice Potter Stewart. His 1970 opinion in Dandridgev.
Williams allowed the Court to evade the "strict scrutiny" test in cases that
raised issues of "fundamental rights" and that challenged "suspect
classifications" by legislators. 24
The Dandridge case involved a Maryland law that placed a cap on
welfare payments to families with dependent children.25 The law provided
that families with six or more children could receive no more benefits than
those with five children.26 In other words, the "excess" children received no
money for food or clothing. This law was clearly intended to punish families
(almost all headed by single mothers) who exceeded the state legislature's
notion of proper family size. It would be fatuous to ignore the political and
racial context of this legislation; states like Maryland (and Congress as well)

22. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693,
704 (1976).
23. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,485 (1970).
24. Id. at 471.
25. Id. at 473.
26. Id. at 474.
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were dominated in the late 1960s by conservative white voters who resented
giving their tax dollars to African-American women who kept having
children just to increase their welfare funding. However incorrectly the
voters perceived the welfare issue (in fact, most families who received Aid to
Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") benefits were white), and
however tainted by racial prejudice, they acted on their beliefs. This was the
political reality of those years, however much we may want to erase it from
our memories.
The Supreme Court, speaking through the patrician Justice Stewart,
closed its eyes and ears to this reality. Justice Stewart conceded that the
Maryland law produced "some disparity in grants of welfare payments to the
largest AFDC families." 27 He also conceded that the case "involves the most
basic economic needs of impoverished human beings."
Justice Stewart
further admitted that the "rational basis" cases-including Lee Optical-on
which he relied for precedent "have in the main involved state regulation of
business or industry." 29 So why did he extend the Lee Optical principle,
limited by Justice Douglas to cases involving "business and industrial
conditions," to the much broader category of "social and economic"
legislation? Justice Stewart did not explain this jurisprudential
expansion. He simply wrote the following words: "We recognize the
dramatically real factual difference between the cited cases and this one, but
we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional standard. 30
Why not? The Maryland legislature certainly had a "rational basis" for
the law, in saving taxpayer dollars, but was that enough? Do children have a
"fundamental right" to food and clothing? Or did the legislature create a
"suspect classification" by discriminating between larger and smaller
families, without regard to their needs? These seem to me to be relevant
questions, worthy of judicial scrutiny, but Justice Stewart brushed them
aside, concluding (without any discussion) that the Maryland law did "not
affect[] freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights," presumably the only
rights protected against governmental deprivation.
Am I being unfair to Justice Stewart? After all, the development and
progression of constitutional doctrine requires (in appropriate cases) the
expansion of principles developed in one era to cover situations that arise in
later times. But I think, at least in the Dandridge case, that he stretched the
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 484.
Dandridge,397 U.S. at 508.
Id. at 485.
Id.
Id. at 484.
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Lee Opticalprinciple far beyond the limits that Justice Douglas had intended
to impose on his fellow judges. Justice Rehnquist, in turn, stretched the
Dandridge principle even further, since it would be difficult-if not
impossible-to deny that the abortion question does not raise a "liberty"
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Rehnquist, in fact, conceded
in his Roe dissent that the "liberty" interest "embraces more than the rights
found in the Bill of Rights. 32 Whatever those rights may be, they certainly
require more judicial scrutiny than the "rational basis" test provides, which is
the bare minimum. To hold otherwise is to depreciate those basic
constitutional rights; to see them as deserving of no more judicial scrutiny
than the regulation of the Oklahoma eyeglass business.
Before I let Justice Rehnquist escape from my critical lens, let me point
out that he has continued to cite the Lee Optical case as precedent in dozens
of opinions, both before and after Roe. For example, writing in solo dissent
in 1972, he relied on Lee Optical in arguing that illegitimate children (whose
paternity had been acknowledged by their deceased father) had no right to
benefits granted their legitimate siblings under workmen's compensation law
in Louisiana.33 And in 1986, writing for the Court in a case that upheld the
power of cities to zone "adult theaters" into the boondocks far from
downtown areas, Justice Rehnquist again relied on Lee Optical for support.34
Even on the abortion issue, Justice Rehnquist still trots out his favorite
precedent. Having failed to find the indispensable fifth vote to overturn the
Roe decision, he grudgingly bowed to reality in 1992, when Justices Sandra
O'Connor, David Souter, and Anthony Kennedy wrote (delivering "the
opinion of the Court" in Planned Parenthoodv. Casey35) that "the essential36
holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again reaffirmed."
Justice Rehnquist conceded in his Casey dissent that "[a] woman's interest in
having an abortion is a form of liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause,, 37 but he continued to insist, citing Lee Optical, that "[s]tates may
regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state
interest." 38 In other words, even if a right is protected by the Constitution,
and state laws that deprive someone of that right are subject to the "strict
scrutiny" test, laws that limit the exercise of that right short of absolute
deprivation should be examined under the highly deferential "rational basis"
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 172-73 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 179-80, 183-85 (1972).
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 53 (1986).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
Id. at 846.
Id. at 966.
Id. (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)).
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test. This seems illogical to me, but obviously not to Justice Rehnquist.
Even as he retreats, he defends his remaining ground with great tenacity, inch
by inch.
IV. PREGNANT WOMEN, RAILROAD BERTHS, DIRTY BOOKS, AND BOOKIES

The major purpose of this article is to explore Justice Rehnquist's use of
the Lee Optical case to defend his position that the Constitution does not
imply a "right of privacy" that extends to abortion rights. Yet, it also seems
fair to question whether Justice Blackmun, writing for the Roe majority,
misused or stretched precedent in concluding that the Constitution does
imply these rights. Let us take a look (more briefly than our examination of
the Lee Opticalcase) at the cases Blackmun cited as precedent in concluding
that "a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy, does exist under the Constitution.,, 39 The nine cases he cites for
these propositions, one broad and the other more narrow, are certainly a
mixed bag. 4 The "line of decisions" he cited had no chronological order
(they ranged between 1886 and 1969), but they roughly tracked the
provisions of the Bill of Rights, as Blackmun stacked up his precedential
building blocks.
The first case seems an odd choice. Back in the nineteenth century,
Clara Botsford took a trip on the Union Pacific Railroad and was smacked on
the head by a Pullman berth, "causing a concussion" that left her with "great
suffering and pain to her in body and mind, and in permanent and increasing
injuries. 41 After she filed suit for damages, the railroad's lawyers moved
that Ms. Botsford be required "to submit to a surgical examination" by its
doctors, who agreed not to "expose" her body "in any indelicate
manner." 42 She refused, and the trial judge upheld her objection. 43 The
Supreme Court agreed, holding that compelling anyone, "especially a
woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit it to the touch of a stranger,

39. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
40. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Boyd

v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
41. Botsford, 141 U.S. at 250.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 251.
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without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault and a trespass" in
violation of "common law" principles.44
But the Supreme Court went further in its Union Pacific Railway Co. v.
Botsford opinion. "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law,"
wrote Justice Horace Gray. 4 "As well said by Judge Cooley," Gray
continued, "'The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete
immunity: to be let alone."' 46 Justice Gray quoted in this passage from the
leading treatise on torts by the leading constitutional scholar of those times,
Judge Thomas Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court. 47 Cooley was best
known for his massive book, A Treatise on ConstitutionalLimitations, first
published in 1868, which elevated the "freedom of contract" to the
constitutional pantheon, from which it was finally dislodged
by the Supreme
48
Court during the "Constitutional Revolution" of 1937.
Judge Cooley was not, however, the judicial reactionary that his
writings on economics seem to suggest. He was more of a nineteenth
century "liberal;" what we might now label as a "libertarian." His term, "the
right to be let alone," was later appropriated by Louis Brandeis, the "people's
lawyer," who joined the Supreme Court in 1916. It is ironic that the "right to
be let alone," which the Supreme Court first applied in a railroad tort case,
was transmuted by Louis Brandeis into a "right of privacy" that he first
applied to the field of commercial advertising. The long road from Botsford
to Roe wound through some very strange byways.
Brandeis actually invented "the right to privacy" before the Supreme
Court decided the Botsford case, in a seminal HarvardLaw Review article he
wrote (with Joseph Warren) in 1890 with that title. 49 Brandeis even used the
term "the right to life" in this article, although he employed it in a much
different sense than opponents of abortion now do. His article rejected the
rigid formalism of nineteenth-century jurisprudence; it reflected the rapid
growth of technology that propelled American society toward the twentieth
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 252.
Id. at 251.
Botsford, 141 U.S. at 251 (citation omitted).
THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

438
(1868).
48. Id.
49. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(6th ed. 1890).
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION
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century. "Political, social, and economic changes entail the recognition of
new rights," Brandeis wrote, "and the common law, in its eternal youth,
grows to meet the demands of society. 50 He noted that "in very early times"
the "right to life" afforded protection only against "battery in its various
foms" But, he continued, "now the right to life has come to mean the right
to enjoy life,--the right to be let alone."52
Significantly, Brandeis did not direct this "right to be let alone" against
state intrusion, but that of private individuals and corporations. He wanted
the common law to protect the individual's name and likeness from
commercial exploitation or exposure. "Instantaneous photographs and
newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life," Brandeis complained, "and numerous mechanical devices
threaten[ed] to" invade personal privacy.53 He referred to the case of Marion
Manola, a Broadway actress whose "appearance in tights" had been
"photographed surreptitiously and without her consent" and used for
advertising purposes by the "Castle in the Air" company. 54 Long before the
National Enquirer appeared on supermarket racks, Brandeis decried "the
invasion of privacy by the newspapers" and urged that "the law must afford
some remedy" to people like Marion Manola. 55
Having invented the "right to privacy" in the Harvard Law Review,
Brandeis repeated the term (and big chunks of his article) in later Supreme
Court opinions. Among the "mechanical devices" he had warned against in
1890 was the microphone, which could be attached to a telephone and
hooked up to a recording machine. 56 These three "recent inventions"
threatened, he wrote, "to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in
the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.' ' '57 Prophetically,
Brandeis had foreseen in 1890 the telephone wire-ta~ping that he denounced
in 1928, dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, 8 in which the Court's
majority upheld a federal law that authorized the interception and recording
of telephone conversations in criminal cases. 59 "The makers of our
Constitution," Brandeis chastised his colleagues, had "conferred, as against
50. Id. at 193.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 195.
54. Warren, supra note 49, at 195 n.7.

55. Id. at 195.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

59. Id. at 440.
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the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men." 6
Justice Blackmun approvingly cited Brandeis' Olmstead dissent in his
Roe opinion.
Blackmun also cited a 1969 Supreme Court opinion that
quoted extensively from this dissenting opinion, a case that reversed a
criminal conviction for possession of pornographic movies. 62 The Court's
opinion in Stanley v. Georgia,63 holding that the First Amendment protects
"the right to receive information and ideas" from state intrusion, relied on
Brandeis's Olmstead dissent for the proposition that the Constitution
embodies a "fundamental . . . right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's
privacy." 64 Mr. Stanley certainly did not want the State of Georgia to restrict
his right "to receive information and ideas" from the raunchy movies he
concealed in his dresser drawers. But does this case really help Justice
Blackmun to answer the abortion question?
Some of the other cases cited by Justice Blackmun in his Roe opinion
seem even less supportive of the "right to privacy" than the Stanley
decision. Blackmun traced one of the "roots" of privacy rights to the Fourth
Amendment's protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures" by
government agents. 65 However, the Supreme Court opinions he cited on this
issue have only tenuous connections to this constitutional root. Along with
Brandeis' Olmstead dissent, Justice Blackmun cited two later decisions, one
involving a federal prosecution for placing sporting bets from a telephone
booth, and the other a state prosecution for possession of concealed
weapons. In the "bookie" case of Katz v. United States,66 the Court adopted
the position Brandeis had advocated in his Olmstead dissent, but with
significant limitations. 67 The Court's majority in Katz held that "the Fourth
Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to
privacy. ' ' 68 Citing the 1890 HarvardLaw Review article by Warren and
Brandeis, the Court noted that "protection of a person's general right to
privacy-his right to be let alone by other people-is, like the protection of
60. Id. at 478.
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
62. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
63. Id. at 557.
64. Id. at 564 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
65. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
66. Id. at 347.
67. Id. at 352.
68. Id. at 350.
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his property
and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual
69
States.
If the Katz case did not offer Justice Blackmun much support for his
Roe opinion, the Court's 1968 decision in Terry v. Ohio" offered even
less. In this criminal case, the defendant had been convicted of carrying a
concealed weapon. 7' A suspicious police officer observed two men who had
been pacing up and down the sidewalk outside a Cleveland jewelry
store. His search revealed a loaded pistol in a pocket of Terry's overcoat.7 2
Upholding this "stop and frisk" search against a Fourth Amendment
challenge, Chief Justice Earl Warren cited and quoted from the Botsford and
Katz opinions for the proposition that individuals are "entitled to be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion" into their privacy.73 But Warren noted
that "the specific content and incidents of this right must be shaped by the
context in which it is asserted." 74 In his Terry opinion, Warren
did not find a
75
"privacy" right that prevailed over the government's interest.
Two of the other cases that Justice Blackmun cited for support in his
Roe opinion did not use the term "privacy" or come even close to the
abortion issue. In 1923, the Supreme Court struck down a Nebraska lawenacted during World War One-that banned the teaching of German in
public schools.76 The Court's decision in Meyer v. Nebraska interpreted the
"liberty" interest of the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting "those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men." 78 That statement did not move Justice Blackmun
very far on his journey toward abortion rights.
Even less helpful was Blackmun's citation to Palko v. Connecticut,79
decided in 1937. This bizarre case involved a man who had been convicted
of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.80 The State appealed and was
granted a new trial.81 The jury in the second trial convicted him again and
69. Id. at 350-51.
70. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).

71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 9.
Id.

75. Terry, 392 U.S. at 9.
76. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

77. Id. at 390.
78. Id. at 399.
79. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).

80. Id. at 321.
81. Id.
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sentenced Palko to die in the electric chair.82 His lawyers appealed to the
Supreme Court, citing the Fifth Amendment provision that protects any
person from being subjected "for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb. 83 The Supreme Court rejected Palko's appeal,
ruling that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution did not bind the
states to the federal rule.84 The Justices further held that constitutional rights
such as trial by jury and prosecution by grand jury indictment "are not of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."'s The Palko decision, which
cost the hapless defendant his life, was a very shaky precedent for Justice
Blackmun's later claim in his Roe opinion that the Texas criminal abortion
statute violated any right of privacy.
V. WHOSE THUMB WEIGHS HEAVIER ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SCALE?

Justice Rehnquist cited only one case, Williamson v. Lee Optical, to
support his proposition that the Constitution does not imply a "right of
privacy" that can be extended to protect abortion rights. 86 Justice Blackmun
cited nine cases to support his contrary position.
Which of these two
Justices bested the other in this constitutional conflict? Blackmun had both
cases and votes on his side in Roe v. Wade. Seven Justices-including Chief
88
Justice Warren Burger-joined the majority opinion in the Roe decision.
That majority eroded as public opinion shifted on the abortion
issue. Writing for the Court in 1989, Justice Rehnquist (who succeeded
Burger as Chief Justice in 1986) upheld significant restrictions on abortion
rights in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.89 Rehnquist employed the
"rational basis" test to endorse state laws that barred doctors from
"'encouraging or counseling' a woman to have an abortion not necessary to
save her life," and that subjected doctors to criminal penalties if they failed to
perform tests of fetal "viability" on women that they had "reason to believe"
82. Id.
83. Id. at 322 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
84. Palko, 302 U.S. at 323.

85. Id. at 325.
86. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
88. Roe, 410 U.S. at 115.
89. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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were pregnant for twenty weeks or more. 90 The Webster decision, which in
effect stationed police officers inside doctors' offices, did not overrule Roe,
but it deployed the "rational basis" test to undermine a ruling based on the
judicial standard of "strict scrutiny" of laws that implicated constitutional
rights. 91
In the Webster case in 1989, Justice Rehnquist fell short by one vote of
his long-proclaimed goal of applying the "rational basis" test to the abortion
question, and thereby reversing the Roe decision. Three years later, in the
Casey decision in 1992, Rehnquist lost even more ground.92 Only Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas (both fervent Roman Catholics) joined
Rehnquist (a Calvinist Lutheran) in voting to overturn Roe.93 Was it
religious persuasion or belief in the "rational basis" test that influenced
judicial votes in the Casey decision? In my opinion, neither of these factors
determined the outcome. Justice Anthony Kennedy, who voted in Casey to
"reaffirm" the central holding of the Roe case, was an equally fervent Roman
Catholic and a former alter boy. But Kennedy believed that his "personal
reluctance" to uphold abortion rights must yield to his conviction that "the
Court's legitimacy depends on
94 making legally principled decisions" that will
be "accepted by the Nation.
Justice Kennedy's reference to the public's perception of the Court's
"legitimacy" introduces a new factor into the judicial balancing of individual
rights and state powers. The "strict scrutiny" and "rational basis" tests of
legislation both focus their judicial lenses on lawmakers. In contrast, the
"legitimacy" test looks to the public for support. The triumvirate of
Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter called on "the contending sides of a national
controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate
rooted in the Constitution."95 However, that mandate was not rooted in any
explicit or even implicit constitutional provision. It rested, Kennedy
explained, in the Court's reluctance to "surrender to political pressure" and to
"overrule under fire" a "watershed decision" upon which an entire generation
of women had relied.9 6
Where does the Casey decision leave us in deciding whether Justice
Rehnquist or Justice Blackmun had the stronger argument in the Roe
case? In my opinion, Justice Kennedy lured the Court down an enticing, but
90. Id. at 501.
91. Id. at 503.
92. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
93. Id. at 833.
94. Id. at 866.

95. Id. at 867.
96. Id.
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dangerous, bypass of the constitutional crossroad that Rehnquist and
Blackmun forced us to confront. The "rational basis" road on which
Rehnquist travels has few bumps or potholes. Under the doctrine of legal
positivism, whatever the legislature enacts is constitutional, with only the
most egregious exceptions. The "strict scrutiny" road on which Blackmun
crosses this judicial intersection forces judges to look closely at the
"compelling state interest" in the challenged legislation. It requires more of
judges, but it also requires more of legislators, which I consider a good
thing. All too often, elected officials become what Justice Robert Jackson
called "village tyrants" in bowing to popular demands to punish an unpopular
group or criminalize unpopular behavior.97 The more that such officials
know their actions will face the "strict scrutiny" of judges who need not fear
electoral retribution, the more (hopefully) they will think before they vote.
To my mind, it is ironic that Justice Rehnquist clerked for Justice
Jackson, whose 1943 opinion in West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette98 remains the classic statement of the limits of the "rational basis"
test. The right of a state to regulate a business (i.e., eyeglasses), includes the
"power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a
'rational basis' for adopting," he wrote.99 "But freedoms of speech and of
press, of assembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender
grounds."' ° Jackson widened his judicial vision. "One's right to life,
liberty, and property," he added, "and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."' 0'1 It may be
presumptuous for me to suggest that Justice Rehnquist dig out Volume 319
of the United States Reports and read Justice Jackson's majestic opinion in
the Barnette case. If he does, and if he thinks about the spirit of Jackson's
words, I hope he will conclude that laws designed to punish women who
choose abortion over childbirth deserve "more exacting judicial scrutiny"
than laws that regulate the eyeglass industry.

97. West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
98. Id. at 624.
99. Id. at 639.

100. Id.
101. Id. at 638.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Prior to his elevation to Chief Justice of the United States in 1986,
Associate Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist was not often viewed as a
champion of the First Amendment. He had, in fact, authored or joined in
Supreme Court opinions having the effect of limiting free
speech.' Generally, in clashes between government power and individual
rights, Justice Rehnquist was among the Justices most consistently siding
with the former.2 Aggravating the matter, the Justice whose title Rehnquist
1. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); FCC
v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983);
Board of Ed., Island Trees Free Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mn.
Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orioto, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
2. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649 (1984); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981);
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Vance v. Bradley, 440
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was to assume, Warren E. Burger, had written or joined a number of
important First Amendment opinions3 broadly interpreting the constitutional
right to freedom of speech and of the press during his career as Chief
Justice.4 Was the First Amendment in for an overhaul in the new "Rehnquist
Court?"
Because the vote of the Chief Justice counts no more than the vote of
any other Justice, it is unrealistic to assume that Rehnquist, even if he
wanted to as the new Chief, could steer the Supreme Court in any given
direction on any given issue. But Rehnquist became Chief Justice at a time
when the Court was in transition. Additionally, other personnel changes in
the Court did not seem to bode well for free speech advocates. Justice Potter
Stewart, one of the Court's legendary First Amendment champions, had left
the bench five years earlier to be replaced by Justice Sandra O'Connor, who
would be less passionate about First Amendment freedoms. The retiring
Justice Warren Burger was replaced by Antonin Scalia in 1986; Justice
Lewis Powell would soon be replaced by Anthony Kennedy in 1988; Justice
William Brennan by David Souter in 1990; Justice Thurgood Marshall by
Clarence Thomas in 1991; Justice Byron White by Ruth Bader Ginsburg in
1993; and Justice Harry Blackmun by Stephen Breyer in 1994. With the
single exception of Justice White5 being replaced by Ruth Ginsburg, each
U.S. 93 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Fronterio v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
3. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539 (1976); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
4. Notwithstanding his appreciation for First Amendment interests, former Chief Justice
Burger was notorious for his clashes with news reporters. See Nina Totenberg & Fred
Barbash, BurgerLoved The Law But Not The Hassle, WASH. POST, June 22, 1986, at COI.
5. During his tenure on the Court, Justice Byron White was considered somewhat
antagonistic to the news media. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176-77 (1979) (holding
that it does not violate freedom of the press to allow libel plaintiffs to inquire into journalists'
"editorial thought processes"); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1978)
(holding that newsrooms are not exempt from police searches, irrespective of whether anyone
in the newsroom is suspected of wrongdoing, provided requirements for search warrant are
met, but Justice White was mixed on issues of free speech generally); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 679-80 (1972) (holding that journalists have no First Amendment right to refuse to
testify before a grand jury about information obtained from confidential sources). See, e.g.,
Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560 (1991); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364
(1984); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282
(1982) (White, J., dissenting) (favoring limitations); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980)
(supporting free speech); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Elrod v. Bums, 427
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Justice was at least "perceived" to have been succeeded by a Justice less
sympathetic to First Amendment values.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that early apprehensions of
the Court were unjustified and to show how the Rehnquist Court today holds
steady in its solicitude for freedom of speech. As are the cases before it, the
Rehnquist court is surely different from the predecessor Burger Court. But
on the tough, politically charged, and socially sensitive issues, the Rehnquist
Court has shown impressive allegiance to First Amendment principles.
While this article focuses mainly on issues of freedom of speech, it is the
writer's view that the same allegiance can be found in 6the Rehnquist Court's
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

U.S. 347 (1976); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the FCC's
subsequently abandoned "fairness doctrine" requiring radio and television stations to air both
sides 6f important issues).
6. It is true that the Court has allowed greater accommodation of religion by the state.
See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2018-19 (1997) (allowing public school teachers to
teach remedial courses in parochial schools); Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 837
(1995) (requiring a state university to provide religious publication the same financial support
accorded other student publications); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384 (1993) (requiring a school system to provide equal access for religious activities); Board
of Educ. of Westside Comm. Sch. v. Mergans, 496 U.S. 226, 247 (1990) (requiring school
systems to provide religious groups the same access accorded nonreligious groups); Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993) (finding no Establishment Clause
violation in the state providing sign language interpreters for hearing impaired students in
church run schools); But by and large, the Court has maintained a tradition of separation of
church and state. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) (finding an
Establishment Clause violation in allowing members of the clergy to offer invocations or
benedictions at public school commencement ceremonies); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 730 (1994) (creating a public school district to
specifically accommodate disabled children of orthodox religious sect violates the
Establishment Clause); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (invalidating municipal ordinance against animal sacrifice on Free
Exercise grounds). The Court's general adherence to precedent in the above cases is
remarkable given the widely acknowledged dissatisfaction by a majority of the current Justices
with the still controlling "Lemon Test." See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192
(1973). "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys." Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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I. THE CONFLICT

Freedom of speech is as fundamental a value of American culture as it
is of constitutional law. Like motherhood and apple pie, it cannot be
challenged or threatened in the abstract. It never is. The most serious
challenges and threats to free speech always occur when it must be balanced
against other cherished values, such as protecting the American flag or
insulating children from the evils of pornography and indecency. Is speech
still to be deemed "free" when invoked as a weapon of racial hatred?
If the First Amendment protects the most desirable speech, it must also
protect that which is least desirable or its guarantees would be meaningless.
In the last decade, the Rehnquist Court was faced with balancing free speech
against all of these other important, rival interests noted above and, in each
case, free speech prevailed.
JR. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND FLAG DESECRATION
Few issues have given the Court more difficulty than deciding whether
desecration of the American flag is protected by the First Amendment. The
First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only of "speech," but the
Court has long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or
written word.
The Court has acknowledged that "conduct" may be
"sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the
scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 8 In United States v.
O'Brien,9 the Burger Court had previously held that incidental limitations on
expressive conduct, such as burning one's draft card, could be punished if
doing so served an important governmental interest unrelated to suppression
of expression.10
The Court's first opportunity to apply the O'Brien decision to the issue
of flag desecration arose out of a political demonstration during the 1984
Republican National Convention to protest the policies of the Reagan
administration. After a march through the streets of Dallas, Gregory Johnson
burned an American flag while protesters chanted." No one was physically
injured or threatened with injury, although several witnesses were seriously

7. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
8. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
9. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

10. Id. at 377.
11. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399.
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offended by the flag burning.12 Johnson was 13
convicted of desecration of a
venerated object in violation of a Texas statute.
Occurring as it did at the end of a demonstration coinciding with the
Republican National Convention, there was never much question that
Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct. The Court
invalidated Johnson's conviction, finding that it was directly related to the
suppression of expression.15 Justice Brennan, for the Court, wrote: "If there
is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." 16
Justice Brennan was, in his day, the Court's premier liberal advocate
and frequently its most articulate proponent of free speech. Accordingly, in
Johnson, he waxed eloquent:
We can imagine no more appropriate response to burning a flag
than waving one's own, no better way to counter a flag burner's
message than by saluting the flag that bums, no surer means of
preserving the dignity even of the flag that burned than by-as one
witness here did-according its remains a respectful burial. We do
not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so
we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.17
The majority opinion in Johnson drew some bitter, and equally forceful,
dissents. s Chief Justice Rehnquist: "The government may conscript men
into the Armed Forces where they must fight and perhaps die for the flag,
but the government may not prohibit the public burning of the banner under
which they fight. I would uphold the Texas statute as applied in this case." 19
Justice Stevens, dissenting separately, stated:
The ideas of liberty and equality have been an irresistible force in
motivating leaders like Patrick Henry, Susan B. Anthony, and
Abraham Lincoln, schoolteachers like Nathan Hale and Booker T.
Washington, the Philippine Scouts who fought at Bataan, and the
soldiers who scaled the bluff at Omaha Beach. If those ideas are

12. Id.
13. Id. at 400 (citing 'lEx.PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (1989)).
14. Id. at 400-02.

15. Id. at 399.
16. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
17. Id. at 420.
18. Id. at 421.
19. Id. at 435 (White & O'Connor, RI., joining in dissenting opinion).
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worth fighting for-and our history demonstrates that they are-it
cannot be true that the flag that uniquely symbolizes their power
is
20
not itself worthy of protection from unnecessary desecration.
But perhaps the most intriguing, and to some surprising, opinion was
authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, who provided the crucial fifth vote
for the majority:
The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do
not like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense
that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the
result. And so great is our commitment to the process that, except
in the rare case, we do not pause to express distaste for the result,
perhaps for fear of undermining a valued principle that dictates the
decision. This is one of those rare cases ....

•.. I do not believe the Constitution gives us the right to rule as
the dissenting Members of the Court urge, however painful this
judgment is to announce. Though symbols often are what we
ourselves make of them, the flag is constant in expressing beliefs
Americans share, beliefs in law and peace and that freedom which
sustains the human spirit. The case here today forces recognition
of the costs to which those beliefs commit us. It is poignant but
21
fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it in contempt.
Kennedy's opinion was particularly curious in that he was a Reagan
appointee who many anticipated would embrace the Reagan Justice
Department's view that flag burning is not within free speech
protection. Kennedy was the third choice for the seat vacated by retiring
Justice Lewis Powell. President Reagan's first choice was Robert Bork, who
has written critically of the Johnson decision 22 and who, if confirmed,
presumably would have provided the fifth vote to uphold Johnson's
conviction and the Texas law.23

20. Id. at 439.
21. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420-21.
22. ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING ToWARDs GOMoRRAH: MODERN LIBERAUSM AND

AMERICAN DECLINE 99-101 (1996).
23. Much to the dismay of many conservative Republicans and the Justice Department
of the Bush administration, Justice Kennedy not only provided the crucial fifth vote but wrote
the decision of the Court in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) (rejecting the Bush
Administration's position that brief religious ceremonies at public school commencement
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Public outrage over the outcome in Johnson was so intense and negative
that, within four months of the Court's decision, Congress passed the Flag
Protection Act of 198924 making it a "federal" crime, punishable by up to a
year in prison, for anyone who "knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically
defiles, bums, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of
the United States."' It would not take long for challenges to the new federal
law to reach the Supreme Court, with the Bush administration urging that
Johnson be reconsidered.26 If the Court were to decline the invitation, the
Administration argued that the Johnson decision did not foreclose the
validity of the Flag Protection Act of 1989 in light of Congress' considered
legislative judgment that there is a compelling national interest in protecting
the flag.27 The Court has, in the past, held that Congress has greater
authority to define the national interest than any state.28 But the Court still
declined the invitation to reconsider Johnson and rejected the
Administration's constitutional arguments on the merits. 29 The vote was
identical to that in Johnson,
5-4, with Justice Brennan again writing the
30
decision for the Court.
IV. FREEDOM OF SPEECH, INDECENCY, AND PORNOGRAPHY

In 1979, the Burger Court emphatically recognized society's interest in
protecting children from indecency and pornography in Federal
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, often referred to as
"The Seven Dirty Words Case." The Court also noted special hazards posed

ceremonies do not violate the Establishment Clause). Kennedy also provided the fifth vote in
PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), which reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.

113 (1973). Both decisions have been sharply criticized by Robert Bork in

SLoucHING

TowARDs GOMORRAH. See BoRK, supra note 22. Had Bork been confirmed as a Supreme

Court Justice, he likely would have cast the pivotal votes to turn the Court around.
I
24. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1994) (originally enacted as Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-131, §§ 2-3, 103 Stat. 777(1989)).
25. Id. § 700 (a)(1).
26. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
27. Brief for the United States, United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (No. 891433); Brief for the United States, United States v. Haggerty, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (No. 891434).
28. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (upholding federal set-aside
program for minority contractors); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486
(1989) (rejecting set-aside program for minority contractors adopted by municipality).
29. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 312.

30. Id.
31. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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by broadcasting that would resonate through later cases, including a
landmark decision a generation later involving indecency on the Internet.3
At issue in Pacifica was a federal regulation 33 which prohibited the use
of "indecent or profane language by means of radio communications. ' 34 A
radio station owned by the Pacifica Foundation made an afternoon broadcast
of a satiric monologue, entitled "Filthy Words," which listed and repeated a
variety of colloquial uses of "words you couldn't say on the public...
airwaves.,, 35 The Federal Communication Committee ("FCC") found that
language in the monologue depicted sexual and excretory activities in a
particularly offensive manner, and noted that they were broadcast in the
early afternoon "when children are undoubtedly in the audience."' 36 The
FCC concluded that the language as broadcast was indecent and could be
prohibited.37
Pacifica challenged the application of the FCC regulation to its
38
broadcast as a violation of free speech but lost, 5-4, in the Supreme Court.
Justice John Paul Stevens, for the Court, wrote: "[O]f all forms of
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection;" 39 a result Justice Stevens justified, in part, by
noting that radio broadcasts extend into "the privacy of the home," where
they are "uniquely accessible to children." 4 Of the five Justices in the
majority, only Justices Rehnquist and Stevens remain on the Court. All four
dissenters, however, have now left the Court. The Burger Court's resolution
of the Pacifica case would seem to have created a framework for further
regulation of electronic broadcasting by the subsequent, and decidedly more
conservative, Rehnquist Court. However, that was not to be the case.
In Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,4 1 the new
Rehnquist Court was confronted with a question raising issues that seemed
identical to those in Pacifica.42 If Congress could prohibit or restrict the
transmission of indecent radio broadcasts in the interest of protecting
children, could it do the same when the transmission is of indecent interstate

32. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1973).
34. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 731.

35. Id. at 729.
36. Id. at 732.

37. Id.
38. Id.at751.
39. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748.

40. Id. at 748-49.
41. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
42. Id.at 117-19.
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commercial telephone messages, commonly known as "dial-a-porn?" 43
Relying on the Court's decision in Pacifica, the Justice Department argued
in the affirmative. 4 However, dividing 6-3, the Rehnquist Court found in
the negative.4 5
The Court noted that "dial-a-porn" had become big business, 4 and in
New York City alone, the "dial-a-por" service "received six to seven
million calls a month for the 6-month period ending in April 1985." 47 And
much like the indecent broadcasts at issue in Pacifica,"dial-a-porn" services
were also accessible, although not perhaps as accessible, to children in the
privacy of the home. 48 The Court acknowledged that the government had a
"compelling interest of preventing minors from being exposed to indecent
telephone messages," 49 but in this case Congress had gone too far, and its
ban had "the invalid effect of limiting the content of adult telephone
conversations to that which is suitable for children to hear. It is another case
of 'burn[ing] the house to roast the pig."'5 0
There is no doubt that the government could not proscribe the indecent,
although non-obscene, telephone messages in Sable from being printed in a
newspaper, 51 and Pacifica indicated the messages could be banned from
radio and, presumably, television broadcasts.52 In 1997, the question arose
as to how the Court should view "indecent" communications on the
Internet. 3 The Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA") 54 made it a
crime to display "indecent" material online in a manner that might make it
available to minors.55 Key portions of the law had been found to violate free
speech by a special three judge district court.5 6 By the time the case reached
the Rehnquist Court, there seemed to be a growing consensus that the
43. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988). "The statute, as amended in 1988, imposed an outright
ban on indecent as well as obscene interstate commercial telephone messages." Sable, 492
U.S. at 117.

44. Id. at 127.
45. Id. at 131.
46. Id. at 120 n.3 (citing Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846, 848 (2d

Cir. 1986)).
47. Id.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28.
Id. at 131.
Id. (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476

(1957).
52. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 738.
53. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997).
54. 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)(1)(B)-(2), (d)(1)(2).

55. Id.
56. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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Justices would also find the provisions unconstitutional.57 But what would
be the basis of such a ruling? How would the Internet be viewed; what
"test" would the Court apply to cyberspace speech; and should the Court
treat it as it treated broadcasting in Pacifica? It has been argued that if there
ever were a place "uniquely accessible to children" 58 in the privacy of the
home, it would be cyberspace.5 9 But unlike radio and television, indecent
online messages are not likely to be found by accident or by merely changing
stations. They must be intentionally sought, as might sexually explicit
messages available through "dial-a-porn." 6 Would that not make Sable the
more applicable precedent?
In what has been called "the legal birth certificate of the Internet,"' the
Rehnquist Court, in a sweeping ruling, found cyberspace entitled to6freater
The
protection than either broadcasting or telephone communications.
Court struck down the CDA regulations as "content-based" and therefore
subject to the most rigorous scrutiny.63 The Justices were unanimous in the
result, differing only on the scope of relief,64 with Justice Stevens writing for
a seven Justice majority: "The interest in encouraging freedom of
expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven
benefit of censorship. 65
The Court flatly rejected comparisons between the Internet and
broadcasting, finding the latter considerably more accessible and intrusive,
and thus more subject to regulation. 66 Veteran court watcher and author,
Stephen J. Wermiel, called the decision an "intrepid First Amendment step
into cyberspace" with a message that was "loud and clear that the Court
as a new forum for the open exchange of ideas and
views the Internet
67
information."

57. John M. Broder, White House Is Set to Ease Its Stance on Internet Smut, N.Y.
TIMES, June,16, 1997, at 3A.
58. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 749.
59. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
60. Sable, 492 U.S. 115.
61. Edward Felsenthal & Jared Sandberg, High Court Strikes Down InternetSmut Law,
WALL ST. J.,
June 27, 1997, at BI (quoting Bruce Ennis). Bruce Ennis argued the case in the
Supreme Court on behalf of a coalition of civil rights and other groups opposed to the
Communication Decency Act of 1996. Id.
62. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351.
63. Id. at 2348.
64. Id. at 2351.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 2342.
67. Stephen Wermiel, "Let Them Talk Among Themselves," LEGAL TIMEs, July 14,
1997, at S46.
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The Court, however, has neither been free of concerns about indecency
nor entertained doubts about the right of democratically elected
representatives to address its perceived harms through appropriate
legislation. One of the more interesting and amusing, yet important,
confrontations in this area came before the Rehnquist Court in Barnes v.
Glen Theater,Inc. 68 The case involved a South Bend, Indiana night club, the
Kitty Kat Lounge, and two of its employees, all of whom wanted to provide
"totally nude dancing" as entertainment.69 These parties claimed that the
state's public indecency law, which requires dancers to wear at least pasties
and a G-string, violates their First Amendment right to freedom of
expression. 70

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sharply
divided en banc and sided with the plaintiffs by ruling that nonobscene nude
dancing performed for entertainment is protected expression and that the
state law was an improper infringement on that activity "because its purpose
was to prevent
the message of eroticism and sexuality conveyed by the
71
dancers."
Dividing 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit en

banc. 72 In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed that totally

nude dancing is "expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment 7 3 but, citing the four-part "O'Brien test," 74 concluded that the,

68. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
69. Id. at 563.
70. Id. at 564.
71. Id. at 565 (citing Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1990)). The decision of the Seventh Circuit, per Judge Richard Posner, and the dissent, per
Judge Frank Easterbrook, provide powerful and enlightening, but sharply opposing,
viewpoints of the history and scope of freedom of expression embodied in the First
Amendment. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089, 1120 (7th Cir. 1990).
Could nude dancing and its "message of 'eroticism"' have been what the framers had
contemplated protecting in drafting the First Amendment? Id. at 1118. The appeals court's
conflicting rationales are highly recommended for an extensive explanation of these topics.
72. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565.
73. Id. at 566.
74. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Court found that a government
regulation is:
[S]ufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 376-77. O'Brien burned his draft card on the steps of the South Boston courthouse in
the presence of a sizable crowd; he was convicted of violating a statute that prohibited the
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statute is justified despite "its incidental limitations on some expressive
activity. 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist found that "the statute's purpose of
protecting societal order and morality is clear from its text and history" and
that the law "reflect[s] moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude
among strangers in public places;" that it "furthers a substantial government
interest in protecting order and morality; '76 and "is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression."77
V. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND RACIALLY MOTIVATED HATE CRIMES

How to grapple with lingering racial hostilities in the United States has
long been an issue that has divided the country. The issue generated
remarkable division in the Supreme Court in 1992, when the Justices agreed
to decide the constitutionality of a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance-similar to
ordinances in many cities and laws in forty states-that prohibited "hate
crimes. ' 8 The ordinance defined "hate crimes" as the display of a symbol
which one knows or has reason to know "arouses anger, alarm or resentment
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." 79 In R.A. V. v.
City of St. Paul, Minnesota,80 the ordinance was being applied for the first
time against seventeen-year-old Robert A. Viktora, who had been accused of
burning a cross on the front lawn of an African-American family that had
just moved into the neighborhood. Viktora challenged the ordinance as a
violation of free speech. 2 In a 9-0 decision, the Justices agreed for sharply
different reasons,3 revealing a deep philosophical divide on the Court over
the scope of free speech and the meaning of the Court's own First
Amendment jurisprudence.
Justice Scalia, writing for the five Justices in the majority, 4 said
although the cross burning was "reprehensible," the St. Paul ordinance
violated free speech, and therefore Viktora could not be prosecuted under an

knowing destruction or mutilation of such a card. Id. at 369. The Supreme Court affirmed.
Id. at 377.
75. Barnes,501 U.S. at 567.
76. Id. at 569.
77. Id. at 568-70.
78. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
79. Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., CRIMNAL ORDINANCE CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
80. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
81. Id. at 379-80.
82. Id. at 380.
83. Id. at 381.
84. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined the
majority opinion.
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unconstitutional statute.85 To Justice Scalia, it was as if a city council,
having the authority to ban obscenity, chose to enact an ordinance
prohibiting only those legally obscene works that contain criticism of the
city government.8 6 "Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that the
city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas."8 7 The St. Paul
ordinance, concluded Scalia, fostered an unconstitutional88 content-based
discrimination "silencing speech on the basis of its content."
The Supreme Court of Minnesota sought to save the ordinance by
giving it the most narrow construction, 9 concluding that it only reached
those expressions that constitute "fighting words" within the meaning of
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,90 which have no First Amendment protection
and which the state has the power to proscribe. 91 But Justice Scalia, for the
Court, said St. Paul had erred in singling out certain kinds of "fighting
words" for special condemnation. 92 The ordinance imposed special
prohibitions on those speakers who express views on the "disfavored
subjects" of race, color, creed, religion, or gender while at the same time the
ordinance permitted displays containing abusive invective as long as they
were not addressed to those topics. 93 In addition to "content discrimination,"
Justice Scalia went on to find that the St. Paul ordinance also amounted to
unconstitutional "viewpoint discrimination" in that displays containing
"fighting words" that do not relate to race, color, creed, or gender would
seemingly be useable by those arguing in favor of racial tolerance and
equality but not by their opponents.9 4 "St. Paul has no such authority to
license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to
follow Marquis of Queensbery rules."9 5
Seldom in the Court's history has a majority opinion evoked such
vitriol in a concurring opinion, from Justices who agreed with the result but

85. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 394.
88. Id. at 392.
89. Id. at 385. It is settled that the United States Supreme Court is bound by the
construction given a state law or municipal ordinance by that state's highest court. Posadas de
P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 339 (1986); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.

747,769 n.24 (1982).
90. 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (holding that "fighting words" have no First Amendment

protection).
91. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 391-92.
Id. at 392.
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disagreed with how the Court's majority had reached the decision. 96 Justice
White, writing for the concurrence 97 dismissed the Court's opinion as "arid
and folly" and "transparently wrong., 98 Where Justice Scalia seemed to
view the ordinance as underinclusive, allowing offensive speech on some
issues but not others, Justice White viewed the problem as one of
overbreadth, allowing criminal penalties not only for unprotected expression
but for expression protected by the First Amendment as well. 99 To Justice
White, the problem was that speech or expressive activity that merely
"causes hurt feeling, offense, or resentment" is nonetheless protected by the
First Amendment.' w St. Paul's proscription of such speech was thus "fatally
overbroad and invalid on its face."''1 1 In the view of Justice White and the
three other Justices who joined his opinion, a more carefully drafted law
with the same end but directed only at "fighting words" rather than words
that are merely obnoxious, insulting, or otherwise offensive, would face no
First Amendment obstacle.10 2
Yet to the many civil rights groups that had urged the Court to uphold
the St. Paul ordinance,10 3 it was not the Court's hotly disputed reasoning but
the result of the unanimous decision that was most worrisome. The decision
had placed a constitutional cloud over another popular legislative approach
to the hate crime issue: punishing existing crimes like vandalism or
harassment more severely if prosecutors can show that racial, religious, or
96. See generally R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 397 (White, J., concurring).
97. Justices White, Blackman, and O'Connor concurred with Justice Stevens joining in
part.
98. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 398, 415 (White, J., concurring). The Court's "decision is an
arid, doctrinaire interpretation, driven by the frequently irresistible impulse of judges to tinker
with the First Amendment. The decision is mischievous at best and will surely confuse the
lower courts. I join the judgment, but not the folly of the opinion." Id.
99. Id. at 397.
100. Id. at 414 (White, J., concurring).
101. Id.
102. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 414. Justice Scalia's concern that lawmakers may not regulate
some fighting words more strictly than others might conceivably have been ameliorated had
St. Paul merely added to its ordinance a catch-all phrase such as "'and all other fighting words
that may constitutionally be subject to this ordinance. "' Id. at 402.
103. One journalist comments:
With the desire to punish racist intimidation colliding with free speech
Some
concerns, the case split groups that are normally allied.
organizations-the Anti-Defamation League, the NAACP and People for
the American Way-supported the law's constitutionality; others,
including the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish
Congress, argued against it.
Ruth Marcus, Supreme Court Overturns Law BarringHate Crimes; Free Speech Ruling Seen
as FarReaching, WASH. POST, June 23, 1992, at Al.
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gender bias was a factor in the underlying crime. Marc Stem of the
American Jewish Congress told The Washington Post "that the penaltyenhancement statutes are 'very doubtful after today .... If you enhance for
race and not for sexual orientation, you have the
1°4 same content basis you have
here"' that invalidated the St. Paul ordinance.
The answer to many of these questions would come soon enough. A
year later, in 1993, the Court considered the case of Wisconsin v.
Mitchell. °5 Todd Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery in
Wisconsin, where the offense ordinarily carries a maximum sentence of two
years imprisonment.1' 6 But because the jury found that Mitchell had
intentionally selected his victim because of race, the maximum sentence for
Mitchell's offense was more than tripled to seven years under the state's
enhancement statute. 1°7 Relying on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in R.A.V., the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the enhanced
sentence, holding that the Wisconsin statute "violates the First Amendment
directly by punishing what the legislature has deemed to be offensive
thought."1° The Unites States Supreme Court reversed, thus reinstating
Wisconsin's law and Mitchell's seven-year sentence. 1' 9 Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that sentencing judges have traditionally considered a wide
variety of factors in addition to evidence bearing solely on guilt. 10 While a
judge may not take into consideration a defendant's abstract beliefs, however
obnoxious to most people, the Court concluded that the Constitution "does
not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one's
beliefs and associations ... simply because those beliefs and associations are
protected by the First Amendment.""' The unanimous decision was devoid
of the stormy rhetoric found in the RA.V. case.

104. Id.
105. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
106. Id. at 480 (citing Wis.

STAT.

§ 940.19(2) (1997) (effective 1993) and

§ 939.50(3)(e) (1997)).
107. Wis. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b) (1997) (effective May 3, 1988) (enhancing the
maximum penalty for an offense whenever the defendant "[i]ntentionally selects the person
against whom the crime... is committed... because of the.., race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person").
108. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 481-82 (quoting State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811
(1992)).
109 Id. at 483.
110. Id. at 485.
111. Id. at 486.
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VI. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS
Other than Brown v. Board of Education,112 which is now universally
accepted, no other Supreme Court decision has generated more controversy
than the landmark abortion ruling in Roe v. Wade.' 13 The Roe decision
remains the focal point of heated debate throughout the country. In 1992,
the Court was within one vote of overruling Roe in PlannedParenthood
v. Casey.114 Justice Kennedy, a Reagan appointee upon whom many had
counted to provide a fifth vote to overrule Roe, instead provided the fifth
vote to reaffirm the decision. Justice White, one of the two dissenters in
Roe, l5 subsequently departed from the Court, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
widely believed to be pro-choice, was appointed to his seat. The right to
choose an abortion appears to be more secure today than at any point in the
preceding decade, at least in the United States Supreme Court. But having
lost in the courts, anti-abortionists have increasingly taken their cause to the
streets and directly to the front doors of abortion clinics. In many cases, the
message has not been subtle: the purpose of their presence was to prevent
women from obtaining abortions. 16
In 1994, the Supreme Court sought to balance the right to choose an
abortion against the right to speak in Madsen v. Women's Health Center,
Inc.117 Two years earlier, anti-abortion activists had staged a series of
demonstrations at the Women's Health Center in Melbourne, Florida. 8
Upon finding that access to the clinic was being impeded and potential
patients were being discouraged from entering, a Florida state judge issued
an injunction directed at the protesters. 19 The injuction created buffer zones
that protesters could not enter, noise restrictions during hours when the
clinic might be providing abortions or abortion related services, and other

112. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
114. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
115. The other dissenter was Justice Rehnquist, then an Associate Justice, and, at the
time of this writing, the only Justice still on the Court to have participated in the Roe decision.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 171.
116. Since the Court's decision in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
there have been at least four fatal acts of violence at U.S. abortion clinics: in Pensacola,
Florida, March 10, 1993, and again on July 29, 1994, in Pensacola; in Brookline,
Massachusetts on December 30, 1994; and in Birmingham, Alabama on January 29, 1998.
From Associated Press news reports.
117. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
118. Id. at 758.
119. Id.
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restrictions. 12° Abortion opponents argued that the noise restrictions violated
their right to free speech.1
In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court upheld most of the
injunctive measures but also took special note of the free speech rights of
demonstrators.'2 The Court said that "standard time, place, and manner
analysis is not sufficiently rigorous" for evaluating content-neutral
injunctions that restrict speech; instead, the test is "whether the challenged
provisions... burden' no more speech than necessary to serve a significant
government interest. 23
It would take three years to determine what these words in Madsen
actually meant. The case, Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network,124 involved a
network of abortion clinics in upstate New York that the Court found had
been under siege by anti-abortion activists.1 5 "[T]he clinics were subjected
to numerous large-scale blockades in which protesters would march, stand,
kneel, sit, or lie in [clinic] parking lot driveways and doorways," blocking or
hindering cars from entering the lots, and hindering both patients and clinic
employees from entering the clinics. 26 In addition, smaller groups of
protesters consistently attempted to stop or disrupt clinic operations by,
among other things, milling around clinic doorways and driveway entrances,
trespassing onto clinic parking lots, crowding around cars, and surrounding,
crowding, jostling, grabbing, pushing, shoving, yelling, and spitting at
women and their escorts entering the clinics.! 2 Outside the clinics, antiabortion protesters called "sidewalk counselors" used similar methods in
attempting to dissuade women headed toward the clinics from having
2 The local police were ineffective in responding to the
abortions.
1 29
protests.
The district court issued a temporary restraining order and later, after
the protests and sidewalk counseling continued, a preliminary injunction
order.130 The injuction banned "demonstrating... within fifteen feet...
of... doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways and
driveway entrances of [clinic] facilities," ("fixed buffer zones") similar to
120. Id. at 759-61 (citing Operation Rescue v. Woman's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 644,
679-80 (Fla. 1993)).
121. Id. at 761.
122. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 793.
123. Id. at 765.
124. 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).

125. Id. at 860.
126. Id.

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 860.
130. Id. at 861.
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those allowed in Madsen, or "within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle
seeking access to or leaving such facilities" ("floating buffer zones").3 1
Again, it was Chief Justice Rehnquist who wrote the Court's majority
opinion and, applying Madsen, upheld the fixed buffer zone but struck down
the floating zone. 132 Chief Justice Rehnquist was troubled by the fact that
the floating buffer zones prevented demonstrators from communicating a
message from a normal conversational distance or handing leaflets to people
on the public sidewalks who were entering or leaving the clinics. 13 3 Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated:
This is a broad prohibition, both because of the type of speech that
is restricted and the nature of the location. Leafletting and
commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of
speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment, and speech in
public areas is at its most protected on public
134 sidewalks, a
prototypical example of a traditional public forum.
There was something in the decision for everyone, and abortion rights
advocates as well as the foes, were all quick to declare victory. 13 5 But, it was
a compromise ruling with freedom of speech emerging as the larger winner.
The Los Angeles Times called the decision an important victory for "[flree
speech of the loud, aggressive, in-your-face variety... one that could shape
future sidewalk confrontations on matters ranging from animal rights and
union picketing to street beggars and celebrity photographers. 1 36
VII. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE PROFITS OF CRIME

When asked to analyze a Supreme Court ruling giving extraterritorial
effect to a law bashing the Philippines, the sagacious but fictitious Chicago
saloon keeper, Mr. Dooley, 37 issued in Irish dialect his often quoted
131. Id. at 862 (quoting Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue W. N.Y., 799 F. Supp.

1417, 1440-41 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)).
132. Id. at 866-67.
133. Id. at 867.
134. Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 867.
135. See Joan Biskupic, Court Backs Capital Fixed 15-Foot Buffer Zone at Clinics;
Justices Condemn Some Antiabortion Tactics in Ruling that Reinforces a 1994 Decision,
WASH. POST, February 20, 1997, at A18; Linda Greenhouse, High Court Upholds 15-Foot
CapitalBuffer Zone at Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, February 20, 1997, at Al.
136. David Savage, 'In-Your-Face' Speech Wins in Supreme Court, L.A. TMES,
February 22, 1997, at Al.
137. Peter Finley Dunne, a famous turn-of-the-century political commentator in
Chicago, wrote under the pseudonym of "Mr. Dooley."
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reply: "No matter whether the Constitution follows the flag or not, the
Supreme Court follows the 'iliction returns."' In a narrow sense, Mr.
Dooley may be correct for Supreme Court Justices, like all Article IHjudges,
must be nominated by the elected President and confirmed by elected
senators. 13 Those who reach the Supreme Court bench are a function of,
and naturally follow from, those who reach the White House and the Senate.
Mr. Dooley, however, is incorrect in every other respect. Once given the
nod, federal judges serve for life and, unlike elected representatives, have the
unique freedom to insulate themselves from popular opinion. The wisdom
of this arrangement becomes particularly evident in matters of free speech
where the Justices, with some consistency, reach decisions that are at least
"arguably" faithful to the Constitution but clearly at odds with current public
sentiment. Mr. Dooley might appreciate how the Supreme Court balanced
New York's "Son of Sam" law with freedom of speech in Simon
& Schuster,
139
Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board.
During the summer of 1977, David Berkowitz was identified as the
serial killer known as the "Son of Sam." After his arrest, Berkowitz was
offered a large sum of money for the rights to his story. However, the New
York legislature quickly acted to prevent such compensation since the
families of the victims remained uncompensated.1 40
The legislature enacted a statute intended to "ensure that monies
received by the criminal under such circumstances shall first be made
available to recompense the victims of that crime for their loss and
suffering."' 42 The measure had overwhelming support. The author of the
statute explained: "It is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency that
an individual.., can expect to receive large sums of money for his story
once he is captured-while five people
are dead, [and] other people were
143
injured as a result of his conduct."'
New York's "Son of Sam" law as amended required that an accused or
convicted criminal's income, from works describing his crime, be deposited
in an escrow account held by the state Crime Victims Board and ultimately
made available to the victims of the crime and the criminal's other
creditors. 44 The law was seldom applied and, in 1986, the "Son of Sam"
138. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
139. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
140. Id. at 108.

141. N.Y. [law] § 632-(a)(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
142. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 108 (citing to N.Y. [law] § 632(a)(1) (McKinney
1982 & Supp. 1991)).
143. Id. (quoting Senator Emanuel R. Gold), reprinted in N.Y. LEGisL.rrv ANN. 267

(1997).
144. Id. at 111. "Ironically, the statute was never even applied to the Son of Sam
himself; David Berkowitz was found incompetent to stand trial, and the statute applied only to
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law was challenged on free speech grounds by Simon & Schuster,
Incorporated, a publishing house. r45 Simon & Schuster had entered into a
contract with Henry Hill, a mid-level foot soldier in one of New York's
Mafia families from 1955 to 19802 46 Hill, who had engineered some of the
most daring crimes of his day, including the theft of $6 million from
Lufthansa Airlines in 1978, was arrested in 1980 on extortion, narcotics, and
a variety of other charges.1 47 In exchange for immunity from prosecution, he
testified against many of his former colleagues.' 48 Collaborating with author
Nicholas Pileggi, Hill produced a book, Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family,
which depicts "in colorful detail, the day-to-day existence of organized
crime. 1 49 The book was a phenomenal success-with more than a million
copies in print within nineteen months of its publication. 150 A few years
later, Wiseguy was converted into a feature length film called Goodfellas,
which won a host of awards as the best film of 1990.151
While the notoriety may have created a windfall for Simon & Schuster,
it also brought the attention of the Crime Victims Board.152 The Board
notified Simon & Schuster that under New York's "Son of Sam" law the
Board was entitled to any monies due to Hill.153 In the ensuing litigation,
Simon & Schuster argued that the state's law, by now duplicated in forty
states and the federal government, 154 was inconsistent with the First
Amendment.155

criminals who had actually been convicted." Id. (citing to Dennis Hevesi, Cases Under
"Sam" Law: Notorious but Few, N.Y. TMES, Feb. 20, 1991, at B8). Berkowitz did assist in
the writing of his story but, according to the Crime Victims Board, voluntarily paid his share
of the royalties from the book SON OF SAM published in 1981 to his victims or their estates.

Id.
145. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 105.
146. Id. at 112.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 114.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 123.
155. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115. The federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3681 (1997)
(effective Oct. 12, 1984), was passed, with strong bipartisan support, as part of the Victims of
Crime Act of 1984 after more than a decade of congressional debate regarding the need for the
federal government to provide compensation and assistance to the victims of crime. Victims of
Crime Act of 1984, Title II, ch. XIV, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1406(a) (1984).
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The Justice Department entered the case, amicus curiae, on the side of
New York and in defense of the federal statute which had been placed in
jeopardy by the case.1s6 Government lawyers argued:
Statutes limiting the profits criminals receive from expressive
works that describe their crimes substantially further government
interests of the highest order... The spectacle of criminals
profiting from books or movies recounting their unlawful actions
understandably and appropriately is perceived as agravating the
harm already inflicted on the victims of those actions.
The government's brief also quoted from the testimony of a former
Congressman before the Senate Judiciary Committee while the Committee
was considering enacting a law similar to the one in New York: "There is
a criminal
something basically wrong about a system of justice which allows
158
to profit from his crime while his victims continue to suffer.
The Supreme Court, however, saw the issue quite differently. Justice
Sandra O'Connor, writing for the Court, did acknowledge that "the State has
a compelling interest in ensuring that victims of crime are compensated by
those who harm them"'159 and "an undisputed comjpelling interest in ensuring
that criminals do not profit from their crimes," 6 but O'Connor concluded
the law was not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's compelling
interest. 6 1 As evidence of its "overinclusiveness," O'Connor suggested that
the law could have been invoked to confiscate the proceeds of Civil
Disobedience,162 where Henry David Thoreau acknowledged his refusal to
pay taxes, and even The Confessions of Saint Augustine,16 where the author
laments "'my past foulness and the carnal corruptions of my soul,' one
pears from a neighboring
instance of
6 which involved the theft of
vineyard.'
156. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members
of the N.Y. St. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1990) (No. 90-1059)."
157. Id. at 6.
158. Comprehensive Crime Control Act, 1984: Hearingson S. 2423 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1984) (statement of M. Butler,
constitutional expert).
159. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 118.
160. Id. at 119.
161. Id. at 123.
162. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND ON THE DUTY OF CIvIL DISOBEDIENCE (New
American Library 1960) (1849).
163. AuGusINE SAINT BISHOP OF HIPO, THE CONFESSIONS OF SAnrr AUGUSTINE (J.G.
Pilldngton trans., Heritage Press 1963).
164. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121 (quoting AUGUSTINE, supra note 163).
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Only Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the judgment, objected to the
use of the "compelling state interest" test, which derives from the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence. 165 Justice Kennedy said the law should be
rejected solely on the ground that it was a regulation based on content which
has the full protection of the First Amendment. 166 "[R]esort to the
[compelling state interest] test,"1 67 warned Justice Kennedy, "might be read
as a concession that [s]tates may censor speech whenever they believe there
is a compelling justification for doing so. Our precedents and traditions
allow no such inference."1 68 Justice Kennedy's point on the appropriate test
is all but certain to be revisited in future free speech clashes before the high
Court.
The Court's decision in the Simon & Schuster case did not prevent Hill
or any other criminals from being sued by those they may have hurt, but it
prohibited states from singlinq out profits from books or movies to be set
aside for the victims' benefit. 69 New York had the support of dozens of
other states, the Justice Department, and at least half a dozen victims' rights
groups.170 Two lower courts and the New York Court of Appeals, 171 the
state's highest court, had all upheld the "Son of Sam" law. 7 2 The United
States Supreme Court was surely not following any election returns when it
rejected it as a violation
of free speech.173 And at least on the Court, there
74
dissents.
were no

Vi.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND POLITICAL PATRONAGE

More than a hundred years ago, Justice Holmes, in his famous dictum,
said a policeman "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
165. Id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
166. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 124.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 124-25.
169. Id. at 109.
170. Id. at 115.
171. On May 7, 1991, the New York State Court of Appeals, by unanimous vote, ruled
that convicted murderer Jean Harris was not entitled to, and could not assign to others,
royalties from her best-selling book STRANGER IN Two WORLDS. Children of Bedford, Inc. v.
Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1991), vacated, 502 U.S. 1025 (1992).
172. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115.
173. Id. at 107.
174. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices White, Stevens, Scalia, and Souter joined. Justices Blackmun and
Kennedy filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas, who did not join the
Court until eight days after the case was argued, did not participate. Id. at 123-24.

Published by NSUWorks, 1998

63

Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 1

1998]

O'Brien

no constitutional right to be a policeman." 175 The Burger Court had come a
long way in modifying, if not outright rejecting, that idea. The Court has
held, in effect, that while there may be no constitutional right to be a
of
policeman, the government has no right to condition the employment
76
police officers or any other civil servants on what they say or believe.
The Rehnquist Court has not only embraced Elrod v. Burns 177 ' and
Branti v. Finkel,178 it has expanded on them, extending their free speech
protections from government employees to those who merely apply for
government work.
The four dissenters in Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois,180 led by Justice Scalia, argued that "the desirability of patronage is
a policy question to be decided by the people's representatives ' 181 and "a
political question if there ever was one."'182 The dissenters were convinced
that Elrod and Branti were "not only wrong, not only recent, not only
contradicted by a long prior tradition, but also ... unworkable in practice"
and therefore "should be overruled." 183
Notwithstanding that Rutan was decided by the thinnest of margins over
the most impassioned dissent, the Rehnquist Court chose to enlarge upon the
decision rather than retreat by dealing, what dissenting Justices considered, a
body blow to political patronage as we have known it. The latest conflict
arose in two cases in 1996, Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee
County, Kansas v. Umbehr184 and O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of
Northlake.'85
Umbehr involved an independent contractor, Keen Umbehr, who
contracted with the Wabaunsee County Board of Commissioners "for him to
be the exclusive hauler of trash for cities in the county.' ' 186 But "[d]uring the
term of his contract, Umbehr was an outspoken critic" of the Board who
voiced his criticisms at the Board's meetings and in letters and editorials in
local newspapers. 187 Umbehr's allegations that the Board was in the habit of
violating the state's Open Meetings Act "were vindicated in a consent decree
175. McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
176. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507

(1980).
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

427 U.S. 347 (1976).
445 U.S. 507 (1980).
Rutan v. Republican Party of 111., 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
Id.
Id. at 104 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 114.
Id. at 110-11.
116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996).
116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996).
186. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2345.
187. Id.
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signed by the Board's members. 188 In addition, "Umbehr also ran
unsuccessfully for election to the Board." 189
Board members "allegedly took Umbehr's criticism badly," voting 2-1
to terminate his exclusive contract with the County. 19° Umbehr sued the two
majority Board members under chapter 42 of the United States Code section
1983,191 claiming that the termination of his government
contract was in
92
retaliation to his criticism of the County and the Board.'
The O'Hare Truck Service case raised similar questions about the
practice of elected politicians favoring their friends and disfavoring their
enemies.193 John Gratziana owned and operated O'Hare Truck Service. The
company was among those called from time to time by the City of Northlake,
Illinois to perform towing services. Shortly after Gratziana refused to
contribute to the incumbent mayor's reelection campaign and sided openly
with his opponent, Gratziana was removed from the list of those towing
companies to be called. 194 Consequently, Gratziana sued the City under
chapter 42 of the United States Code section 1983, claiming infringement of
his First Amendment rights. 195
Both Umbehr and Gratziana did work "for" the government, but neither
were employees "of' the government.
They were independent
contractors.1 96 The Court found the distinction constitutionally insignificant
and went on to extend Rutan's First Amendment protection for job
"applicants" to independent contractors. 197 Both the Umbehr case1 98 and the
O'Harecase 199 were decided by a lopsided 7-2 votes, with Justices Scalia
and Thomas in dissent. This was no small matter to Justice Scalia who, in
one of his most memorable, and passionate dissents, characterized the
decisions as a twin assault on the American political system itself.
Justice Scalia stated:
They say hard cases make bad law. The cases before the Court
today set the blood boiling, with the arrogance that they seem to
display on the part of elected officials ....
For every extreme case
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2345.
Id. at 2345-46.
O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2355.
Id. at 2353-54.
Id.
Id.
See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2350; O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2360.
Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2361 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2361 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of the sort alleged here, I expect there are thousands of contracts
awarded on a "favoritism" basis that no one would get excited
about. The Democratic mayor gives the city's municipal bond
business to what is known to be a solid Democratic law firmtaking it away from the solid Republican law firm that had the
business during the previous, Republican, administration. What
else is new?... Hooray! Favoritism such as this happens all the
time in American political life, and no one has ever thought that it
violated-of all things-the First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.
The Court must be living in another world. Day by day, case by
case, it is busy designing a Constitution for a country I do not
recognize. Depending upon which of today's cases one chooses to
consider authoritative, it has either (O'Hare) thrown out vast
numbers of practices that are routine in American political life in
order to get rid of a few bad apples; or (Umbehr) with the same
purpose in mind subjected those routine practices to endless,
uncertain, case-by-case, balance-all-the-factors, and-who-knowswho-will-win litigation.
20 0
I dissent.
Allowing those in power to award benefits and privileges to their
friends and supporters has been sanctioned by history.20 1 But Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court in Umbehr, and Justice Kennedy, writing
for the Court in O'Hare, both felt existing precedents were sufficient to
balance the interest of patronage with the right to free speech.2
Both
decisions rely heavily on Pickeringv. Board of Education of Township High
School District 205. Originally applicable only to government employees,
Pickering held that the interests of the [employee] "as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern" be balanced "against the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees."0 While the decisions in
Umbehr and O'Hare clearly extend First Amendment protection to
independent contractors, they leave open the possibility they may not be
entitled to quite the same "degree" of protection as government employees.
In the broader context, however, Umbehr and O'Hare reinforce the
perception that the Rehnquist Court views the First Amendment right to free
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 2373-74 (Scalia, L,dissenting.).
Elrod,427 U.S. at 377-78 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2347; O'HareTruck Serv., 116 S.Ct. at 2356.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 568.
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speech broadly. Reasonable minds can disagree over whether this is an
auspicious development. Some, such as Justice Scalia in the patronage
cases, would seem to believe the Court has been overprotective of speech or
expressive activity at the expense of other rights and interests. I leave it to
the reader to draw an independent conclusion.
The Rehnquist Court, however, does not speak with one voice on any
single issue; it is, after all, a collegial body. Nor has the Rehnquist Court
been uniform in its approach to freedom of speech. Freedom of speech does
not always carry the day. The Court, for example, had expressed concern
over whether the federal government had a sufficiently substantial interest in
requiring local cable television operators to carry the programming of local
broadcasters. 5 In 1997, the Court concluded that it did, and thus the
Federal Communication Commission "must carry" rule faced no First
Amendment impediment. 20 6 Similarly, the Court found no First Amendment
violation when Florida required its lawyers to wait until thirty days after an
accident or disaster before contacting victims or their relatives.
Despite
powerful arguments and advocacy to the contrary, the Court concluded the
state's interest in discouraging "ambulance chasing" by its lawyers
outweighed any free speech concerns. 2 8 The Rehnquist Court reaffirmed
that freedom of speech is susceptible to time, place, and manner restrictions
in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 9 allowing New York City to require those
desiring to stage rock concerts in Central Park to rent a city-owned sound
system, a requirement the Court justified by the New York's interest in
controlling noise in a public park.2 0 In Frisby v. Schultz, 21' the Court found
no First Amendment violation in communities which banned picketing of
private dwellings.2 12 The Court has consistently tolerated a diminished First
Amendment right for students in public schools, ruling that their newspapers
are subject to censorship by school officials 21 3 and that students may be
disciplined for using gross sexual innuendo in a student assembly speech
without violating the First Amendment. 1 4
205. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997).
206. Id. at 1203.
207. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995).
208. Id. at 628.
209. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
210. Id. at 803.
211. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
212. Id. at 488.
213. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
214. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); see also Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (upholding the First
Amendment right of high school students to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam war,
cited with approval in Hazelwood and Bethel).
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The Court's approach to commercial speech has been somewhat
schizophrenic. In 1996, the Court rejected, on free speech grounds, Rhode
Island's ban on liquor price advertising in a decision that cast doubt on
efforts by the Clinton administration to sharply restrict cigarette
advertising.2 15 The following year, however, the Court, divided 5-4, found
no First Amendment obstacle in the government requiring agricultural
producers to pay for generic advertising to promote their products,
notwithstanding their belief that the advertising
216- was unwanted, unnecessary,
and may have even been misleading or false.
However, the defeats for freedom of speech in the Rehnquist Court
have been truly dwarfed by the victories.217 Although there may be shifting
majorities and close votes, there can be little doubt as to where the Court is
generally going in this area. And on the thorniest, most explosive case, those
cases that divide lower court judges, lawyers, law students, and lay persons
alike, there has been a consistent majority at the Supreme Court on the side
of a broad right to free speech.

215. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1515 (1996). The decision

cast doubt on the viability of Posadasde P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328
(1986).
216. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1997).
217. See, e.g., Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Elections
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2314-15 (1996) (rejecting federal limits on "uncoordinated"
expenditures by political parties on behalf of candidates as inconsistent with the First
Amendment); McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (rejecting
Ohio's prohibition on the anonymous distribution of campaign literature); United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995) (rejecting, on free speech
grounds, a federal ban on government employees accepting honoraria for speeches, writings,
etc.); City of LaDue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58-59 (1994) (rejecting a municipal ordinance
banning the posting of signs in residential neighborhoods in order to reduce "visual clutter");
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 431 (1993) (rejecting a
municipal ordinance banning distribution of "commercial handbills" via news racks otherwise
permitted on public property); Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S.
123, 137 (1992) (linking parade permit fees to anticipated costs to the county rejected as
content-based violation of free speech); The Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989)
(stating one may not criminalize truthful publication of the names of rape victims obtained
from public records); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (holding no libel
action for transparently fictitious satire of public figure); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986) (holding that the burden is on libel plaintiff to prove
allegedly libelous news report are false rather than on defendant to prove accuracy or absence
of malice).
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I. INTRODUCTION

Popular discourse about the Supreme Court often seeks to characterize
its direction in political terms. Yet the Rehnquist Court, while it has
undoubtedly turned rightward, has never turned as starkly rightward as
predicted in such accounts, 1 even though Presidents Reagan and Bush
between them filled five seats on the current Court.2 To be sure, President
Clinton-with two appointments of his own in the last five years-has had
the chance to counterbalance the Reagan-Bush nominations.3 But both
before and after Clinton's appointments, it was evident that Justices who
were expected to be "conservative" sometimes voted for "liberal" or
"moderate" results.
Why might this be so? One explanation might be that court-packing is
simply harder than it looks, and a president's ability to predict the judicial
orientation of his nominees is inherently prone to error.4 President
Eisenhower is famously said to have labeled as "mistakes" his appointments

1. Compare David G. Savage, Turning Right: The Making of the Rehnquist Court

(1992) with James F. Simon, The Center Holds (1995).
2. President Reagan nominated, and the Senate confirmed, Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy, in addition to elevating Justice William
Rehnquist to the Chief Justiceship. President Bush nominated, and the Senate confirmed,
Justices David Souter and Clarence Thomas.
3. President Clinton nominated, and the Senate confirmed, Justices Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer.
4. See, e.g., Christoper E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The
Court-Packing Efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 57 ALB. L. Rv. 1111, 1130 (1994).
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of Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.5 Likewise,
President Nixon's appointment of Justice Harry A. Blackmun hardly
produced, as expected, a conservative "Minnesota Twin" to Chief Justice
Warren Burger. And those who predicted that Justice David Souter's
appointment would be a "home run" for conservative causes later lamented
that it had been something less than a bunt.
But three other explanations seem more powerful than presidential
miscalculation alone. This essay seeks to explore those explanations. First,
the institutional structure of the Court may constrain or systematically
moderate ideological tendencies. Second, a Justice's jurisprudential
commitments may limit his or her expression of ideological
orientation. Finally, the very concept of conservative judicial ideology is
quite complex, and thus an apparently "liberal" result sometimes represents
simply the dominance of one strand of conservatism over others. These
institutional, jurisprudential, and ideological factors might help explain the
surprising moderation of Justices predicted to be conservative.

II. THE PHENOMENON OF IDEOLOGICAL SHORTFALL
Without doubt, the Rehnquist Court has taken positions consistent with
conservative politics in a variety of constitutional areas since 1980. The
Court has narrowed pregnant women's rights against state regulation of
abortion 6 and rejected the claim that consensual homosexual sex is protected
by the same conceltion of liberty that had earlier protected access to abortion
and contraception. The Court has likewise declined to extend such liberty
rights to physician-assisted suicide.8 The Court has been increasingly willing
to invalidate race-based affirmative action programs, 9 even when
implemented by the federal government. 10 In an analogous line of cases, the
Court has struck down several state attempts to create majority-minority

5. Asked whether he had made any mistakes as President, Eisenhower said: .'Yes, two,
and they are both sitting on the Supreme Court."' HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JusTIcEs AND
PRESIDENTS

266 (3d ed. 1992).

6. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992); Webster v. Reprod.
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989).
7. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
8. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2275 (1997) (upholding state ban on
assisted suicide against a substantive due process challenge).
9. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (invalidating
under strict scrutiny a race-based preference in a municipal procurement program).
10. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (evaluating
federal affirmative action program under strict scrutiny and remanding constitutionality of the
program under appropriate standard).

Published by NSUWorks, 1998

71

Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 1

1998]

Sullivan

electoral districts." The Court has made it more difficult for challengers to
prove that a school district is continuing to violate the requirements of Brown
v. Board of Education.12 For the first time in sixty years, the Court has
sought to restrain federal power in relation to the power of the states by
striking down a congressional assertion of power under the Commerce

Clause.

Similarly, the Court has struck down congressional efforts to

"commandeer" state legislative or executive action. 14 Perhaps nowhere has
the Court's conservative trend been more apparent than in the area of
criminal justice.15 Hence, it is difficult to dispute that Presidents Reagan and

Bush had considerable success in moving the Court to the political right.
The Court, however, has also issued a number of decisions
disappointing conservative advocates. For instance, the Court did not, as
many had predicted, overrule Roe v. Wade.1 6 Nor did it eliminate

11. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 927 (1995) (striking down congressional
redistricting where evidence showed that race was overriding purpose); Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (striking down congressional redistricting where bizarre shape of the
prescribed districts created an inference that race motivated the action).
12. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 51 (1990) (holding
that district court abused discretion in ordering an interdistrict remedy for an intradistrict
violation of the principles of Brown).
13. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (invalidating federal law that
prohibited gun possession near a school without any requirement that the gun had moved in
interstate commerce and without any congressional findings of fact on commerce effects).
14. Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2383-84 (1997) (invalidating a provision
of the Brady Bill that imposed on state law enforcement officers the obligation to perform
background checks on handgun purchasers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149
(1992) (invalidating take-title provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 636 (1997) (per curiam) (upholding
sentence enhancements for conduct of which the defendant was acquitted); Whren v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1777 (1996) (upholding pretextual traffic stops supported by a
reasonable articulable suspicion); Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1992)
(narrowing habeas corpus review); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (upholding
use of victim impact statements in death penalty sentencing hearings); Illinois v. Perkins, 496
U.S. 292, 300 (1990) (holding that Miranda does not apply when one posing as a prison
inmate induces a defendant to confess); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987)
(upholding the pretrial detention of defendants found likely to be dangerous); McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987) (upholding state death penalty against equal protection
challenge based on social science research indicating racially disparate impact).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69
(1992) (reaffirming the central holding of Roe that the state may not criminalize abortion prior
to the viability of the fetus).
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Establishment Clause restrictions on school prayer. 7 The Court declined to
allow the states or Congress to criminalize flag burning. 8 And,
notwithstanding other harbingers of an antifederalist revival, the Court
forbade state voters from imposing term limits on their federal legislatorsalbeit narrowly and over a bitter dissent.19 Some recent decisions extending
the Equal Protection Clause drew a cacophony of conservative oppositionfor example, a decision barring the exclusion of women from an all-male
public academy 20 and a decision barring a state from precluding all claims of
discrimination based on homosexual orientation. 2' The Court granted free
access to state appeals courts for indigent parents attempting to retain rights
of relationship to their children, thus reviving a long-dormant strand of
fundamental rights analysis in equal protection law.22 Finally, the Rehnquist
Court has consistently interpreted the Free Speech Clause to forbid
government prescriptions of orthodoxy, protecting groups
as divergent as
2
leftist flag burners23 and white supremacist cross burners. F
Even in decisions reaching conservative results, the Court has
articulated doctrines that stop short of their apparent logical conclusion. For
example, in the affirmative action cases, the Court has stopped short of
establishing outright color blindness as a constitutional norm, intimating that
race-based affirmative action might be upheld on somewhat weaker
justifications than would be required of policies discriminating against racial
minorities. 25 In cases imposing federalism-based limits on congressional
17. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992) (holding impermissible the official
recitation of a non-denominational prayer at a middle school graduation ceremony).
18. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990) (involving a
congressional statute); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (involving a state statute).
19. See United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 782-83 (1995)
(holding that state-imposed term limits violated the Qualifications Clauses and infringed the
interests of the national citizenry).
20. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2286-87 (1996) (striking down Virginia
Military Institute's exclusion of women for lack of an "exceedingly persuasive" reason).
21. Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (striking down a state constitutional
amendment that denied to homosexuals the opportunity to enact or enforce local and state
antidiscrimination measures).
22. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 117 S. Ct. 555,559 (1996).
23. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 420 (1989).
24. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (unanimously striking
down law barring the placement of symbols likely to arouse racial anger or alarm).
25. While subjecting race-based preferences to strict scrutiny, the Court sought to
"dispel the notion that strict scrutiny [in this context] is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."'
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980)). Under such strict but not fatal scrutiny, governments might
permissibly adopt race preferences that are narrowly tailored to redress specifically identified
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power, the Court has barred congressional acts requiring states to enact or
enforce specified policies but allowed similar results to be accomplished by
imposing regulatory conditions on federal funding that states find irresistible
as a practical matter.2 And, in free speech challenges, the Court has
sometimes split the difference between the speech claim and the government.
For example, the Court has struck down a hate speech law while upholding a
hate crime penalty enhancement statute,2 7 upheld some but not all regulations
of anti-abortion protestors,2 and permitted public airport terminals to ban the

solicitation of funds but not the sale or distribution of literature. 29 Such

decisions give greater latitude to speakers than might have been expected
given the Court's starting assumptions-for example, that regulations

past discrimination - even if that discrimination was not committed intentionally by the state,
or the scope of the redress is not limited to the individual victims of adjudicable
discrimination. For example, a city or state might use race-conscious procurement policies
where it had merely been a "'passive participant' in a system of racial exclusion practiced by
elements of the local construction industry," rather than a deliberate practitioner of racial
exclusion itself. City of Richmond v. LA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (O'Connor, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and White, L). And, "[i]n the extreme case, some form of narrowly
tailored racial preference might be necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion,"
id. at 509, whether or not such preferences were limited to making particular victims of
adjudicable discrimination whole. Indeed, Justice Scalia concurred separately in both Croson
and Adarand to emphasize his disagreement with the. Court to the extent it authorized raceconscious measures extending beyond remediation for identified victims of discriminationthe only sort of remediation he would regard as consistent with a constitutional norm of color
blindness. Id. at 526 (Scalia, L, concurring in the judgment). See also Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, L, concurring in part and in the judgment).
26. For example, in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171-77 (1992), the Court
invalidated a requirement that a state take title to undisposed radioactive waste while at the
same time upholding conditional funding provisions.
27. Compare R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (unanimously
striking down law barring the placement of symbols likely to arouse racial anger or alarm)
with Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-90 (1993) (upholding aggravated penalty for
racially motivated assault).
28. See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855, 866-68 (1997) (striking down
provisions of an injunction requiring protestors to stai a certain distance from clinic entrants
but upholding provisions requiring protestors to stay a certain distance from clinic entrances);
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 776 (1994) (striking down provisions of
an injunction barring signs near a clinic and establishing buffer zones at back and side of
building, but upholding provisions barring noise near a clinic and establishing a buffer zone at
the front perimeter and entrance).
29. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 685
(1992); Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830, 831 (1992)
(per curiam).
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designed to protect access to abortion clinics are content neutral and that
airports are not latter-day public forums.30
In short, the Rehnquist Court has not simply followed but in some cases
has defied and in other cases stopped short of the outcomes that might have
been predicted by the election returns. These results typically depended on
votes of at least one of the five Reagan-Bush nominees, necessarily so in the
seven years since Justice Thomas' appointment, and in some cases received
the support of several. The following sections explore the role of
institutional factors, jurisprudential considerations, and ideological
complexity in helping to explain such votes.

m.

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

Two features of the Court's institutional situation in relation to the other
branches suggest reasons why conservative Justices might vote moderate or
liberal. The first and most distinctive institutional feature of the Supreme
Court is its relative insulation from political pressures. 31 Politics may play an
inevitable role in the nomination and confirmation process, but constitutional
guarantees of lifetime tenure and protection from salary cuts32 afford the
Justices considerable opportunity to change their minds. Thus, a Justice's
opinions, over time, may cease to bear much resemblance to his or her
political profile at the time of nomination and appointment.
Assuming that Justices sometimes diverge from their predicted political
profile while in office, is there any structural reason to suppose that the shift
will be in a "liberal" rather than a "conservative" direction? To be sure, there
are counterexamples. President Kennedy's only appointee, Justice Byron
White, arguably grew more conservative during his long tenure on the
bench,33 except for his nearly parliamentary willingness to defer to the
30. Whether the pro-speaker position in such cases is properly denominated "liberal" is
a controversial question. In cases involving racist speech and abortion clinic protests it might
be argued that the free speech libertarian position has migrated from the left to the right of the
political spectrum. See J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist
Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 383-85, 393-94 (1995)
(characterizing the shifting political valences of recent free speech controversies as an instance
of 'ideological drift"').
31. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLmics 16-23 (1962) (famously noting the counter-majoritarian
difficulty that flows from the very insulation of the Supreme Court from political pressure,
coupled with the power of judicial review).
32. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
33. For example, Justice White concurred in the judgment in Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 502-03 (1965), invalidating a prohibition of contraceptive use on substantive
due process grounds, but found no similar Constitutional warrant for protecting access to
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(usually Democratic) Congress.3 4 But, it is at least plausible to suppose that
insulation from political majorities typically creates a structural incentive to
articulate and protect the interests of political minorities, if only through
repeat exposure to such claims and a desire to distinguish the work of the
judiciary from that of the political branches. This tendency will often,
though not always, appear politically "liberal. 35
A second and independent institutional explanation arises from the
Justices' concern to protect the Supreme Court's credibility. The Supreme
Court cannot tax, nor does it possess armed forces to back up its
decisions.37 Lacking power of sword or purse, the Court depends on the
power of its legitimacy.3 8 At first glance, the legitimacy problem seems
more likely to generate conservative decisions than liberal ones. After all,
the Court's legitimacy would appear most threatened when the Court protects
the interests of a small minority over the intense opposition of the majority. 9
However, the Court's need to preserve its legitimacy might motivate
unexpectedly liberal decisions in some situations because its reputation
depends on the perception that its legal pronouncements transcend ordinary
politics. Conservative Justices might favor results that appear liberal in the
short run in order to diffuse any suspicion that they are caving in to political
pressure from their conservative sponsors and their allies. One way of doing
this is to abide by stare decisis and entrench earlier liberal decisions even if
they would not be reached again as an initial matter.
The pivotal joint opinion of Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony
Kennedy, and David Souter in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey,40 for example,
abortion, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting), or consensual
adult sexual conduct, see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (per curiam) (White

J.).
34. For example, Justice White voted to invalidate minority business preferences in
procurement by state and local governments, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 511 (1989), but voted to uphold a preference for minority-owned broadcast licensees
that was promulgated by the FCC at the direction of Congress, see Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC,

497 U.S. 547, 563-66 (1990).
35. If a challenged policy is itself 'liberal," then counter-majoritarian decisionmaking

will appear "conservative." The Court's recent affirmative action and race-based districting
cases provide an illustration. The Court invalidated popularly enacted programs in order to
protect individual members of the racial majority. Another example might be the Court's
recent federalism decisions, where it has struck down acts of Congress in the name of divided
government.
36. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
37. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

38. See Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 129-70
(1980) (discussing the legitimacy problem).

39. See id. at 132-33.
40. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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declined to overrule Roe v. Wade41 in part on the ground that the Court ought
not overturn settled law in the face of vehement public controversy over
abortion, lest it appear to be doing politics rather than law.42 Likewise, the
Court's recent decisions invalidating most affirmative action programs, but
holding out the possibility that some such programs might be justified by
remedial or distributive concerns expressed in earlier cases, might be read as
seeking to avoid a perception that the Court interprets the Constitution in
light of the latest public opinion polls. Similarly, in the area of federal-state
relations, Justice Kennedy strikingly defied any preconceived label as a rigid
antifederalist by casting the decisive vote in a single Term both to invalidate
43
a federal gun-possession statute as exceeding Commerce Clause authority,
and to invalidate state-imposed term limits on members of Congress as
exceeding state authority. 44
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

A second explanation of why conservative Justices might vote moderate
or liberal is that they have a jurisprudential orientation that moderates or
constrains any ideological tendencies they might have.
Justices'
jurisprudential tendencies tend to follow one of two general approaches to
fashioning legal directives. One aVProach employs bright-line rules, while
the other utilizes flexible standards. Rules, generally speaking, bind a legal
decision-maker in a fairly determinate manner by capturing underlying
principles or policies in ways that then operate independently. What gives a
rule its force is that judges will follow it in fairly rote fashion even where a
particularized application of the background principle might arguably yield a
different result. Standards, on the other hand, allow judges to apply the
background principle more directly to a fact situation.
To take a simple example; suppose you wished to ensure safe driving on
a highway. You might set a rule: "drive no faster than fifty-five miles per

41. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42. Casey, 505 U.S. at 864-69.
43. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995).
44. United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995). Justice
Kennedy argued that the Court ought both to stop the states from "invad[ing] the sphere of
federal sovereignty," and to hold the federal government "within the boundaries of its own
power when it intrudes upon matters reserved to the [s]tates." Id. at 841 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
45. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court: 1991 Term, Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22 (1992), and MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO
CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987), for a discussion on rules and standards.
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hour." Alternatively, you might set a standard of reasonableness: "drive
safely for the highway conditions."
What are the comparative advantages of each approach? Rules
constrain the discretion of the decision-maker who applies them 46 and
typically require the determination of only very limited issues of fact. For
example, under the fifty-five miles per hour rule, a police officer only needs
to determine at what speed the car was traveling. The fifty-five miles per
hour rule also prevents two police officers from treating identical situations
differently, whereas under the "reasonableness" standard, one driver might
be ticketed while the other drives away free. Thus, the advantages of rules
include certainty, predictability, formal fairness, clear notice to those they
govern, and economy in the process of decision-making. 47
Standards, by contrast, require consideration of more facts. Under the
"drive safely for the conditions" standard, for example, a police officer must
take into account the time of day, the weather, the volume of traffic, and so
forth. Standards thus give more discretion to the decision-maker in deciding
particular cases. Though less predictable and more time-consuming to apply
than rules, those who favor standards would say that they are more
substantively fair and accurate than rules in capturing the relevant policy
concern. For example, while the fifty-five miles per hour rule might prohibit
a driver from reaching a safe sixty miles per hour on an empty straightaway
under sunny skies but permit a driver to travel a treacherous fifty miles per
hour on a rain-slicked curve at rush hour, the "drive safely" standard might
correct such anomalous outcomes.4a Advocates of standards also approve
their flexibility and capacity to evolve in their application over time with
changing mores or circumstances.
Constitutional doctrines, like traffic rules, may be expressed in the form
of either rules or standards. 49 Approaches that use categorical, formal,
bright-line tests are rule-like. For example, consider holdings that obscenity
is unprotected speech, 50 or that the legislature may not wield executive

46. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuLEs: A PHiLOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULES-BASED DECISION-MAKING INLAW AND IN LnE 157-62 (1991) ("A decision-maker
not -constrained by rules has the power, the authority, the jurisdiction to take everything into
account. Conversely, the rules-constrained decision-maker loses at least some of that

jurisdiction.").
47. Id. at 96-98 (discussing the virtues of "predictability, reliability, and certainty");
Sullivan, supra note 45, at 62-66 (discussing substantive arguments favoring rules and
standards).
48. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 66-69.
49. See id. at 69-95.
50. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973), for the rule-like holding that
obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment.
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power,51 or vice versa. 52 Almost as rule-like in practice are tests that use
strong presumptions to decide cases once a threshold classification has been
made. When the Court employs strict scrutiny-such as to review
infringements of fundamental rights,53 content based suppression of speech, 54
or suspect classifications 55 -it is nearly impossible for the government to
prove the law constitutional.
Conversely, when the Court employs
rationality review-for example, to review challenges to socioeconomic
legislation 5 -- the Court typically defers to the judgments of the other
branches so that it is difficult, if not nearly impossible, for the challenger to
win. This two-tiered system of scrutiny limits judicial discretion because
once the Court has sorted a challenged law into the appropriate tier, it is
confined to the resulting decisional rule, as are the lower courts in deciding
analogous cases.
By contrast, constitutional tests that employ balancing, intermediate
scrutiny, or functional analysis operate as standards. Consider the Court's
express use of intermediate scrutiny to evaluate laws that classify individuals
based on gender,57 as well as facially neutral laws with a disproportionate
adverse effect on interstate commerce, 58 and facially neutral laws with a

51. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (invalidating a statute that
delegated executive budget-cutting authority to the Comptroller General, who was subject to
removal by joint resolution of Congress).
52. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952)
(holding that the President may not encroach upon the legislative power by ordering takings of
private steel mills without congressional authority).
53. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (applying strict scrutiny to
abortion regulations).
54. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invalidating a Minnesota
ordinance that prohibited symbols raising anger or alarm on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender).
55. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(suggesting the need for exacting scrutiny to protect discrete and insular minorities).
56. See, e.g., Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (rejecting claim
that taking private land for immediate resale to private homeowners did not constitute a taking
for public use); United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 178-79 (1980)
(rejecting equal protection challenge to denial of retirement benefits to workers based on dates
rather than length of service); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 486-88 (1955)
(rejecting substantive due process challenge to law barring opticians from fitting eyeglasses
without prescription).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2274 (1996) (inquiring whether
the government can offer an "exceedingly persuasive justification").
58. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (inquiring whether
the burden on interstate commerce is "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits").

Published by NSUWorks, 1998

79

Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 1

1998]

Sullivan

substantial adverse impact on speech or expressive conduct. 59 Intermediate
scrutiny, like standard-based reasoning generally, asks how strong the
government's interest is in relation to the constitutional policy at stake.
Functional analyses of separation of powers challenges provide another
example of standard-like reasoning. Whereas formal approaches would
condemn any trespass by one branch into another's powers, a functional
approach invalidates only those trespasses that go too far.60 These overtly
balancing modes of analysis gives judges considerably greater discretion than
the stark extremes of strict or rational review.
The Court deviates from rules to standards, if more informally,
whenever it weakens the presumption traditionally embodied in strict
scrutiny or rationality review. For example, applying "strict but not fatal"
review to race-based affirmative action invites governments employing such
measures to try to justify them in court. 61 Conversely, applying aggressive
rationality review to invalidate laws found to reflect irrational animus-for
example, the prohibition on gay rights claims struck down in Romer v.
Evans---invites claimants to challenge measures ranging beyond
traditionally suspect classifications. Either way, the two-tier approach
collapses into de facto balancing.
A preference for constitutional standards over constitutional rules will
tend to register as political moderation because, generally speaking, rules are
more effective than standards at effecting sharp and lasting changes in
constitutional interpretation. Standards allow the Court to decide cases
narrowly:
63 for example, this waiting period is not on its face an undue
burden, this wholesale preclusion of gay antidiscrimination claims is
unjustified, 64 this particular district was drawn with excessive attention to
racial demographics.6 5 The use of standards tends to moderate sharp swings
between ideological poles; standards allow future courts more discretion to
distinguish prior cases and decide cases in fact-specific fashion, and thus to
afford more solace and spin opportunities to the losers.

59. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86 (1968) (rejecting a facial
and as-applied challenge to a law criminalizing the burning of a draft card and establishing the

modem Court's test for analyzing content-neutral laws as inquiring whether the law closely
fits a substantial government interest).
60. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-93 (1988) (upholding independent
counsel statute because it did not "unduly trammel on executive authority," or "unduly
interfere with the role of the Executive Branch").
61. See supra note 25.

62.
63.
64.
65.

116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879-901 (1992).
See Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628-29.
See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,917 (1995).
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Of the five Justices Presidents Reagan and Bush appointed to the Court,
only two (Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas) turned out to favor
rules; 66 the other three (Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) have
tended to favor standards. 67 The latter group's preference for standards in
deciding constitutional cases furnishes one explanation for unexpectedly
moderate or liberal decisions.
To take a few examples, consider first the issue of race-based
affirmative action. Four Justices, including Justices Scalia and Thomas,
would favor a rule that the Constitution should be color blind, and that no
race-conscious measures should ever be permissible, whether aimed at
subordinating or benefiting racial minorities. On the other hand, four
Justices would apparently defer to many race-conscious measures designed
to benefit minorities while still striking down race-conscious measures that
are designed to disadvantage minorities, believing that they can perceive the
difference between a no trespassing sign and a welcome mat. Between these
two camps stands Justice O'Connor-the key swing vote on this issue-who
would permit some limited race-conscious measures where they are shown to
be closely tied to remedying past discrimination, relatively broadly
defined.68 Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Miller v. Johnson69
does something similar in asking whether race is the "predominant" factor in
how electoral district boundaries are drawn, rather than in precluding racial
considerations altogether.70 By saying that race-conscious measures are
sometimes, if rarely, permissible, such standards and race-based
distinguishing plans give governments the latitude to defend some
affirmative action plans and lower courts the wiggle room to uphold them.
To take another example, consider the First Amendment's bar on
establishment of religion. As many as four Justices at any given time, led by
Justice Scalia, have argued for a narrow rule that only sectarian preferences
71
and outright coercion of faith ought to count as forbidden establishment.
66. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 65-95.
67. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175,
1176 (1989); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[a]
government of laws means a government of rules" and that the majority's functional analysis
of separation of powers was "ungoverned by rule, and hence ungoverned by law").
68. See supra note 25. While agreeing that all racial classifications are subject to strict
scrutiny, Justice O'Connor's view is that strict scrutiny here is no longer "fatal in fact"
collapses a rule into something like a standard; affirmative action plans are evaluated by how
starkly they consider race (is race merely a factor or is it dispositive?) and how closely tied
they are to remedying discrimination.
69. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
70. Id. at 917.
71. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 642 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (joined
by Justices Rehnquist, White, and Thomas).
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Justice O'Connor, however, has led a slim majority of the Court to maintain
a broader and more flexible standard, holding that the Establishment Clause
also forbids any government actibn that a reasonable observer would
interpret as government "endorsement" of religion.72 This standard is highly
fact-intensive and susceptible to shifting outcomes. For example, a publicly
sponsored Christmas creche might be permissible if surrounded by reindeer
and a talking wishing well in a shopping district,73 but not if standing alone
on a courthouse staircase. 74 This standard permits courts to invalidate more
public religious expression than they would under Justice Scalia's rule.
As a further example, consider the limits of free speech in public spaces
other than the traditional public forum of streets and parks. In a 1992
decision involving Hare Krishna devotees seeking to leaflet and solicit in the
New York airport terminals, 75 four Justices, led by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist, would have established a bright-line rule: airports are not
traditional public forums for speech akin to streets and parks, and the First
Amendment therefore permits unlimited regulation of speech there, so long
as it is viewpoint-neutral. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, however, steered
the Court to a split result: leafleting must be permitted in the airports though
soliciting need not.76 They did so by embracing, in slightly different terms, a
standard that focused on whether the particular speech was reasonably
compatible with the functioning of the public space.77 A compatibility
inquiry gives more flexibility to the courts to enforce free speech rights than
does a rigid hierarchy of types of public places.78
As a final example, compare two approaches the Rehnquist
Court has
79
taken to separation of powers issues. In Morrison v. Olson, the Court took
a highly flexible balancing approach in upholding the independent counsel
statute by a vote of 8-1.o The majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that granting authority to prosecute high-level Executive officers to
appointees whom the President does not select and may not remove at will
does not trench too far upon the Executive power, even if prosecution is

72. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
73. See id. at 671.

74. Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,579 (1989).
75. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992);
Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992) (per curiam).
76. See id.

77. 505 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78. For an example of similar split results in a free speech challenge, recall Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinions for the majority in the abortion clinic protest cases. See supra

note 28.
79. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).

81. Id. at 658.
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inherently executive in nature. 81 A scathing dissent by Justice Scalia
objected to this brand of prudentialism in structural matters, arguing that the
issue should be the nature and not the degree of the infringement.82 By
contrast, last Term, in Printz v. United States,83 the Court invalidated, by a
vote of 5-4, a federal requirement that local law enforcement officers
perform background checks on handgun purchasers to ensure their
conformity to federal standards. The Court reasoned that structural principles
of federalism forbade any conscription of state or local officers in
end.84
administering federal law, however trivial the burden or desirable the
Writing this time for the majority, Justice Scalia flatly stated that any
"'balancing' analysis is inappropriate," and that "no comparative assessment
of the various interests" could overcome the affront to state sovereignty
embodied in such a law.85 Plainly, the Morrison standard afforded the
government more leeway for structural innovation than the Printz rule, and
against the political backdrop at the time, appeared unexpectedly politically
moderate.86
The embrace of standards over rules thus leads conservative Justices to
reach results that, in a period when the Court is moving rightward, appear
more moderate or liberal than would a rule fashioned from a similar
ideological starting point.87 This observation gives rise to an antecedent
question: Why do some Justices favor rules and others favor
standards? Why any particular Justice is drawn to either disposition is
perhaps ultimately a psychological, biographical, or even aesthetic
question. But to the extent the choice is conscious and articulate, it is likely
to follow from different conceptions of the judicial role. Like the
institutional considerations discussed above in Part II, the choice of rules or
standards might be understood as a strategy for maintaining the Court's
legitimacy. Each camp 88might claim that its method facilitates greater judicial
modesty than the other.

81. Id. at 679-85.
82. See id. at 711-12, 733-34 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
83. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
84. See generally id. at 2384.
85. Id. at 2383.
86. Whether endorsement of independent counsels is understood as politically liberal or
conservative at any time period, of course, depends to some extent on the political affiliation
of such counsels' targets.
87. Of course, the choice of standards over rules might have the opposite political
valence in a period when the Court is moving leftward. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, PostLiberal Judging: The Roles of Categorizationand Balancing, 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 293, 30708 (1992).
88. See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 112-22.
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Specifically, those who favor rules, like positivists and codifiers of

earlier generations, seek to limit the exercise of discretion in judicial
decision-making, and thus favor the reduction of constitutional propositions

as much as possible to claims of fact, not value. They suspect that the
context-specific application of standards will lead judges inappropriately to
impose their own values. Those who favor standards, in contrast, see their
role in constitutional interpretation as akin to that of common law judges,
requiring reference to the accretion of past history, precedent, and collective
wisdom in order to constrain the inevitable exercise of some contemporary
discretionary judgment.89 Justices who favor a common law approach to

constitutional interpretation believe that they will be disciplined from
imposing their own values by our traditions, social practices, shared
understandings, and the process of reasoned elaboration from -such starting
points. They believe that it is more arrogant to assert the philosophical 9 or

interpretive certainty required by announcement of a single inflexible rule.

0

Those who choose standards over rules might believe that such a

choice, in addition to embodying judicial restraint, promotes judicial
legitimacy in several other ways.

It might, as a type of alternative

constitutional dispute resolution, help to defuse sharp ideological conflict by
giving something to each side. Relatedly, it might take steps toward a
desired constitutional end-state while minimizing the expressive injury to the
losers. 91 Finally, it might seem to facilitate democratic debate and resolution
of the matters it leaves unresolved, placing conflict over values more
squarely in the hands of the people than of judges. 92 Whatever its
89. Such organicism is evident, for example, in the Casey joint opinion sustaining while
narrowing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and in Justice Souter's concurring opinion in
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2283 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the
judgment) (analogizing his approach to interpreting the Due Process Clause to the judicial
method of the common law).
90. For an example of such a critique, see Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the

Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. at 852 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("When bedrock principles collide,
they test the limits of categorical obstinacy and expose the flaws and dangers of a Grand
Unified Theory that may turn out to be neither grand nor unified.").
91. For example, the Casey decision overruled several post-Roe decisions, see Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 881-87 (1992) (upholding waiting period requirements
that prior decisions had struck down), even while leaving Roe's Constitutional bar to criminal
prohibition intact, with the net effect that abortion must be permitted but could be discouraged.
Thus an opinion that reaffirmed the right to abortion at the same time constricted the scope of
that right as a practical matter.
92. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving

Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1996). Sunstein argues that "shallow and
narrow" constitutional rulings are more desirable than "deep and broad" rulings on the ground
that they remand matters for democratic deliberation. To the extent that standards are the
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jurisprudential or institutional motivation, the choice of standards over rules
will register on the political spectrum as unexpectedly moderate or liberal
during a period of general rightward shift.
V. THE COMPLEXITY OF CONSERVATIVE IDEOLOGY

A third reason why conservative Justices might appear to vote moderate
or liberal is that the very concept of constitutional conservatism is quite
complex. A judicial conservative might be thought to favor, at least to some
degree, any of the following: 1) originalism; 2) textualism; 3) judicial
restraint (deference to legislatures); 4) libertarianism (deregulation);
5) states' rights (decentralization); 6) traditionalism; 7) stare decisis;
8) capitalism; and 9) law and order. These different strands of judicial
conservatism may sometimes pull in competing directions, both among
Justices, and even within a single Justice across an array of cases. And when
one strand trumps others, the outcome of the case may appear surprisingly
moderate or liberal.
Such tensions are easy to identify in divided decisions by the Rehnquist
Court. For example, adherence to the original meaning of the Constitution
may trump deference to the government for sake of law and order. Justices
Scalia and Thomas, typically the Court's staunchest advocates of originalism,
have sometimes voted with criminal defendants and against the government
where they thought that the framers must have meant to forbid modem
practices, such as videotaped testimony in child sexual abuse cases 9 3 or
unannounced drug raids.94
Original meaning may be at odds with traditionalism. For example,
Justice Thomas voted to sustain a First Amendment right to distribute
anonymous election leaflets, reasoning that the framers themselves had
engaged in anonymous debates over the Constitution, signing their writings5
with a variety of pseudonyms from "Publius" to the "Federal Fanner."
Justice Scalia, dissenting, found the originalist record ambiguous and would
have deferred instead to the long tradition and current legislative practice96 in
nearly all states of requiring identifying information in election literature.

device for achieving shallow and narrow rulings; however, it is hardly obvious that
ambiguities left open by the decision will be remanded for democratic resolution, as opposed
to further litigation.
93. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995).
95. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 359-69 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
96. Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Stare decisis may be at odds with any of the other strands of
conservatism. The decisive joint opinion in Casey, for example, embraced a
strong if limited respect for stare decisis, reaffirming Roe's central holding
without regard to whether it was correct as an original matter. 97 The
dissenters, in contrast, saw stare decisis as far too weak to overcome the lack
of clear textual or originalist authority for invalidating popularly enacted
abortion regulation. Similarly, in Establishment Clause challenges to such
practices as official school prayer, invocations of original practices such as
George Washington praying at his inauguration have 98failed to overcome
precedents limiting government endorsement of religion.
Some opinions would seem to represent a triumph of libertarianism over
textual or originalist literalism or judicial restraint. For example, all the
Justices except Chief Justice Rehnquist recently proved willing to invalidate,
as an unreasonable search and seizure, state-mandated drug testing for
political candidates. 99 In others, strict adherence to text and original meaning
may yield to some combination of stare decisis, traditionalism, and a robust
view of property rights. For example, Justice Scalia, who typically favors
textualist and originalist readings, exemplified this when he wrote an opinion
for the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,10 calling for strict
review under the Takings Clause of regulations that sharply diminish
property values-even though the Takings Clause says nothing about
regulation of property whose title is not transferred to the state, and even
though the framers did not envision applying the Takings Clause to such
regulations. 1
These examples could be multiplied indefinitely, but suffice to illustrate
that any effort to carry out a program of judicial "conservatism" in
constitutional interpretation involves a simultaneous equation with multiple
variables. Even a single Justice pegged as a conservative may be pulled in
different directions. The outcome of a case, therefore, depends not only upon
a Justice's default weighing of these variables, but on the relative strength of
97. Stare decisis, or respect for precedent, carries varying degrees of weight among the
five Justices appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter give considerable respect to at least the core of prior precedents. Justices Scalia and
Thomas are more willing to overturn "unsound" precedents. See, e.g., John Wallace, Stare
Decisis and the Relmquist Court: The Collision of Activism, Passivism and Politics in Casey,

42 BuFF.L. REv. 187, 205-07 (1994).
98. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (compare Souter's concurrence at 60910 with Scalia's dissent at 632-36, noting early historical examples of official prayer).
99. Chandler v. Miller, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1305 (1997).
100. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
101. His reference points instead were precedent, see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922), and traditional cultural "understandings" of the contours of property, see
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
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each particular ideological pull in the differing circumstances of each case.
To complicate matters still further, Justices may agree on a variable but
disagree strenuously over its application. For example, consider the dueling
originalism that has led the majority and dissent to disagree vigorously as to
whether the framers did or did not intend that Congress might employ state
officials to administer federal programs, 02 or whether the framers did or did
not intend that the Establishment
Clause bar only that aid to religion which
10 3
others.
over
sect
one
preferred
Finally, constitutional rights sometimes may undergo what might be
called "ideological drift. ' °4 That is, rights once thought of as having liberal
provenance are embraced by conservatives even as liberal attachment to
them falters. There is no better recent example than freedom of
speech.10 5 Free speech rights were traditionally asserted in this century by
anarchists, socialists, syndicalists, and communists, and closer to our own
time by the pioneers of racial civil rights and opponents of the war in
Vietnam. But left-wing support is not always forthcoming when free speech
claims are asserted by racist cross-burners, anti-abortion demonstrators, large
corporate advertisers, or donors of large sums to political campaigns. In the
latter sort of case, liberals often favor government regulation designed to
ensure racial dignity, reproductive privacy, or greater equality in the
marketplace of ideas, and conservative groups take up the banner of free
speech libertarian opposition.
In such circumstances, popular views of the political valence of
decisions may lag behind the ideological drift, leading to the perception that
conservative Justices have voted "liberal" on free speech, and vice
versa. For example, in a recent abortion clinic protest case, the traditionally
liberal Justice Stevens voted to uphold all restrictions on the protestors while
the historically conservative Justice Scalia would have struck them all

102. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (compare the majority opinion
at 2370-75 with Stevens' dissent at 2389-94).
103. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995) (compare Thomas' concurring opinion at 855-58 with Souter's dissent at 866-76).
104. See Balkin, supra note 31, at 393-94.
105. For another example, consider the shift from left to right on the political spectrum
of the view that the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection is a guarantee of
formal equality that bars all official use of race as a classification. Today, many conservatives
use a principle once urged in the civil rights movement to reject affirmative action and
aggressive interpretations of the Voting Rights Act, while many liberals eschew formal
equality claims in favor of a view of the Equal Protection Clause as an antisubordination
principle under which benign racial classifications should not be treated the same as invidious
ones.
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down.1°6 Similarly, in a recent campaign finance case, the supposedly
conservative Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia embraced vigorously the
free speech rights of political parties while several supposedly liberal Justices
expressed willingness to allow wide-ranging government regulation of
campaign finance. 1°7 Because the press has an institutional interest in strong
First Amendment protection, such decisions are apt to be reported as
"liberal" victories for free speech, even if the credit must go to
"conservative" Justices.
VI. CONCLUSION

This essay has suggested three possible explanations-institutional,
jurisprudential and ideological--of why a Court moving generally rightward
might nonetheless be characterized occasionally by surprising judicial
moderation or even a liberal turn. These factors help show why it is so
difficult to capture the work of the Court along a single political
vector: "sharp right turn," or "the center holds." There is nothing mutually
inconsistent among these accounts. Indeed, they may reinforce one another,
as when institutional concerns influence jurisprudential orientation. And
these accounts help to refute the view, sometimes expressed in popular
commentary, that the moderate judicial behavior of the swing Justices on the
Rehnquist Court is incoherent or inexplicable.

106. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753,777 (1994). The majority in
Madsen, steering between the poles set by Justices Stevens and Scalia, upheld some of the

restrictions but not others.
107. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm'n v. F.E.C., 116 S. Ct. 2309 (1996).
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Internet' has revolutionized the exchange of information by
providing our society with a "new marketplace of ideas."2 As history has
revealed, new methods of communication lead to differences in
opinion. Consequently, differences in opinion lead to government
regulation, which then lead to litigation.3 The development of the Internet

1. In Reno v. ACLU, the United States Supreme Court defined the Internet as "an
international network of interconnected computers." Reno v. ACLU, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 2334
(1997) [hereinafter Reno Ill. Although it is difficult to estimate because of its rapid
expansion, the Internet connects approximately 9.4 million computers worldwide and is
believed to transmit the speech of 40 million people. Brief for Appellees at *9, Reno II (No.
96-511), 1997 WL 74378. For extensive facts on the Internet, its history, and how it works
see Reno II, 117 S.Ct. at 2334-36.
2. Id. at 2351. For the origin of this marketplace concept, see Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 116 S.Ct. 2374, 2381
(1996) (upholding a provision that allowed cable operators to ban indecent programming on
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created relatively effortless access to adult-oriented materials for both
children and adults. This fact influenced the government to enact a
regulation to protect minors.4 This regulation spurred litigation which has
made its way through the legal system, all the way to the United States
Supreme Court.
On June 26, 1997, in Reno v. ACLU ("Reno 1/')6 the first United States
Supreme Court case involving the Internet, the Court handed down a
landmark decision.7 Two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of
1996 ("CDA"), 8 were declared unconstitutional in a 7-2 opinion authored by
Justice Stevens. 9 The CDA prohibited the transmission of "indecent"' 0 and
"patently offensive"" communications to minors via the Internet. Moreover,
the Court held that indecent speech on the Internet is protected by the First
leased channels); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (upholding a
statute making it a crime to make an indecent interstate telephone call); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978) (upholding a FCC order on a radio broadcast); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 72-73 (1976) (upholding a Detroit ordinance on adult
films); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949) (upholding restrictions on the use of sound
trucks); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 559-60 (1948) (striking down an ordinance banning
the use of amplification devices without the police chief's permission).
4. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (West Supp. 1997).
5. See Reno II,
117 S.Ct. at 2329.
6.Id.
7. Id. at 2351.
8. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47
U.S.C.A. § 223(a)-(h) (West Supp. 1997)) [hereinafter "CDA"].
9. Reno I,117 S.Ct. at 2351.
10. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1997) (providing for criminal prosecution
of anyone in interstate or foreign communications who "by means of a telecommunications
device knowingly... (i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission of, any
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene or
indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18 years of age").
11. Id. § 223(d)(1). Section 223(d)(1) prohibits:
Whoever(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or
persons under 18 years of age, or
(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner
available to a person under 18 years of age,
any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs.., shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two
years, or both.
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Amendment. 2 This comment analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the
Court's rationale in Reno II, examines the implications of this decision, and
explores its ramifications on future Internet legislation. Specifically, this
author applauds the reasoning applied by the majority and questions the
logic of Justice 13O'Connor's opinion, in which she concurred in part and
dissented in part.
The foundation of the Court's analysis in Reno II was its declaration
that the Internet is a distinct medium of communication which can be
distinguished from broadcast media. 14 This distinction provided the Court
with the framework for an analysis of the issue presented. The main issue
was whether the Court should uphold "the constitutionality of two statutory
provisions enacted to protect minors from 'indecent' and 'patently offensive'
communications on the Internet." 5
The decision in Reno II is extremely important for several
reasons. First, the Court has provided the Internet with the broadest possible
First Amendment protection.' 6 This opinion sends a message to the
legislature that broad, content-based regulations on the Internet will be
struck down.' 7 Second, the Court was presented with the opportunity to
establish First Amendment guidelines with respect to the Internet.18 These
guidelines create a new application of the traditional legal standards of the
First Amendment. Finally, this case is significant because the Internet is
creating a new jurisprudence.
In examining the Court's decision, Part II of this case comment reviews
the factual and procedural history of the case. Although the facts of this case
are brief, the procedural history plays a crucial role in the majority opinion
because the Court utilizes many of the factual findings and legal arguments
found in the United States district court's decision.' Part III explains the
arguments of each side and the rationale employed by both the majority
opinion and the dissent. Part IV of the comment analyzes the Court's logic
by focusing on the strengths and weaknesses of both the majority and the
dissenting opinions. In conclusion, Part V explores the implications of the

12. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
13. Id. at 2351.
14. Id. at 2343.
15. Id. at 2334.
16. Id.
17. Content based regulations "restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content." Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)
(citations omitted).
18. Reno 11, 117 S. Ct. at 2336.
19. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997)
[hereinafter Reno 1].
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Court's reasoning and the ramifications of the decision on future Internet
legislation.
HI. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.

The Origin of the Lawsuit

On February 8, 1996, President Clinton signed into law, as Title V of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996,20 the CDA.2 1 Almost as soon as the
President's pen left the paper, twenty plaintiffs2 2 brought suit against the
Attorney General of the United States, Ms. Janet Reno, and the Justice
Department 2 3 challenging the constitutionality of two provisions24 of the
CDA72 As a result, United States District Judge, Judge Buckwalter, entered
a temporary restraining order
26 against section 223(a)(1)(B)(ii) as it related to
indecent communications.
Accordingly, a second group of twenty-seven plaintiffs27 filed suit
against the appellants also challenging the constitutionality of the statute on

20. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)-(h) (West Supp. 1997).
21. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2329.
22. The plaintiffs in the initial suit included the following: American Civil Liberties
Union; Human Rights Watch; Electronic Privacy Information Center; Electronic Frontier
Foundation; Journalism Education Association; Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility; National Writers Union; Clarinet Communications Corp.; Institute for Global
Communications; Stop Prisoner Rape; AIDS Education Global Information System;
Bibilbytes; Queer Resources Directory; Critical Path AIDS Project, Inc.; Wildcat Press, Inc.;
Declan McCullagh dba Justice on Campus; Brock Meeks dba Cyberwire Dispatch; John Tyler
dba The Safer Sex Page; Jonathan Wallace dba The Ethical Spectacle; and Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. Id. at 2339 n.27.
23. Hereinafter, Ms. Reno and the Justice Department will be referred to as the
"appellants."
24. These challenged provisions are 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1997) and
47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
25. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2339.
26. Id. Section 223(a)(1)(B) is the "indecency provision."
27. The plaintiffs in the subsequent suit included the following: American Library
Association; America Online, Inc.; American Booksellers Association, Inc.; American Society
of Newspaper Editors; Apple Computer, Inc.; Association of American Publishers, Inc.;
Association of Publishers, Editors and Writers; Citizens Internet Empowerment Coalition;
Commercial Internet Exchange Association; Compuserve Inc.; Families Against Internet
Censorship; Freedom to Read Foundation, Inc.; Health Sciences Libraries Consortium;
Hotwired Ventures, LLC; Interactive Digital Software Association; Magazine Publishers of
America; Microsoft Corp.; The Microsoft Network, LLC; National Press Photographers
Association; Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc.; Newspaper Association of
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its face.2 Both cases were consolidated into a single suit and were brought
before a three-judge district court pursuant to the CDA.29 The district court
granted a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the challenged

provisions.30
B.

The United States DistrictCourt Opinions

The United States district court judges unanimously held the CDA to be
unconstitutional. 31 However, each of the three judges wrote a separate

opinion, each using a slightly different rationale to reach their

decision.32 These opinions are important because the reasoning applied in
each one was influential in the Supreme Court's decision.
Consequently, Chief Judge Sloviter recognized that "there is certainly a
compelling government interest to shield a substantial number of minors
from some of the online material that motivated Congress to enact the
CDA. 3 3 However, she questioned the strength of the appellant's interest in
this case.34 Chief Judge Sloviter held that the CDA abridges the First
Amendment because it regulates more than is necessary; thus, it "chills the
expression of adults. 35 In addition, she was not convinced by the

appellant's contention that the application of the CDA could be narrowly

tailored only to commercial pornographers. 36 Lastly, Chief Judge Sloviter
rejected the affirmative defenses 37 encompassed by the CDA because she felt

America; Opnet, Inc.; Prodigy Services Company; Society of Professional Journalists; and
Wired Ventures, Ltd. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2339 n.28.
28. Id. at 2339.
29. Id.
30. Id.

31. Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 883.
32. Id. at 824. The following judges each wrote a separate opinion creating the majority
opinion: Chief Judge Dolores K. Sloviter, Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter, and Judge Stewart
Dalzell. Id.
33. Id. at 853. The Court in Reno 11 found the same compelling governmental interest as
Chief Judge Sloviter. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
34. Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 855.
35. Id. at 854 (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131
(1989)).
36. Id. at 855. Chief Judge Sloviter's point is reflected in the majority opinion. Reno II,
117 S. Ct. at 2341.
37. The affirmative defenses include: the "verified credit card" defense, which states
that a speaker has a defense from criminal liability if he/she restricts access to indecent
materials "by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult
personal identification number," and the "good faith" clause, which stated a speaker must
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the defenses were neither technologically feasible
38 nor effectively protective
"from the unconstitutional reach of the statute."
Aside from Chief Judge Sloviter's opinion, Judge Buckwalter
39
concluded, according to Sable Communication of California,Inc. v. FCC,
that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and failed the strict scrutiny
standard. 4° Judge Buckwalter reached this conclusion by asserting that the
CDA lacked "simple fairness" because the words "indecent" and "patently
offensive" were not defined within the statute. a Judge Buckwalter agreed
with Chief Judge Sloviter that these provisions had a chilling effect on
speech on the Internet because users would not know whether they were
protected from criminal liability. 42 He felt that the "unique characteristics"
of the Internet required cautiously drafted legislation.43
Similarly, Judge Dalzell concluded that the CDA was unconstitutional
and that the "special attributes" of the Internet invalidated any content-based
regulation on this medium.44 Moreover, he distinguished the Internet as a
"new medium of mass communication" 45 that required a "medium-specific"
analysis. 46 Judge Dalzell rejected the appellants' argument that the CDA
accomplished their interest of protecting minors from pornography because,
according to the factual findings, the majority of adult-oriented material on
the Internet is transmitted from outside the United States. 47 He concluded
that the CDA may have shielded children from pornography originating in
from Amsterdam; thus, it did not accomplish the
New York, but not 48
government's interest.

employ "in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions.., to restrict or prevent
access by minors" 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(5) (A)-(B) (West Supp. 1997).
38. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 856. Chief Judge Sloviter's logic is adopted by the Court in
Reno IL Reno I1,117 S. Ct. at 2348-49.
39. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
40. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 858.
41. Id. at 861-62 (quoting 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1997)). The Court in
Reno II agrees with Judge Buckwalter's holding. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
42. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 865.
43. Id. The majority opinion utilizes Judge Buckwalter's reasoning in Reno II. Reno II,
117 S. Ct. at 2344.
44. Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at 867. Judge Dalzell does not define the "special attributes"
he referred to in his logic. Id.
45. Id. at 872.
46. Id. Judge Dalzell's "medium-specific" approach is adopted in part in the majority of
the Court's approach to the issue presented in Reno II. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2340.
47. Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 882. Approximately half of the communications that are
transmitted over the Internet originate overseas. Id.
48. Id.
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A.

The Appellants' Argument

The appellants argued that both of the challenged provisions of the
CDA were constitutional because they advanced the compelling
governmental interest of shielding minors from exposure to adult-oriented
material through narrowly tailored means. 49 Furthermore, the appellants
contended that since adults and children have a First Amendment right to
receive and to gain information via the Internet, parents will be afraid to use
this beneficial resource if children have access to "indecent" and "patently
offensive" materials.5 0 Thus, the appellants stated that the CDA not only
advances their compelling interest in protecting minors from harmful
materials, it also advances their "equally compelling interest in furthering
the First Amendment interest of all
5 1 Americans to use what has become an
unparalleled educational resource."
The appellants addressed the constitutionality of both of the challenged
provisions
by
relying
on
precedence
involving
indecency
restrictions. First, they argued that since minors do not have the ability to
make informed decisions on whether to view sexually explicit material on
the Internet, the holding in Ginsberg v. New York53 should be applied. 54 In
order to protect the impressionable well-being of minors, the Court in
Ginsberg upheld an indecency statute prohibiting bookstores and movie
theaters from allowing minors to view indecent movies or materials. 55 The
appellants contended that this principle also applied to the Internet.5 6
Second, the appellants argued that the holding in FCC v. Pacifica
57 which stated
Foundation,
that government may regulate indecent
communications on broadcast media so that children are not exposed to
them, also applies to the Internet.5 8 Third, the appellants asserted that they
have an interest in creating zoning programs to curb the effects of adult-

49. Brief for Appellants at *14, Reno II (No. 96-511), 1997 WL 32931.
50. Id. at *18-19.
51. Id. at *14-15.
52. Id. at *19.
53. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
54. Brief for Appellants at *20, Reno II (No. 96-511).
55. 390 U.S. at 645.
56. Brief for Appellants at *19, Reno II (No. 96-511).
57. 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978). In Pacifica,the Court upheld the FCC's prohibition of
George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue broadcast on radio. Id.
58. Brief for Appellants at *20-21,Reno I (No. 96-511).
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oriented material on children.5 9 The appellants argued that zoning
ordinances, like those in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,60 should
also apply to cyberspace. 6' Similarly, the government urged that regulating
the appellants viewed the CDA as a
cyberspace is "a zoning issue. ' 62 Thus,
63
time, place, and manner restriction.
The appellants also made several alternative arguments. First, they
argued that the "patently offensive" provision is not vague because the same
words are found in the second prong of the Miller v. California64 test for
Next, the appellants urged that the challenged provisions are
obscenity.
constitutional because of the knowledge requirement and the statutory
defenses. 66 Additionally, the government contended that no alternatives
existed that were as effective as the CDA in advancing their
interests. 7 Furthermore, they argued that technology exists for "tagging 68
and monitoring indecent and patently offensive materials.69

59. Id. at *21-22.
60. 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986). In Renton, the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that
prohibited adult movie theaters from being located within 1000 feet of a residential zone. Id.
61. Brief for Appellants at *21-22, Reno II (No. 96-511).
62. Transcript of Oral Argument at *19, Reno II (No. 96-511), 1997 WL 136253 (June
26, 1997). Time, place, and manner restrictions regulate when, where, and how speech is
communicated. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1989) (upholding an ordinance that
prevented anti-abortion activists from picketing the residence of a doctor who performed
abortions).
63. The government contended that the CDA censors places in cyberspace such as mail
exploders, chat rooms, and newsgroups. Brief for Appellants at *37, Reno II (No. 96-511).
64. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In Miller, the Court created the Miller test, which provided
the framework to determine obscenity states:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
65. Brief for Appellants at *42, Reno II (No. 96-511).
66. Id at *25-27. The "verified credit card" defense and the "good faith" clause were
applied in the event that prosecution occurred. 47 U.S.C § 223(e)(5)(A)-(B) (Supp. 1997).
67. Brief for Appellants at *38, Reno 11 (No. 96-511).
68. Id. "Tagging" refers to a system in which the speakers would label or "tag" their
speech as "indecent" so that other users would know the type of speech they are encountering.
Id.
69. Id.
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Lastly, according to the appellants, if the Court were to deem the

provisions unconstitutional, then it should utilize the statutory "severability

clause"70 to eliminate only the unconstitutional terms and not the entire
provision.7 The appellants stated that "[t]he district court threw up its hands
and struck down a statute without... finding that
7 2 any more narrowly
tailored, constitutionally acceptable solution exists."
B.

The Appellees' Argument

The appellees based their argument on the contention that the CDA, a
content-based regulation, failed strict scrutiny on its face because it was not
narrowly tailored to accomplish a substantial government interest.73 The

appellees offered several alternative arguments to prove this contention. 74

First, the appellees argued that the CDA was unconstitutional because it
imposed criminal sanctions on the constitutionally protected speech of
adults.7 5 The appellees urged that even though the government interest was
to protect children, the CDA abridged the First Amendment by banning the
indecent speech of adults throughout cyberspace.7 6 Therefore, according to
the appellees, the CDA was too restrictive because it regulated more than
was necessary to achieve the government's interest.7

70. 47 U.S.C.A. § 608 (West Supp. 1997). The "severability clause" states: "If any
provision of this chapter or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held
invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the application of such provision to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected thereby." Id.
71. Brief for Appellants at *45-47, Reno II (No. 96-511).
72. Transcript of Oral Argument at *31, Reno II (No. 96-511). For extensive
explanations of the government's views see The United States Department of Justice Home
Page (visited July 28, 1997) <http://www.usdoj.gov.>.
73. Brief for Appellees at *20, Reno II (No. 96-511).
74. Id.
75. Id. at "20-21.
76. Transcript of Oral Argument at *59-60, Reno 11 (No. 96-511). The appellees relied
on the First Amendment rule that the government may not "reduce the adult
population ... to ... only what is fit for children." Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium v. FCC, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 2393 (1996) (citations omitted). In Denver, the Court
upheld a statute authorizing cable operators to prohibit indecent speech on television. Id. at
2397-98. In addition, the appellees cited Sable, which held that a complete ban on indecent
dial-a-porn telephone conversations limited adults to what is appropriate for children. Brief
for Appellees at *21, Reno H (No.96-511) (citing Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989)).
77. Id. at *20.
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Next, the appellees argued the CDA was both substantially overbroad
and unconstitutionally vague. 78
They asserted that the CDA was
substantially overbroad because it neither defined its language nor its
reach. 79
Furthermore, the appellees contended that the "indecent"
provision and the "patently offensive" provision 81 were too vague.8 2 They
stated that because these words were undefined, the CDA placed "millions
of ordinary citizens... at risk of criminal prosecution merely for
communicating in possibly 'offensive' terms online. 8
Also, the appellees argued that the statutory defenses were ineffective
and not technologically feasible.8 First, they argued that the defenses did
not provide speakers with guidelines on how to avoid criminal
liability. 5 Second, according to the appellees, the defenses were not
available and were also too expensive to the majority of speakers.8 6 Third,
87
they stated88that the technological defenses such as credit card verification,
"tagging,' and mandatory age verification were meaningless because, at the
time of this case, it was impossible to effectively and economically
9
determine
ageSupreme
of a speaker
thethe
cyberspace.8
appellees
asserted that
Courtonline
shouldin not
narrow the Finally,
CDA bythe
utilizing
the

78. Id. at *39.
79. Id. at "41-42.
80. 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1997).
81. Id. § 223(d)(1).
82. Brief for Appellees at *42, Reno II (No. 96-511).
83. Id.
84. Id. at *46-47.
85. Id. at *44 n.25.
86. Id. at *20.
87. Credit card verification requires an Internet speaker to provide an on-line service
with a valid credit card before "signing on" to the Internet. Brief for Appellees at *14, Reno I
(No. 96-511). Then, the on-line provider has to verify the credit card with the credit card
company to determine whether or not the speaker is a minor. The appellees argued that this is
an ineffective defense because credit card verification is costly to the Internet providers. In
addition, credit card companies will only verify a card if the request is for a commercial
transaction. The appellees also point out that credit card verification is an entirely unavailable
defense to Internet users who are not charged for access. Id. at *14-15.
88. The appellees, relying on the United States District Court's findings, contended that
"tagging" is also not available because it is technologically impossible, burdensome on
speakers, and does not prohibit minors from being sent "indecent" material. Id. at *16.
89. Transcript of Oral Argument at *27-29, Reno H (No. 96-511). For extensive
explanations on the views and arguments of the appellees, see The ACLU Freedom Network
(last modified July 23, 1997) <http://www.aclu.org.>.
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statutory severability clause. Instead, they urged that the entire CDA should
be struck down if the challenged provisions were found unconstitutional. 9°
C.

The Majority Opinion

The cornerstone of Reno II was the majority's determination that the
Internet is a distinct medium of communication which differs from broadcast
media. 91 In order to establish this new medium, the majority distinguished
the precedence relied upon by the government.92
Initially, the majority addressed Ginsberg v. New York.93 In Ginsberg,
the majority upheld a New York statute that prohibited the sale of obscene
materials, such as magazines, to minors even if the materials were not
considered obscene to adults. 94 The majority distinguished Ginsberg by
contrasting the New York statute and the CDA.95 First, the statute in
Ginsberg did not ban parents from purchasing sexually-explicit materials for
their children; however under the CDA, parents giving consent to their
children to receive "indecent" communication could have been held
criminally liable.96 Second, the New York statute was only applicable to
commercial transactions, while the CDA did not differentiate between the
types of transmissions. 97 Third, the majority stated that the statute in
Ginsberg provided a definition of the materials that were considered obscene
for minors whereas the CDA left the terms "indecent" and "patently
offensive" undefined.98
Likewise, the m~ajority also distinguished FCC v. Pacifica Foundation
for several reasons. 99 According to the majority, the statutes in Pacifica
targeted specific broadcasts,'tm but the CDA prohibited broad categories of

90. Brief for Appellees at *20, Reno H (No. 96-511).
91. Reno H1,117 S. Ct. at 2340, 2343. The Court's "medium-specific" analysis is similar
to that applied by Judge Dalzell in Reno L See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 872.
92. Reno 11, 117 S. Ct. at 2341, 2343. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115 (1989); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
93. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.
94. Ginsberg,390 U.S. at 629.
95. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2341.

96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2341-42.

100. In Pacifica,a listener-supported radio station broadcast George Carlin's monologue

"Dirty Words" in the middle of the afternoon when minors were most likely to hear it.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729-30.
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speech with no limitations. 10 Also, the statutes differed because the FCC
order was not punitive like the CDA.10 2 Moreover, the majority explained
that the radio is a different type of communication medium than the Internet
and has historically been given limited First Amendment protection.10 3
Similarly, the majority distinguished the zoning ordinances in Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc. from the government's attempt to "cyberzone" by
means of the CDA.1°4 The majority found that the zoning ordinances in
Renton only affected the location of adult movie theaters and bookstores,
while the CDA zoned the content in all of cyberspace.' 0 5 Since the CDA
regulated "what" was transmitted and not "where" it was transmitted, the
majority disagreed with the government's contention that the CDA is a time,
place, and manner restriction.1°6 Instead, the majority concluded that the
CDA is a content-based regulation. 0 7
By distinguishing these authorities, the majority differentiated the
Internet from other communication mediums.10 8 Initially, the majority
explained that broadcast media has historically been regulated and
supervised by the government because of its "'invasive' nature."' '° The
majority adopted the district court's finding that Internet communications do
not have the ability to invade a person's computer or home." 0 Instead, the
majority determined that the Internet is different from broadcast media
because encountering adult-oriented material on the Internet "'requires a
series of affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning a
dial.'"'11

101. Reno I, 117 S. Ct. at 2341-42.
102. Id. at 2342. There were two statutes in Pacifica prohibiting the use of indecent
language on radio communications. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 739 n.13.
103. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2342.
104. Id. "Cyberzoning" is a zoning ordinance in cyberspace. Id.
105. Id. In addition, the Court also pointed out that the government interest in Renton
was to protect children from the "secondary effects" of adult-oriented materials, but the
government's interest in the CDA was to protect children from the "primary effects of
'indecent' and 'patently offensive' speech." Id.
106. Reno 11, 117 S. Ct. at 2342-43.
107. Id. at 2342. For a good example of a case involving a content-based restriction, see
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. St. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116
(1991) (holding that "[tihe Son of Sam law is such a content-based statute" because "[i]t
singles out income derived from expressive activity for a burden the State places on no other
income, and it is directed only at works with a specified content").
108. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2343.
109. Id. (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128

(1989)).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2336 (quoting Reno 1,929 F. Supp. at 845).
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By analogy, the majority relied on Sable Communications of California,
Inc. v. FCC to prove this point.' 12 The majority viewed searching for
sexually explicit material on the Internet to be the same as the conduct in
Sable of placing a "dial-a-porm" telephone call.'13 Furthermore, the majority
concluded that the Internet and broadcast media differ because most adultoriented material on the Internet provides warning screens for minors
whereas radio and television do not have such warning devices.'1
Additionally, the majority ruled that First Amendment scrutiny should
be applied to issues regarding freedom of speech on the Internet.' 1 5 First, the
majority agreed with the lower court that the "indecent" provision and the
"patently offensive" provision were too vague because they lacked
definitions.116 Next, the majority established its concerns that because the
regulation, it would have an
CDA is an undefined, punitive content-based
"obvious chilling effect on free speech."' " 17
As a result, the majority declared that the CDA was overbroad on its
face because it suppressed constitutionally protected speech between adults
when less restrictive alternatives existed for advancing the government's
interest. 11 The majority recognized that there is a governmental interest in
shielding minors from harmful speech." 9 However, the majority determined
that this interest did not justify molding adult speech into what is appropriate
for children.12'
In addition, the majority rejects the government's argument that the
CDA's scienter requirement and the statutory defenses save it from failing
because of overbreadth. 121 The majority, relying on the lower court's factual
findings, agreed that at the time of the decision, the technology for
112. Id. at 2343.
113. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2343-44.
114. Id. at 2343.
115. Id. at 2344.
116. Id. at 2344-45.
117. Id. at 2344.
118. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2347. The majority was also concerned about the issue of
applying community standards of the person offended to material on the Internet. The Court
explained that the application of community standards to a transmission sent to the entire
nation will be judged by the community of the offended listener. Id. For good articles on
both sides of this issue see Joanna H. Kim, Comment, Cyber-PornObscenity: The Viability of
Local Community Standards and the Federal Venue Rules in the Computer Network Age, 15
LoY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 415 (1995); and Timothy S. T. Bass, Comment, Obscenity in Cyberspace:
Some Reasons for Retaining the Local Community Standard, 1996 U. CI. LEGAL F. 471

(1996).
119. Reno 1I, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2349.
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monitoring all of cyberspace did not exist and the means that did exist were
too expensive for the non-commercial user.1 22 In addition, the Court refused
to utilize the "severability clause" included in the CDA.12 3 According
to the
24
opinion, even "textual surgery" could not have saved the CDA.1
D.

The Concurring in Part,Dissentingin PartOpinion

Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor's concurring in part,
dissenting in part opinion in which she declared that she would strike down
the challenged provisions only to the extent that adult speech is
suppressed.'
The cornerstone of Justice O'Connor's opinion was her
argument that what the majority called the "patently offensive" prov 1n26
was actually two separate provisions. 27 According to Justice O'Connor,
these were the "'specific person' provision"' 28 and the "'display'
provision. ' 129 Although Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that the
"display provision" was unconstitutional because it was technologically
impossible to zone all of cyberspace, she argued that the other provisions
were constitutional as long as the adult 3 sending the transmission knows that
the recipient of the material is a minor.1 0
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that the provisions were
overbroad; however, she argued that the appellees had not proven that they

122. Id. In her concurring in part, dissenting in part opinion, Justice O'Connor agreed
with the majority that in cyberspace "'there is no means of age verification,' cyberspace still
remains largely unzoned-and unzoneable." Id. at 2354 (quoting Reno 1, 929 F. Supp. at
846).
123. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2349-50. The Court did not utilize the "severability clause"
for two reasons. First, the Court stated that its jurisdictional review was limited by the CDA,
to only challenges to the statute "on its face." Id. at 2350; 47 U.S.C.A. § 608 (West Supp.
1997). The Court explained that severing the CDA would change the litigation into an 'asapplied' challenge." Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2350. Second, the Court stated that "[t]he openended character of the CDA provides no guidance what ever for limiting its coverage." Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2357 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
126. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
127. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2352 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
128. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997)). Justice O'Connor
stated this provision "makes it a crime to knowingly send a patently offensive message or
image to a specific person under the age of 18." Id.
129. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1997)). Justice O'Connor
stated this provision "criminalizes the display of patently offensive messages or images 'in
a[ny] manner available' to minors." Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d)(1)(B) (West Supp.
1997)).
130. Reno H, 117 S.Ct. at 2357.
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were substantially overbroad.131 Furthermore, Justice O'Connor contended
that the CDA could have been applied constitutionally because it
was not substantially overbroad with respect to the rights of
minors. 132 Consequently, Justice O'Connor urged that the "indecency
provision" and the "specific person provision" should be sustained when
communication is between an adult and a minor. 33 Justice O'Connor
concluded that the challenged provisions should only be invalidated to the
extent that the provisions encroached on communication between adults. 3
IV. ANALYSIS OF RENO V. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

Under the CDA, a mother could be sent to prison for up to two years for
sending an e-mail on birth control to her seventeen-year-old daughter at
college if the community standards would define the message as
"indecent."1 35 Similarly under the CDA, an adult can enter an "adult only"
chat room and suppress the speech of every adult present by simply saying,
"my sixteen-year-old son is sitting here with me."1 36 If hypotheticals like
these exist, it is difficult to find flaws in the majority's decision that the
CDA abridges the First Amendment. The majority opinion is well-reasoned
and logical. By taking a "medium-specific" approach, the Supreme Court
broadcast media and
correctly determined that the Internet differs from
37
deserves unfettered First Amendment protection.1
In addition, both the United States district court and the Court
accurately found that there is a compelling governmental interest in
protecting the well-being of minors from harmful materials on the Internet
because minors are extremely impressionable. 138 If the government does not
prohibit minor's access to sexually explicit material on the Internet in some
manner, the mental development of minors could be severely effected.13 9 In

131. Id. at 2356.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
136. The Court calls this hypothetical situation the "heckler's veto" because any user
could sign on and say that their minor son is present even if that user did not have a son. Id. at
2349.
137. Id. at 2343.
138. Id. at 2341. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (Justice Brennan
agreed that "[t]he well-being of its children is of course a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate").
139. Justice Powell agreed that "children may not be able to protect themselves from
speech which, although shocking to most adults, generally may be avoided by the unwilling
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addition, the Court's conclusion that the CDA did not advance this interest is
on the mark. The pinnacle of the Court's rationale is the determination that
the CDA was both too vague and overbroad.14° Since the legislative history
of the CDA showed that the definitions of "indecent" and "patently
offensive" were omitted, exactly what do these terms mean?' 4' The Court
has repeatedly held that "'sexual expression which is indecent but not
obscene is protected by the First Amendment. ' " 142 Thus, in order not to chill
the speech of society, it is imperative that these terms are adequately defined
in the CDA.
Furthermore, the Court correctly decided that the CDA regulated more
than is necessary to achieve the appellant's compelling interest because it
regulated constitutionally protected speech among adults. 43 If Congress
wants to permissibly prohibit this type of speech, it must show that it is
trying to further a compelling governmental interest. 144 Although the interest
asserted by the appellants was compelling, in order to withstand strict
scrutiny, the government needed Eproof that the CDA was narrowly
constructed to advance this interest.' 5 The Court accurately reasoned that
since the CDA infringed upon the constitutionally protected speech of
adults, it was not narrowly-tailored and regulated more than was
necessary.146 Therefore, instead of referring to the CDA as failing strict
scrutiny, the Court logically invalidated
the challenged provisions by
147
utilizing the overbreadth doctrine.
The Court's ruling that neither the statutory defenses nor the
"severability clause" save the CDA from constitutional muster is also

through the exercise of choice. At the same time, such speech may have a deeper and more
lasting negative effect on a child ....
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 757-58 (1978)
(Powell, J., concurring).
140. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2344-47.
141. Id. at 2347.
142. Id. at 2346 (quoting Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989)).
143. Id. at 2347. The Court stated that the "undefined terms 'indecent' and 'patently
offensive' cover large amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or other
value." Id.
144. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (stating "we have required the State to
show that the 'regulation is necessary to serve a compelling interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end"') (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
145. Reno II, 117 S. Ct at 2344.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2347. The Court stated, "the breadth of the CDA's coverage is wholly
unprecedented." Id.
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sound. 48 Since the facts show that technology does not exist to monitor the
content of cyberspace, the statutory defenses are based more on what future
technology holds. 49 In addition, the Court correctly points out that in order
for the Court to apply the CDA's "severability clause," the provisions would
have to be "'readily susceptible"' to change. 50 Neither of the challenged
provisions is susceptible to severability because the CDA would still be a
content-based regulation even if the Court was to merely remove the
undefined terms.'
The Court has held that most content-based regulations
are analyzed under strict scrutiny. 152 After applying strict scrutiny to the
severed CDA, it would still likely be struck down because it does not
advance a compelling interest of the government.
Unlike the majority opinion, Justice O'Connor's concurring in part,
dissenting in part opinion provokes questions. For example, Justice
O'Connor's contention that "the CDA can be applied constitutionally in
some situations"' 5 3 presents this question: In which situations could the
CDA have been constitutionally applied? Justice O'Connor failed to give
examples. If Justice O'Connor is referring to her argument that the CDA
should be sustained in situations where the CDA restricts the speech of
minors and not that of adults, then this argument presents another
question. 154 How are courts going to limit the CDA from restricting only
speech effecting the rights of minors and not the communication between
adults? The only 155means available would be to utilize the CDA's
"severability clause."
Incidentally, Justice O'Connor failed to address the
"severability clause." 156

148. Id. at 2350-51.

149. Chief Judge Sloviter stated: "I can imagine few arguments less likely to persuade a
court to uphold a criminal statute than one that depends on future technology.... ." Reno I,
929 F. Supp at 857.
150. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2350 (quoting Virginia v. American Bookseller's Ass'n, Inc.,
484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988) (citations omitted)).
151. The CDA is regulating the content of what minors could access on the Internet;
thus, it is content-based. Brief of the Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, Various Artists and Art
Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees at *16, Reno II (No. 96-511), 1997
WL 76015.
152. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. St. Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 116 (1992); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126
(1989); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975).
153. Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2355 (O'Connor, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
154. Id.
155. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 608 (West Supp. 1997).
156. See Justice O'Connor's concurring in part, dissenting in part opinion in Reno I.
Reno II, 117 S. Ct. at 2351-57.
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Likewise, Justice O'Connor did not address the issue of the CDA's
vagueness, 157 which presents yet another question. If the Court was, as
Justice O'Connor argued, to sustain the "indecency transmission"
provision, 158 how are people to know what "indecent" means? The CDA did
not define the word.19 Since the CDA is a criminal statute, people must
know the definition of "indecent." Otherwise, Internet users will not know
whether their communication is legal. This creates a potential violation
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 16° The Court
affirmed Shea v. Reno' 61 which stated, "[d]ue process requires that a
criminal statute 'give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable
opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act
accordingly."' 1 62 The Court never reached a due process argument because
it invalidated both of the challenged provisions of the CDA as facially
overbroad.163 If Justice O'Connor's argument prevailed that the "indecency
transmission provision" was not overbroad, a due process challenge would
have rendered this provision unconstitutional.
V. CONCLUSION

A.

Implicationsand Ramifications

Reno H has defined the scope of the Internet under the First
Amendment. This decision implies that speech on this new medium will
receive broad First Amendment protection.' 64 As the Internet continues to
expand rapidly, the 7-2 majority sends a message that content-based
restrictions on the Internet will be struck down for a long time to
come. Justice Stevens concluded the majority opinion in Reno II by
summarizing the Court's approach to content-based freedom of speech:

157. Id.
158. Justice O'Connor's reference to the "indecency transmission" provision is the same
as what the majority opinion calls the "indecency" provision. Id. at 2356.
159. In Reno II, the majority stated "[g]iven the absence of a definition of either
term... provoke[s] uncertainty among speakers about how the two standards relate to each
other and just what they mean." Id. at 2344.
160. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
states: "No person shall be ...deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law ....U.S. CONST. amend. V.
161. 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 501 (1997).
162. Id. at 937 (quoting Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
163. Reno I, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
164. Id.
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As a matter of constitutional tradition, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, we presume that governmental regulation of the
content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange
of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in encouraging freedom
of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but
unproven benefit of censorship. 65

Further, by analyzing the Internet as a new specific medium, Reno II
will have long standing ramifications on future Internet challenges and
legislation. Additionally, as technology continues to evolve, there will be
new constitutional concerns in cyberspace. 66 It is impossible to predict how
the Court may resolve future challenges to the Internet under other
amendments; however, for now, we can be sure the our speech is stringently
protected.
B.

Future InternetRegulations

It is easy to conclude that the CDA was merely the first piece in a long
line of regulatory Internet legislation. 67 Many commentators have called the
second wave of legislation the "son of CDA" or "CDA ].''l6s As far up as

the White House, the wheels are already in motion for new Internet
restrictions.1 69 In addition, proposals for new legislation are already being
created by many state representatives.170 Regardless of how many pieces of
national legislation are proposed, Reno II helps define how these bills should
be drafted in order to withstand a First Amendment challenge.171 The Court

165. Id. at 2351.

166. See generally Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL
767431, at *10 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (ruling on the development of gambling on the
Internet, the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota applied its state laws to
an out of state Internet gambling company).
167. See Wendy R. Leibowitz, Politiciansv. Technology: Why Congress Loves to Hate
the 'Net, NAT'L L.J., July 14, 1997, at B9.
168. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, 'Reno v. ACLU' - The FirstAmendment Meets

the Internet,218 N.Y. L.J., July 8, 1997, at 3.
169. Id. at 7.
170. As examples, California's Democratic Representative, Zoe Lofgren, has introduced
the "Internet Freedom and Child Protection Act" (H.R. 744), Pennsylvania's Republican
Representative, Joseph M. McDade, has created the "Family-Friendly Internet Access Act of
1997" (H.R. 1180), and Washington's Democratic Senator, Patty Murray, is working on the
"Child Safe Internet Act of 1997." Id.
171. Reno 11, 117 S.Ct. at 2348.
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implied that future legislation must be narrowly-tailored. 72 In order to
achieve this goal, the Court suggested alternatives such as tagging, defining
vague terms, "making exceptions for messages with artistic or educational
value, providing some tolerance for parental choice, and regulating some
portions of the Internet-such
as commercial web sites-differently than
' 173
others, such as chat rooms."
The Internet does need regulation to protect the well-being of
minors. However, there must be a carefully crafted balance between what,
how, and to whom the Internet is censored. Due to the fact that there were
no alternatives, striking down the CDA worked to protect our freedom of
speech.
Jeffrey L. Cox

172. Id.
173. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In March 1997, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. ("Hilton Davis I/,)'
which had been eagerly anticipated in the intellectual property
community. The expectations were high. It was hoped that the doctrine of
equivalents would either be abolished or clarified. A degree of consistency
would return to patent law which had been lacking with the ever expanding
application of the doctrine. Patent practitioners would once more be able to
prepare and present to their clients unambiguous and dependable
infringement opinions. Some had even argued that the Court would abolish
the doctrine altogether. Neither expectation came true. Instead, the case at
bar was Solomonically decided on the facts, and the Court offered little else
beyond a detailed analysis of earlier Supreme Court cases. The doctrine of
equivalents is here to stay, and the patent bar will now have to return to the
deeply divided Federal Circuit in the hope that the rift in the patent appeals
court can be bridged and that the Court will exhibit a higher degree of
consistency in future decisions on the doctrine of equivalents.
Part II of this article presents several concepts of patent law which are
indispensable for a proper understanding of the issues presented in this
article. Part III provides an overview of the doctrine of equivalents from a
policy perspective and from an historical perspective. Part IV discusses
various limitations on the doctrine of equivalents and several related
developments in the Federal Circuit. Part V discusses the specific Supreme
Court holdings in Hilton Davis I and attempts to reconcile this latest
decision with the earlier decision in Markman v. Westview.2 Finally, Part VI
presents a proposal for a further clarification of the application of the
doctrine of equivalents.
II. PRELIMINARIES

Patent law, like any area of law, can be understood only if the
underlying concepts are properly understood. This part provides a brief
overview of several concepts of patent law and statutory definitions pertinent
to this article. Furthermore, patent prosecution and claim interpretation are

1. 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997), rev'g 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Hilton
Davis I]. This case at the appeals court level is Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson
Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Hilton Davis 1].
2. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996), affig 52 F.3d 967
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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briefly described so as to introduce the reader to those concepts from a
practitioner's viewpoint.
A.

The Patent Contract

The primary model of domestic patent theory is the so-called contract
model, which essentially states that a letters patent is a contract between the
United States and the patentee.3 The government, under constitutional
authority,4 promises the inventor to grant and enforce a monopoly in the
invention5 for a limited time. The inventor, in turn, promises to describe the
invention so that it may be made and used by those skilled in the art after the
monopoly is terminated.6 The government's side of the bargain is enforced
in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 281, which allows the patentee to bring a
civil action against a suspected infringer after the patent issues.7 The
patentee's side of the bargain comes due prior to the issuance of the
patent. The patentee is required to provide a proper and enabling description
of the invention and to disclose to the Patent Office all pertinent information
of which the patentee is aware that could influence the granting of a

3. See PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1.02, at 1-4 (2d ed. 1997)
(citing In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 624 (C.C.P.A. 1958)); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159 (1989) ("Mhe bargain held out by the federal
patent system of disclosure in exchange for exclusive use.").
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8. 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." Id.
5. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. 11995). The monopoly is infringed by anyone who
"without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the
patent therefor[e]," 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (Supp. 11995), by anyone who induces infringement,
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1994), and by anyone who imports into the United States a product made
abroad by a process which is patented in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (Supp. I
1995).
6. The term of a United States utility patent is 20 years from the date of a first
application for the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994). The patent may lapse, however, if
maintenance fees are not paid every four years. Id. § 151. Design patents are valid for 14
years from the issue date, Id. § 41(b), and are not subject to maintenance fees. It is also
possible, under very restricted circumstances, to extend a utility patent term such as in the case
of drug patents, wherein the invention is subject to a lengthy review process at the Food and
Drug Administration and the patent owner may not be able to market the product at the time
the patent issues. Id. § 155. A patent owner may, however, dedicate the patented invention to
the public at any time during the life of the patent. Id. § 253 (second paragraph).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994).
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patent.8 The examination in the Patent Office is central to the determination
of patentability. The purpose of the in-depth examination is to ascertain that
the patentee is indeed entitled to each claim of the patent, that each claim is
patentable in light of the prior art, and that the public can determine from the
claims whether or not the patented invention is infringed. 9
The typical application process is as follows: the inventor discloses his
invention to a patent attorney. 10 The latter prepares an application by
describing the invention in general terms, by describing at least one
preferred embodiment of the invention in detail, and by defining the
invention with one or more claims." The application is then filed in the
Patent Office together with an oath or declaration by the inventor stating that
he is indeed the first inventor of the subject matter for which the patent is
sought.12 The application is then subjected to an examination before a patent
examiner who is an expert in the technical field to which the invention
pertains.
The examiner thereby reviews the application in light of the formal
requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 112, which calls for an "enabling"
disclosure of the invention 13 and for definite and distinct claims.' 4 The
8. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1997).
9. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1539 (Plager, J., dissenting) (citing Giles Rich, The Extent
of the Protectionand Interpretationof Claims-American Perspectives,21 INT'L REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499,501 (1990)).
10. The United States Patent Office strongly recommends that inventors employ the
services of registered patent attorneys or patent agents. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING PATENTS

(1990). When it is apparent that an application was filed by a pro se applicant, the patent
examiners are instructed to advise the applicant as follows:
While an inventor may prosecute the application, lack of skill in this field
usually acts as a liability in affording the maximum protection for the
invention disclosed. Applicant is advised to secure the services of a
registered patent attorney or agent to prosecute the application, since the
value of a patent is largely dependent upon skillful preparation and
prosecution.
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, CH.

401,

17.01 (6th ed., rev. 2, July 1996).

11. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
12. 37 C.F.R. § 1.63(b)(2) (1997).
13. The first paragraph of section 112 provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention.
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examiner also compares the claimed invention with the prior art, i.e., prior
patents and other technical literature, and determines whether or not, in her
opinion, the claims in the application attempt to monopolize something
which is old.15 Anything which belongs to the prior art and has entered the
public domain cannot
be taken from the public and made the subject of a
6

patent monopoly.1

Upon completing the review, the patent examiner issues an Office

action,

which is usually a rejection of the application. The most common

rejections in the first Office action are based on the examiner's allegations
that the claims, as presented in the application, fail to particularly point out
and distinctly claim the invention,18 that the invention defined in the claims
of the application is anticipated by the prior art,1 9 and that the claimed
invention is obvious over the prior art.20 The applicant then answers the
Office action by responding to each of the examiner's objections. This may
be done by either argumentatively traversing or satisfying the examiner's
requirements and, if necessary, by suitably amending the application.2'
Amendments often consist of a narrowing of the claims by adding
limiting language. Prior art rejections under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 are
typically answered with a narrowing amendment to overcome the rejection
and .to remove the prior art. It is thereby paramount that any amendments

35 U.S.C. § 112.
14. The second paragraph of section 112 provides: "The specification shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention." Id.
15. Prior art is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 102 (the claimed subject matter is anticipated by
the prior art, or there exists a judicial bar against the patentability of the claimed subject
matter), and § 103 (the claimed subject matter is an obvious modification of prior art). 35
U.S.C. § 102 (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994 & Supp. 11995).
16. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 280-82 (1976). In Sakraida, the Court
discussed the labors of Hercules in the Greek fables as the prior art. Id. at 275 n.1. Sakraida
dealt with a patent claim on a water flush system for dairy farms in which dammed-up water
was quickly released and conducted through the soiled areas of the stables to wash the manure
away. Id. at 277. The claims were held to be obvious over the labors of Hercules, which
included his ingenious diversion of a nearby river through the stables and the resulting
removal of all impurities from the stables. Id. at 275 n.1.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1994).
18. Id. § 112.

19. Id. § 102.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. 11995).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1994). "[I]f after receiving [an Office action with a rejection], the
applicant persists in his claim for a patent, with or without amendment, the application shall
be reexamined." Id.
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thus made be supported in the original application. 22 If such support cannot
be found, then the amendment is rejected as being directed to new matter
and the applicant is required, in a further Office action, to cancel the new
matter. 23 When the patent examiner is satisfied that all of the statutory and
regulatory requirements have been met, the application is allowed and,
subject to the payment
of an issue fee by the applicant, the Patent Office
4
issues a patent.
B.

The Patent Claim

The invention is defined in the claims of the patent72 In terms of the
above-noted contract model, the claims define the boundaries of the
government's side of the bargain, and the monopoly granted to the patentee
covers everything which falls squarely within the boundaries of the
claims. A patent claim, which may be in independent or dependent form, 26
consists of an introductory phrase (the preamble), a transitional phrase, and a
claim body. Generally, the preamble introduces the reader to the field to
which the invention belongs, and the body defines the combination of
elements or process steps which make up the invention. Alternatively, the
preamble may recite the elements of a prior art product or process, and the
body of the claim may recite an improvement over that prior art.27 The
transition between the preamble and the body of the claim may be openended or closed. An open-ended term such as "comprising" or "the
22. Id. "No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the
invention." Id. It is possible, however, to force the entry of such new matter by filing a
continuing application. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.53, -. 60, -. 62(a) (1997). A continuing application
which adds subject matter relative to the first application, the parent application, is referred to
as a continuation-in-part ("CIP"). 37 C.F.R. § 1.53. The applicant is thereby afforded the
date of the parent application for any disclosure contained therein, and the date of the CIP for
the subject matter added in the continuing application. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1994).

23. Id. § 132.
24. Id. § 151. When an applicant appears to be entitled to a patent under law, the
Patent Office will issue a notice of allowance and upon the payment of an issue fee within
three months of the notice of allowance, a letters patent is issued to the applicant in the name
of the United States. Id. §§ 151,153.
25. Id. § 112 (second paragraph).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (third paragraph). An independent claim defines a complete
invention by itself. A dependent claim refers back to an independent claim (directly or
indirectly) and incorporates any and all of the subject matter of that independent claim. Id.
(fourth paragraph).
27. Improvement-type claims are also referred to as "Jepson claims." See ROBERT C.
FABER, LANDIs ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIm DRAFMNG § 57 (4th ed. 1996) (citing In re
Jepson, 1917 C.D. 62, 243 O.G. 525 (Ass't Comm'r Patents 1917)).
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invention comprises" means that the invention requires at least all of the
elements recited in the body, and maybe more.2 For infringement purposes,
if the accused product or process has all of the elements of such an openended claim, and several additional elements, the claim is still infringed. 29 It
is only necessary for the patentee to show that the accused product or
process incorporates all of the claimed elements. 30 If, on the other hand, the
claim is written with a closed transition, such as "consisting of' or "the
invention consists of," then only exact accord between the accused product
the claim body, will support a holding of patent
or process and
3
infringement. '
It is difficult to overstate the importance of a patent claim in modem
United States patent practice. The scope of the claims alone answers the
question whether or not a product or process infringes a patent. 32 To be sure,
during the early stages of United States patent law, the patent claim was
relatively unimportant and it generally consisted of a catchall phrase which
covered "the invention as described. 3 3 The central claiming system for
utility patents was replaced in 1836 with the peripheral claiming system,
where the statute required that a patentee "particularly specify and point out
the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his own
invention."34 A peripheral claim thus stakes out the boundaries within which
the patentee holds his monopoly. The general description of the invention
which makes up the bulk of the patent is thus considerably less important in
the context of patent infringement. In the peripheral claiming system it is
therefore possible for a product to be virtually identical to an invention
describedin a patent, yet the claimedinvention is not infringed.
This proposition is best explained by way of a simple example. Assume
the invention is a four-legged stool with an upholstered seat and it is defined
in the following claim: "A stool, comprising: a plate having a seating
surface, upholstery covering said seating surface, and four legs each screwed
to said plate opposite said upholstery and supporting said seating surface in a

28. Id.§§7,8.
29. Id.
30. Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that
"each element of a claim is material and essential," and the burden is on the plaintiff to show
that every element of the claim or a substantial equivalent is present in the accused product or
process).
31. FABER, supra note 27 at §§ 7, 8.
32. See Lemelson, 752 F.2d at 1538.
33. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1565 (Nies, J., dissenting). See generally 3 DONALD
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 8 (Supp.) to § 8.02 (1997).
34. HiltonDavis I, 62 F.3d at 1539 (Plager, J., dissenting) (citing Keystone Bridge Co.
v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877)).
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substantially horizontal position." The claim thus defines the invention as a
combination of three elements, the plate, the upholstery, and the legs. In
order to show infringement, the patentee must show that the accused device
has all three elements in the same combination. 35 Any stool or chair with an
upholstered seating surface and with four legs screwed to the seating plate
could be shown to infringe the claim. Also, a stool with an upholstered
seating surface, five or six legs, a backrest, and two arm rests would still
literally infringe the claim because each of the three elements of the claim is
found in the accused product.36 However, a stool with an upholstered
seating surface and only three legs would not literally infringe the claim. It
could also be argued that, because of the use of the term, "screwed," the
claim inferentially included a fourth element, namely screws or bolts with
which the legs are attached to the seating plate. Accordingly, a stool with
four legs "glued" or "stapled" to the seating surface plate would not literally
infringe the claim. The fact that the stool described in the patent
specification (even with an express teaching that any number of legs over
three would be acceptable or a statement that the legs may be glued or
stapled to the seating surface plate) and the accused stool may be virtually
identical is of little importance. Only the claim defines the invention.
Whether or not infringement could possibly be shown in the foregoing
example under the doctrine of equivalents will be discussed later in this
article. An essential point to remember in this context, however, is that if a
of
claim is literally infringed, the doctrine of equivalents and the doctrine
37
prosecution history estoppel play no role in the infringement analysis.
An element in a claim may also be expressed as a means for performing
a certain function. 38 Such means-plus-function recitations cover everything
expressly described in the specification and their equivalents. 39 By way of
example, the stool legs in the above claim could be recited as "means for
supporting said seating surface in a substantially horizontal position," or the
like. The claim could thus be read on a swing, on a cherry picker seat, or on
a camera boom support. Proper claim construction would now turn on the
questions of whether or not these alternative embodiments were described in
the specification and whether or not they are equivalents of the described

35. Id.
36. If, on the other hand, the claim were in the closed format and the term "comprising"
were replaced with "consisting of," then a stool with a fourth element such as the backrest
would not read on the claim and the patented invention would not be infringed.
37. See, e.g., Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1558-59 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (sixth paragraph).
39. Id.
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stool legs. a° The Patent Office during the patent prosecution phase and the
courts in an infringement action, determine the scope of a means-plusfunction limitation from the specific structure described in the specification
and equivalents thereof.4 1
C.

The EnablingDisclosure

The inventor's side of the bargain requires that he contribute to the arts
a disclosure which, when read by a person of skill in the pertinent art,
enables the skilled artisan to make and use the invention. 42 The invention
'
must be described in "full, clear, concise, and exact terms." 43
Finally, the
inventor must present a best mode example, i.e., an exemplary embodiment
of the invention which the inventor, at the time the application is first filed at
44
the Patent Office, deems to be the best mode of the
No proof is
45 invention.
conceived.
was
necessary as to how the invention
It is important to note that the description of the invention must fully
support and enable the claimed invention. If a patent specification fails to
properly teach and enable the invention, then the contract between the
patentee and the government is void for lack of consideration. 46 Similarly, if
the description does not support the entire scope of the claimed inventionthe claim is too broad in view of the disclosure-then the contract may be
void for insufficiency of consideration. 47
Once more, this proposition may be best underscored with a simple, yet
timely example: Assume the invention is for a disinfectant composition with
two main components, namely a benzalkonium and a phospholipid. The
specification describes and provides examples of various mixtures of 1) a
benzalkonium halide in a range from 3% to 5% by weight; and 2) a synthetic
phospholipid in a range from 1% to 10% by weight. The broadest claim, on
the other hand, defines the benzalkonium component in a range of up to a

40. See, e.g., In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en bane)
(holding that, similar to the courts in infringement actions, the Patent Office must consider
limitations on means-plus-function elements as dictated by the specification, and not import
into the element the broadest possible meaning which reads on anything under the sun).
41. Id. at 1195.

42. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (first paragraph).

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. 1 1995). 'Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made." Id. § 103(a).
46. In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 624 (C.C.P.A. 1958); see ROSENBERo, supra note 3, at
§ 1.02.
47. See Tenney, 254 F.2d at 624.
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maximum of 5% without providing a lower limit. Such a claim may be
argued to be too broad in light of the disclosure and a patent examiner would
typically require that the applicant provide a lower limit. Bound by the
prohibition against the addition of new matter,48 the applicant could only
amend the claim to recite a maximum range from 3% to 5%. If such a
narrow range is not acceptable, then the inventor must choose between the
two alternatives of accepting the severely limited claim, or of filing a
continuation-in-part application "CIP.,, 49 The latter alternative, however, is
often avoided because of the added cost50 and considerable delay in
prosecution.51
D. After the Grant-Reissue
Once a patent has been issued by the Patent Office, it becomes a public
document which defines the patentee's rights within the boundaries of the
claims. The patentee has a right to exclude anyone from making, using,
selling, or importing the claimed invention. 52 If the patent is found to be
defective, it may be surrendered and the Patent Office may reissue a
corrected version of the patent.53 The patent is defective if it contains
mistakes in the description, in the drawing, or in the claims. 54 The claims
are considered defective when they are too broad, i.e., the patentee claimed
more than he had a right to claim.5 They are also considered defective when
they are too narrow, i.e., the patentee claimed less than he had a right to
claim.56 Returning briefly to the above disinfectant example, assume the
original disclosure described a functional example in which the
benzalkonium halide was present at 1% by weight, yet the example was
overlooked by the applicant, who agreed to the limited claims reciting the
range of 3% to 5%. The patentee clearly had a right to claim the broader
range of 1% to 5% and, according to the reissue statute, the Patent Office

48. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1994).
49. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.53, -. 60, -. 62 (1997).
50. The Patent Office filing fee for new applications and continuing applications is
currently $790.00 ($395.00 for independent inventors and small business concerns with fewer
than 500 employees). 35 U.S.C. § 41(a), (b) (1994); see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.17-.21 (1997).
51. The filing of a continuing application typically delays the issuance of a patent by
several months.
52. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (Supp. 11995); see also supra text accompanying note 5.
53. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994) (first paragraph).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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will reissue the patent upon the surrender of the original patent and a proper
application for reissue.
While a reissue application to correct a defective patent in general may
be filed at any time during the life of the patent, 58 it is possible to broaden
the claims only if the reissue application is filed within two years of the
original grant of the patent. 9 In addition, the broadened claims may be
subject to the intervening rights of a person who practiced the invention
prior to the reissue.6° For instance, if someone had started to manufacture,
prior to the grant of the reissue, the described disinfectant with a
would have
benzalkonium halide component of, say, 1.5%, then thepatentee
6
no apparent patent rights against that intervening party.
E.

Infringement

A patent is infringed by anyone who makes, uses, offers for sale, or
sells the patented invention. 62 The statute is simple enough. The patentee
merely carries the burden of proving that the defendant's product or process
is the same as the patented invention.63 The patented invention, as outlined
above, is defined in the claims of the patent and the metes and bounds of the
monopoly granted by the patent are defined in the claims. 64 Accordingly,
infringement is determined by comparing the accused product or process
with the claims. Literal infringement is shown if the accused product or
process incorporates each and every element of the claim.65 However, only a
slight modification in the product may move it outside of the literal scope of
the patent claim, 66 while the heart of the invention is clearly copied. This is
where the doctrine of equivalents comes into play: unscrupulous copycats
who design around the letter of the patent claim, but otherwise copy the

57. Id.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 251.
59. Id. (fourth paragraph).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (Supp. 11995).
61. Id. "The court before which such matter is in question may provide for the
continued manufacture... [if] substantial preparation was made before the grant of the
reissue." Id. (second paragraph).
62. Id. § 271(a); see also supra text accompanying note 5.
63. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 685 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) ("he patent owner has always borne the burden of proving infringement ....").
64. See Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir.

1994).
65. See Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
66. For example, an accused stool could have legs glued to the base, instead of screwed
to the base as expressly required by the claim.
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invention virtually identically may be stopped by this doctrine. 67 The
doctrine affords the courts a vehicle with which to stave off fraud on the
patent and to punish not only literal copying, but also copying by equivalent
design.68
III. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

A.

Two Competing Policy Issues

The patent statutes are founded on the constitutional dictate to promote
the progress of science and the arts 69 and on the economically motivated
effort to reward the diligent inventor for his contribution to the arts. 70 The
primary policy argument adopted by the proponents of the doctrine of
equivalents is that protection for the patentee must be the primary
consideration in claim scope interpretation. The patentee is to be protected
against copying of his invention where only minor elements of the product
are changed so as to circumvent the letter of the patent claim. As stated
more than 180 years ago by Judge Story: "Mere colorable differences, or
slight improvements, cannot shake the right of the original inventor., 72 The
competing policy argument, adopted by the opponents of the doctrine of
equivalents, is that patents fulfill an even more important function in the
progress of the sciences, namely to provide notice to the public as to what is
and what is not available for general use.73 During the negotiation phase
before the Patent Office, the applicant and the patent examiner agree on the
metes and bounds of the claimed invention, and the printed patent must give
fair notice as to what was contained in the agreement. 74 The law does not
currently favor either proposition. Instead, the doctrine of equivalents
strikes a careful balance between the two competing policies. Nevertheless,
one must not overlook the clear prescription by the courts that
75 the doctrine
of equivalents muft remain the exception rather than the rule.

67. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
68. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (A
patent owner "should not be deprived of the benefits of his patent by competitors who
appropriate the essence of an invention while barely avoiding the literal language of the
claims.").
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
70. See Hilton Davis 1, 62 F.3d at 1530 (Newman, J., concurring).
71. Id.
72. Odiome v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432).
73. See Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1541 (Plager, J., dissenting).
74. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
75. Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss3/1

120

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

1998]

Sterner

Currently, a heated debate is brewing as to whether the doctrine of
equivalents is an equitable doctrine that evolved out of the equity courts, 7 6 or
a doctrine which is merely equitable in nature and which may be given to a
jury in deciding infringement. 77 A detailed discussion of the issue is beyond
this article and, in fact, the question may reach the Supreme Court before too
long. It is even conceivable that Hilton Davis 11,78 the primary case in this
79
article, could once more reach the Supreme Court with regard to this issue.
B.

Graver Tank

Prior to the decision in Hilton Davis II, the courts applied the doctrine
of equivalents and its rule of application as it was announced by the Supreme
Court in Graver Tank Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.80 There,
the Court was concerned with protecting the patent holder against "the
unscrupulous copyist" who would make "insubstantial changes" which add
nothing to the art, yet take the product "outside the reach of law." 81 The
Court further recognized that a copyist's intent on pirating an invention
should be expected to introduce a minor variation in an effort to conceal his
piracy, and that direct and literal "duplication is a dull and very rare type of
infringement., 82 Graver Tank established the so-called function-way-result
test, which asked whether the accused product performed: 1) substantially
the same function; 2) in substantially the same way; and 3) to lead to
substantially the same result.83 As explained in Graver Tank, when two
devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and the result of

76. See, e.g., Hilton Davis 1, 62 F.3d at 1543 ('The authority to exercise the unique
remedy which is the doctrine of equivalents lies exclusively in courts of equity.") (Plager, J.,
dissenting).
77. Id. at 1525-26 (pointing to the Supreme Court precedent suggesting that the
doctrine of equivalents is properly handled by the jury).
78. Hilton Davis 11, 117 S. Ct. at 1040.

79. Id. at 1053 ("Whether, if the issue were squarely presented to us, we would reach a
different conclusion than did the Federal Circuit is not a question we need to decide today.").
80. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
81. Id. at 607.
82. Id.

83. Id. at 608. Emphasis is added to indicate that the test is sometimes stated to require
not only substantiallythe same result but the same result. The arbitrary inclusion or omission

of the additional qualifier, however, does not appear to trigger a different outcome and it may
thus be considered a cosmetic difference. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d
1351, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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both is the same, then the two devices are the same, even though they may be
different in appearance. 84
While the rule and its application appeared clear, the various circuits
applied the rule in different ways and reached divergent results. 85 This lack
of uniformity in the application of the doctrine of equivalents was one of the
reasons why Congress, in the interest of promoting uniform patent laws,
established the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 as the only
federal appeals court to hear patent appeals. 86 Dependable uniformity,
however, eluded the Federal Circuit as well as did questions concerning the
doctrine of equivalents. Nevertheless, two applicable standards soon
crystallized in the newly created court, namely the as-a-whole approach and
the element-by-element analysis.87
The first test compares the accused product with the allegedly infringed
claim as a whole.8 8 The Graver Tank test is applied by asking whether the
accused product performs substantially the same function as the patented
invention, in substantially the same way, to yield substantially the same
result.89 The primary case representing the as-a-whole approach is Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States.'° In that case, Hughes held a patent covering
satellite stabilization processes. 91 The Hughes patent, among other claimed
elements, required an interactive feedback system between the satellite and
the ground control station so that satellite velocity and satellite orientation
could be adjusted. The government satellite did not have a feedback
system.
Instead, the velocity and orientation control were processed
internally in the satellite. 93 Recognizing that the way prong of the functionway-result test could not easily be satisfied, the Hughes court held that the

84. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 (citing Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125
(1877)).
85. Daniel W. McDonald et al., Hilton Davis: The Doctrine of Equivalents Survives Now What?, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 309, 311-12 (1997).
86. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, § 127(a), Pub. L. No. 97-164 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988)). All appeals from final decisions of federal district
courts in patent cases, and from final decisions in the Patent Office, are brought in the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, located in Washington, D.C. See Kalman v. KimberlyClark Corp., 713 F.2d 760 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
87. See Paul C. Craane, Comment, At the Boundaries of Law and Equity: The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 105,
114-25 (1992).
88. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1364-66.
89. Id. at 1363-64, 1366.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1366-64.
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government system was so strikingly similar to the patented system as a
an equivalent of the patented
whole that
94 the government system was
invention.
That analysis, of course, would have failed in a stringent reading of the
Hughes claim on the government satellite. In fact, the dissent in Hughes
faulted the majority for paying relatively little attention to the specifics of
the claims and for instead viewing the invention as a whole. 95 In a
comparison between each element of the claim and the accused device, the
court would have had to find that the Hughes claim was not infringed
because it lacked the required element of satellite to ground control
feedback. The element-by-element analysis, however, had its proponents in
the Federal Circuit as well, and it soon emerged as the more prevalent
standard. 96
The element-by-element analysis engendered such mutually exclusive
statements as "when an element is entirely missing [and the accused product]
does not contain either the exact element of the claim or its equivalent, there
is no infringement," 97 and "[t]o require a one-to-one correspondence creates
a bright line rule easier to apply, but costly in terms of unfair results in
exceptional cases."9 8 It should be noted that the element-by-element analysis
is not only easier to apply than the as-a-whole approach, but it also leads to
more predictable results. The element-by-element analysis can be handled
quantitatively with near mathematical and logical precision, while the as-awhole analysis necessarily requires qualitative and thus subjective analysis.
Furthermore, under the element-by-element approach, the scope of
equivalence can be more easily balanced against the limits of prosecution
history, guided by the maxim that "the patent applicant includes elements at
his peril, and that a court is powerless to relieve him of the mistake of
reciting elements which are superfluous to patentability." 99

94. Id. at 1366.
95. Id. at 1366-68 (Davis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
96. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251,
1259 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("An equivalent must be found for every limitation of the claim
somewhere in an accused device.... "); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d
931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d
1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
97. Pennwalt,833 F.2d at 949 (Nies, J., additional views).
98. Id.at 946 (Bennet, ., dissenting in part).
99. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Klimsch-Repro, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 586, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
see also Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 83 (D. Mass. 1983), rev'd in
part, aff'd in part,720 F.2d 1565 (Fed.Cir. 1983), vacated, 755 F.2d 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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IV. LIMITS ON THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

A.

ProsecutionHistory Estoppel

The Supreme Court soon recognized during the earliest stages of the
development of the doctrine of equivalents that the acts by the applicant for
obtaining a patent during prosecution before the Patent Office could serve
as a reliable gauge for the scope with which the range of equivalence should
be applied.' 0 The rule which soon emerged was that, where an applicant for
patent limits his claims to avoid prior art, the applicant cannot later "argue
for a second bite at the abandoned apple."'0 2 As a first threshold, the
prosecution history 10 3 does not come into play if literal infringement is
found.' 4 Where it is available, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel,
also referred to as file wrapper estoppel, refers equally to amendments and to
remarks made by the applicant for patent. 0 5 The threshold question often
asked is whether the patent examiner would have allowed the claims and
issued the patent had the amendment or the remarks not been made or,
alternatively, did the patent examiner allow
the application because of the
°6
amendments or the applicant's remarks.
In Lemelson v. General Mills,'0 7 for instance, the patent examiner
rejected a claim with five elements on prior art, and suggested a more limited
claim with seven elements. 0 8 Lemelson accepted the seven element claim
and was granted a patent on the claim. 1' 9 During a later infringement action,
Lemelson tried to argue that the examiner's rejection of the five element
claim was in error and that the two additional limitations did not help
distinguish the claims over the prior art. 1 0 That argument was summarily
rejected and the applicant's acquiescence in a more limited claim was

100. According to the contract model of patents, prosecution before the Patent Office is
considered the contract negotiation phase. See supra Part II.A.
101. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1880); see also
Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, 282 U.S. 784 (1931).
102. Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
103. The official record of the ex parte proceeding between the applicant for patent and
the Patent Office is referred to as the prosecution history, the file history, or the file wrapper.
The prosecution history of any issued patent may be inspected by the public.
104. Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
105. Townsend Eng'g Co. v. Hitec Co., 829 F.2d 1086, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
106. See Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 953 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
107. 968 F.2d at 1202.
108. Id. at 1203.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1207.
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equated to an amendment volunteered by him and a resultant surrender of
claim scope."' The Federal Circuit thereby emphasized the notice function
of the patent, namely that competitors in the pertinent art were entitled to a
determination
of the scope of the claims on the record before the Patent
12
Office.!
Claim amendments made to persuade the patent examiner to allow the
claims over the prior art generally create an irrebuttable estoppel against the
doctrine of
through
the
of the claims
later broadening
equivalents. Additionally, it has been held that statements made by the
applicant even after the examiner had indicated that the claims were
allowable, could be equally damaging when they were directed towards an
interpretation of the claims at issue.'1
On the other hand, not every claim amendment automatically enjoins
the patentee from relying on the doctrine of equivalents.1 14 Where a claim
was amended during prosecution, the court must determine the reason for the
change.' 15 The scope of prosecution history estoppel is thus determined on
the basis of various factors, including all of the applicant's acts during the
application phase and the reasons for those acts, the prior art removed or not
examiner's objections and
applied because of those acts, and the patent
16
rejections which are removed by those acts.'
The Federal Circuit in 1993 clarified much of the confusion
surrounding the application of prosecution history estoppel with its decision
in Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States International Trade
Commission."7 There, the court held that any unambiguous assertion of
patentability with regard to an element in a claim may create an estoppel
against reliance on the doctrine of equivalents." 8 The applicant in that case
had not amended the claims and added the feature to overcome prior
art.119 Further, the feature was not even necessary to overcome any prior art

111. Id. at 1207-08.
112. Lemelson, 968 F.2d at 1202.
113. See Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
114. Durango Assoc. Inc. v. Reflange Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
115. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857, 864 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1240 (1997), and on remand vacated, 117 F.3d 1385 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
116. Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prod. Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 128485 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
117. 988 F.2d 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
118. Id. at 1175.
119. Id. at 1173.
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reference cited by the patent examiner. 12° Yet, the applicants asserted in
general that the particular feature
2 rendered the claims patentable, and they
were thus held to that assertion.' '
The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is built on the premise that
a patent is a public document which provides unambiguous notice as to what
is and what is not protected by the claims. 122 The fact that an applicant
makes a more limiting amendment than is necessary in light of the prior art
is of no import.' 23 Prosecution history is useful in establishing "meaningful
limitations" on which the public may rely to avoid infringement.
B.

The Range of Equivalence Dictatedby the PriorArt

In 1990, the Federal Circuit introduced a new test for the doctrine of
equivalents with the construction of the so-called "hypothetical
claim."' 5 Based on the understanding that the doctrine of equivalents is
equivalent to a judicial broadening of the claims of a patent, the court in
Wilson Sporting Goods126 suggested that the proper scope of equivalence
could be determined by expanding the claims of the patent in suit towards
the prior art.27 A hypothetical claim would be tested in light of the prior art
and the deciding question would be whether or not the hypothetical claim
would have and could have been allowed by the patent examiner." 2 Upon
the hypothetical allowance of such a broadened claim, the patent owner
would then have the burden of proving that the accused product or process
literally infringes the hypothetical claim. 129
The hypothetical claim construction did not fare well in subsequent
litigation. Three problems with the hypothetical claim become immediately
evident upon a careful review. First, it undermines the function of the Patent
Office as the competent government agency in charge of negotiating the

120. Id.
121. Id. at 1174.
122. Texas Instruments,988 F.2d at 1175.
123. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also
Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 83 (D. Mass. 1983).
124. Genentech, Inc. v. The Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(citing Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
125. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
126. Id. at 684.
127. Id.
128. Id. A hypothetical claim is in essence a claim that is broadened relative to the
patent claim and which would literally read on the allegedly infringing product or process. Id.
129. Wilson, 904 F.2d at 685.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss3/1

126

1998]

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Sterner

it
scope of patent claims.1 30 Second, it violates the notice function. 13 1 Third,1 32
circumvents the statutory prohibition against the addition of new matter.
These three factors, of course, go hand in hand. As repeatedly stressed by
the Federal Circuit, competitors in the marketplace must be able to rely on
the scope of the claims in an issued patent.133 The very purpose of the
stringent examination before the Patent Office is to determine the scope of
the claims which are available to the applicant and to issue a patent with
claims which are sufficiently delineated relative to the prior art. The
dependence on the propriety and depth of the examination before the Patent
Office is reflected in the statutory presumption that any issued patent is
valid. 134 Finally, and maybe most importantly, applicants for patent are
statutorily prohibited from adding anything to a claim during prosecution
which was not originally contained in the application. 35 In the hypothetical
claim construction, however, the patentee is in effect allowed to add
limitations not found in the original specification.
For instance, the primary case at hand concerns a dispute involving a
process for purifying red and yellow dyes used in the food and cosmetics
industries. 3 An aqueous solution of the dye is subjected to ultrafiltration
under defined process conditions. The patent claims in question define those
process conditions at a hydrostatic pressure of 200 to 400 p.s.i.g. and at a pH
of 6.0 to 9.0.137 The claimed pH range was added into the independent
claims during prosecution. As agreed by all parties, only the upper limit of
9.0 was necessary in light of the prior art. The lower limit of 6.0 was not
required. However, simply omitting the lower limit would not be acceptable
either because of the requirement that a claim of a patent must be fully
enabled in the specification.13 8 In other words, a lower limit of 4.0 or 3.0, or
even 2.0, may work in the process described in the specification, but the
process would fail at a pH below 2.0. The hypothetical claim construction in
this case, therefore, would have to strike a balance between a maximum

130. See supra Part II.A.
131. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
132. Id. § 132.
133. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (If
broadening of claims under the doctrine of equivalents is always available to the patentee,
then competing market players "will never know whether their actions infringe a granted
patent" and "the public comes to believe (or fear) that the language of patent claims can never
be relied on.").
134. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (Supp. 11995). "A patent shall be presumed valid." Id.
135. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1994).
136. Hilton Davis 1, 62 F.3d at 1515.

137. Id. at 1515.
138. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
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allowed by the prior art and a minimum dictated by the scope of enablement
in the specification. A hypothetical claim for Hilton Davis would recite a
pH value ranging from 4.0 to 9.0. Hilton Davis, armed with such a claim
would have had little difficulty in showing that Warner-Jenkinson's process,
which operated at a pH of 5.0, infringed their claim.13 9 However, Hilton
Davis now would be awarded a claim which they could not have obtained
from the Patent Office on the basis of their original application. Had they
attempted, during prosecution, to amend their claims to recite a pH ranging
from 4.0 to 9.0, the patent examiner would have required that the new matter
entered with the amendment be canceled because it would have violated
code section 132.'40 The hypothetical claim proposed in Wilson Sporting
Goods, therefore, could potentially violate the statutory prohibition against
the addition of new matter.
C.

Hilton Davis I and the InsubstantialChanges Test

After having supported the function-way-result test of Graver Tank for
years as the predominant test for the doctrine of equivalents, the en banc
Federal Circuit held in Hilton Davis I that this test had caused as much
confusion as it had cleared up.141 The court subsequently stated an
apparently new rule which turned on the question of whether the changes
made by the accused copier were substantial or insubstantial.42 The
decision in Hilton Davis I was a narrow one. 143 The majority opinion in the
Federal Circuit decision stressed that the new standard was not a revision of
the test for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, but a
restatement.' 44 Indeed, the new test had already been expressed in the

139. For clarity of the example, the author has disregarded the other questions
concerning the possible differences between the Wamer-Jenkinson process and the Hilton
Davis claims. In her dissent, Judge Nies pointed out that at least one additional element of the
claim, namely the recited hydrostatic pressure, was not infringed, Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at
1579 (Nies, J., dissenting), and that another element, namely the recited pore size of the
membranes, had not been sufficiently proven to be infringed. Id. at n.34.

140. 35 U.S.C. § 132.
141. Hilton Davis 1, 62 F.3d at 1518.
142. Id.
143. Seven of the twelve judges formed the majority and Judge Newman filed a
concurring opinion. Five judges dissented, with Judges Plager, Lourie, and Nies each filing a
dissenting opinion. While the majority opinion concentrated largely on Supreme Court
precedent in formulating its opinion, Judge Newman concurred essentially only in the
outcome, as her opinion was primarily based on an economic incentives analysis. Id. at 1512.
144. Id. at 1516.
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seminal GraverTank decision. 145 There, the Court warned against an overly
narrow and literal reading of the patent claims which would allow an
"unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes and
The
substitutions in the patent" without being liable for infringement."
majority in Hilton Davis I further held that infringement, under the doctrine
of equivalents, was a question of fact and thus, a question for the jury.147 In
fact, much of the discussion in the various opinions, and particularly Judge
Plager's dissent, deals with the judge-jury question and it was widely
expected that the Supreme Court would decide that issue on appeal. 148 That
expectancy was heightened since the Court had during the previous term
affirmed the Federal Circuit in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,149
which held that claim construction in patent infringement was exclusively
1
within the province of the court and should not be presented to the jury. 50
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that the question whether or not the doctrine
15 1
of equivalents was to be applied is not at the discretion of the trial judge.
The decision in Hilton Davis I turned on the question of whether or not
a pH of 5.0, as practiced by Wamer-Jenkinson, was equivalent to and
included in the range of 6.0 to 9.0.152 Each element of the Hilton Davis
claim was analyzed and compared with the Wamer-Jenkinson
process.153 Hilton Davis was held to have carried its burden of showing the
presence of each element in the accused process with all but one claim
element finding literal support.154 The element defining the pH1 55 in the
process was found to be present, albeit outside of the claimed

145. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
146. Id. at 607.
147. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1520.
148. Both of the principal parties' briefs and each of the 17 briefs for amicus curiae
filed in the Supreme Court, discussed the judge-jury question at length and much of the oral
hearing before the Court dealt with the question. Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1053.
149. 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
150. Id.at 1396.
151. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1521.
152. Id. at 1524.
153. Id.at 1524-25.
154. Id.
155. The pH scale expresses the acidity, neutrality, or basicity of dilute aqueous
solutions. The scale varies within the numerical range of-l.0 to 15.0. A pH of 7.0 designates
a neutral composition. The lower the number, the higher the acidity of the solution. The scale
is a logarithmic scale with a base of 10. A numerical change in the pH by one designates a 10fold increase or decrease of acidity and, similarly, a change by two designates a 100-fold
increase or decrease. KENNETH W. WHrITEN ET AL., GENERAL CHEMISTRY WITH QUALITATIVE
ANALYSIS 531-34 (1988).
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range.156 Hilton Davis had amended its claims during prosecution before the
patent examiner by adding the numeric pH limits. The upper limit of 9.0
was necessary in delineating the claims against the prior art. 157 The lower
limit of 6.0 was not necessary in light of the prior art. As noted above, it is
questionable, however, whether the Patent Office would or could have
allowed an open-ended limitation which recited only the upper limit of 9.0,
but not a lower limit. Such a claim would run afoul of the distinct claiming
requirement 5 8 and of the enablement requirement. 15 9 Adding an express
limit other than 6.0, on the other hand, would run afoul of the prohibition
against the addition of new matter. 16° Hilton Davis, therefore, in order to
obtain a proper claim with an acceptable range of pH values, would have had
to file a continuing application, with the attendant costs and the delay in the
prosecution. 161 Alternatively, Hilton Davis could have attempted to
surrender their patent and obtain a broadened reissue claim within two years
of the patent. Unfortunately for Hilton Davis, Warner-Jenkinson would then
likely have been able to rely on intervening rights. 62 But then again, none of
this mattered to the en banc Federal Circuit, because a pH of 5.0 was
equivalent to a pH of 6.0 and the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel did
not apply where no compelling reason was evident to the court for Hilton
Davis to enter the lower limit of 6.0.163
V. HILTON DAVIS H
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit's majority
opinion. 64 The Court held that prosecution history could indeed create an
156. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1516.
157. Id. at 1515-16. The patent examiner had cited a prior art reference which
disclosed a similar process operating at a pH between 11 and 13. Id.
158. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (second paragraph).
159. Id. (first paragraph).
160. Id. § 132. In her dissent in Hilton Davis I, the late Judge Nies argued that the
notice function of the claims would be served yet the claims were not unduly enlarged if the
courts carefully applied the doctrine of equivalents to individual elements of the claims and
substituted only equivalent elements. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1573-74 (Nies, J.,
dissenting).
161. See supra Part II.C.
162. The Hilton Davis patent, No. 4,560,746, issued in 1985. By the time WarnerJenkinson learned of the existence of the '746 patent in October 1986, they had begun to
commercially use the infringing process. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1516. Hilton Davis
learned of Warner-Jenkinson's infringement in 1989 when it was no longer possible to
broaden the patent claims in a reissue. Id.
163. Id. at 1528.
164. Hilton Davis l1, 117 S. Ct. at 1040.
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estoppel and while affirming the majority of the Federal Circuit in virtually
all other aspects, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further
proceedings.
Specifically, the Court held that any claim amendment
during prosecution, absent an explanation to the contrary on the public
record, created a rebuttable presumption that the amendment was necessary
for patentability.' 66 This presumption, the Court argued, would strike a
proper balance between the notice function of the claims and the primacy of
the Patent Office in ensuring that patent claims167do not cover more than the
invention which is disclosed in the application.
A.

The Supreme CourtDecision in Detail

The question certified to the Supreme Court in Hilton Davis II
was: "Whether patent infringement exists whenever the accused product or
process is 'equivalent' to the invention claimed in the patent, in that the
differences are not 'substantial' as determined by a jury, even though the
68
accused product or process is outside the literal scope of the patent claim."'
Wamer-Jenkinson's main arguments were that the doctrine of equivalents, as
defined in Graver Tank in 1950 cannot be reconciled with the 1952 Patent
Act, 69 that equivalents should be limited to those explicitly mentioned in the
patent, 170 and that Congress did not allow for infringement by equivalents in
the 1952 Patent Act. 171 Hilton Davis, of course, was quite satisfied with the
majority opinion in the Federal Circuit and argued that the doctrine of
equivalents had survived the 1952 Patent Act,"7 2 the doctrine should be
broadly applied and remain available in all infringement actions, 17 and that
equivalents questions are properly presented to the jury in a jury trial. 174
1. The Doctrine of Equivalents and the 1952 Patent Act
Justice Thomas, writing for the unanimous Court, explained that the
differences between the earlier patent statute and the 1952 Patent Act were

165. Id. at 1054.
166. Id. at 1051.
167. Id.
168. Brief for Petitioner at i, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728).
169. Id. at 13.
170. Id. at31.
171. ld. at41.
172. Brief for Respondent at 11, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728).
173. Id. at 23.
174. Id. at 36.
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175
minimal with regard to the requirement for definite and distinct claiming.
The results reached in Graver Tank, Justice Thomas argued, would not have
176
been different had the case been decided following the 1952 Patent Act.
In addition, the arguments upon which Warner-Jenkinson's contention was
based had already been presented in Graver Tank, but had failed to garner a
majority. 177178 Accordingly, overruling Graver Tank on that basis was not

warranted.

Next, the Court discussed Wamer-Jenkinson's contention that no
express mention of Graver Tank or its standard could be found in the
legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act and that Congress had statutorily
overruled Graver Tank.179 Wamer-Jenkinson had argued in their brief that it
was improper to attribute a silent incorporation of the Graver Tank rule to
Congress.18° On questioning by the bench at oral argument, WarnerJenkinson's counsel softened that argument and instead relied on his fallback
position that the precedent need not be overruled in its entirety, but could
serve a useful function if the precedential rule of Graver Tank was properly
read. 181 The Court was not convinced that Congress' silence concerning
Graver Tank and the doctrine of equivalents spoke to a statutory overruling
of the precedent. Instead, the Court opined that Congress had in fact not
overruled the Graver Tank precedent182 and that "Congress [could] legislate
the doctrine of equivalents out of existence any time it chooses."' 8 The
policy arguments presented by both parties in Hilton Davis II, Justice
should be addressed to Congress instead of to the
Thomas suggested,
84
Supreme Court. 1
2. Element by Element Analysis
With regard to the elemental approach to the doctrine of equivalents,
the Court sided with the concerns mentioned in the dissents at the Federal

175. Hilton Davis 11, 117 S. Ct. at 1047.
176. Id.
177. Id. at n.3.
178. Id. at 1047-48.
179. Id. at 1047.
180. Brief for Petitioner at 42-45, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728).
181. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *18, Hilton Davis II (No. 95728), 1996 WL 593639 (Oct. 15, 1996) (oral argument of Richard G. Taranto, Esq., on behalf
of Wamer-Jenkinson) (no departure of Graver Tank needs to take place "depending on how
broadly one reads it") [hereinafter Transcript].
182. Hilton Davis 1I, 117 S.Ct. at 1048.
183. Id.

184. Id.
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Circuit level that patent claims had become too unpredictable because of the
automatic and divergent apxlication of the doctrine and that the doctrine had
taken on a life of its own. 5 The Court thereby adopted much of the logic
presented in the dissent by the late Judge Nies 1'6 and held that the doctrine
could best serve its proper function if it was applied on an element-byelement basis.1 87 Each element of a patent claim is material and essential,
the Court held, and the doctrine of equivalents must not be applied to the
claimed invention as a whole, but to each element. 88 Also, the doctrine
must not be so broadly applied as to effectively remove a required
element.189 The Court cited with approval the broad proposition that the
doctrine must be applied so as to carefully distinguish between substituting
an equivalent component within an invention and enlarging an invention
beyond what is claimed. 19° The applicant, after all, negotiates the scope of
protection to which the patentee is entitled with the Patent Office. That
scope of protection cannot be enlarged at a later point so as to include a
competitor within the claims. Only if the competitor copies the invention,
i.e., practices a fraud on the patent,' 9' and replaces within the invention a
component with one which is equivalent yet does not literally read on the
claimed element, should the doctrine of equivalents be applied. 9 2 The
doctrine is equitable in nature and it is to be applied so as not to "place the
at the mercy of verbalism and... subordinat[e] substance to
inventor
193
form."'

3. Prosecution History Estoppel
Next, the Court discussed the position of the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel in the context of the elemental approach and the new
rebuttable presumption rule. Warner-Jenkinson had argued that any
surrender by the patentee during prosecution before the Patent Office was
essentially equivalent to a public notice of surrender 9 4 and that any

185. Id. at 1048-49.
dissenting).
186. Hilton Davis 1, 62 F.3d at 1573-74 (Nies, J.,
187. Hilton Davis I, 117 S. Ct. at 1049.

188.
189.
190.
191.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) ('The

essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice a fraud on a patent.").
192. Id. at 608-09.

193. Id. at 607.
194. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728) ("[T]he public is
entitled to rely on a reading of those disclosures [made in the patent application], and not
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limitation entered during patent prosecution should estop the patentee from
later asserting broader coverage. 95 That argument, according to the Court,
went too far.196 The Court held that the reasons for such an amendment
should have a bearing on proper claim interpretation. 197 First, the Court
relied on its own precedent which included a line of cases in which the Court
had considered the respective reasons why a certain amendment was
required by the Patent Office. 198 Second, the Court referred to the amicus
brief of the United States, which listed several additional reasons upon
which the Patent Office may require an amendment to a claim. 99 The
United States' amicus brief made reference to the testimony by one of the
Hilton Davis' inventors according to whom the process could work with
much lower pH values than those claimed, but that a pH below 6.0 would
"cause 'tremendous foaming problems in the plant."'"
Accordingly, the
United States argued that the pH limit of 6.0 was added not to overcome
prior art, but to limit the claims to what was enabled in the application, and
therefore, the doctrine of prosecution history did not apply.20' That
conclusion, however, mischaracterizes the interplay between the enablement
requirement in the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and the distinct
claiming requirement in the second paragraph. 2 Only what is enabled in
the specification is the applicant's invention and the claims are limited to
that invention. 0 3 To be sure, it may be true that the "purpose of the
enablement requirement is not to limit the scope of the patent right" per
se, 2 4 but it is nevertheless the necessary result if the term invention is
uniformly applied throughout the text of the statute.

undertake independent scientific experiments, to understand clearly the scope of the
monopoly .... ).
195. Hilton Davis 11, 117 S. Ct. at 1049.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942)
(distinguishing a limitation in an original application claim from one which was added during
prosecution); Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Eng'g Corp., 294 U.S. 42, 42 (1935) (claims
limited during prosecution could not be enlarged in infringement action because the enlarged
claims would have been within the prior art which prompted the claim amendment).
199. Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1050.
200. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728)
(quoting Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1542 (Plager, J., dissenting)).
201. Id.
202. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
203. Id.
204. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728)
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994)).
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In the case at hand, the enabled invention was to be practiced at a pH of
6.0 to 9.0 and the Hilton Davis inventors could not teach an ordinarily
skilled artisan how to make and use the invention outside that range.20 5 They
were, in fact, faced with "tremendous foaming problems" below a pH of 6.0
and thus they could not teach the invention outside that range. The patent
grant, however, is an exchange in which the inventor teaches the invention
and everything outside the boundaries of that invention, belongs to the
public or to a later inventor.
On questioning by the Court, counsel for Hilton Davis pursued a line of
argument similar to that of the United States. Hilton Davis argued that
"what the claim [sic] has to do is, it has to enable a person of ordinary skills
in the art to practice the invention" 2°6 and that the examiner suggested the
lower pH limitation be added to the claim so as to assure the enablement
requirement was satisfied. 2 7 Again, the mischaracterization of the patent
statutes is evident. Both the first and second paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 112
deal with one and the same invention. ° The first paragraph requires that the
invention be described so that those skilled in the pertinent field could
practice it, and the second paragraph requires that the same invention be
defined and distinctly claimed."
Notwithstanding the questionable line of argument, the Court reached
the correct conclusion with regard to prosecution historyr estoppel by
emphasizing the expert agency status of the Patent Office. z 'o The Court
"should be extremely reluctant to upset the basic assumptions" made by the
Patent Office unless it had "substantial reasons to do so. ' 211 With special
reference to the case at bar, the Court announced the rule that the burden
rests on the patentee to show that the reason for the amendment during
patent prosecution should not render the amendment available as a
prosecution history estoppel.21 2 The Court held that the record did not
contain clear enough evidence which would enable Hilton Davis to carry
their burden to overcome the presumption of an estoppel.2 3 The case was
thus remanded with an invitation that the Federal Circuit study the record

205. Id.
206. Transcript, supra note 181, at *36 (oral argument of David E. Schmit, Esq., on
behalf of Hilton Davis).

207. Id.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

35 U.S.C. § 112.
Id.
Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1051.
Id. at 1050.
Id. at 1051.
Id.
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and decide whether or not Hilton Davis should be given an opportunity to
proffer additional evidence.2 14
4. No Equitable Threshold to Trigger Doctrine of Equivalents
Based on the premise that the Graver Tank rule was developed 2 in5
response to problems with the "unscrupulous copyist" and "pirate,
Warner-Jenkinson argued that proof of intent was a necessary threshold
before the doctrine of equivalents could be triggered.21 6 That argument
appeared to be further supported in the Federal Circuit majority opinion
which hinted to evidence of copying as being an important factor in the
application of the doctrine.1 7 The majority nevertheless acknowledged that
intent is not an element of infringement.
In his dissent, however, Judge
Plager vehemently argued that the doctrine of equivalents belonged entirely
to the equity courts, 2 9 and was thus available only after a corresponding
equitable threshold had been overcome. 220 The Supreme Court sided with
the Federal Circuit majority, yet cast a doubtful eye on the applicability of
standards such as independent development and intentional designing around
a patent. 221 It would be difficult, the Court stated, to distinguish between
those who intentionally copied the invention with minor changes and those
who tried to design around the claims of the patent, thus appropriating for
themselves as much of the patented invention as they could.2

214. Id.
215. Brief for Petitioner at 32, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728) (citing Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950)).
216. See generally id. at 32-41.
217. Hilton Davis!, 62 F.3d at 1519.
218. Id.; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (the
monopoly grant is effective regardless of whether the infringer knows of the patent).
219. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1543 (Plager, J., dissenting) ("By virtue of its unique
place in our legal system, and by long-standing custom and tradition, equity powers are
exercisable only by judges. The authority to exercise the unique remedy which is the doctrine
of equivalents lies exclusively in courts of equity.").
220. Id.
221. Hilton Davis II, 117 S.Ct. at 1052.
222. Id.
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5. Not Limited to Equivalents Disclosed in Specification
Next, the Court tackled Wamer-Jenkinson's argument that the notice
function of the claims would be best served if equivalents were limited to
those disclosed in the patent. 223 The dissenters in the Federal Circuit had
argued a similar proposition, namely that equivalence should be determined
with a view to what is considered equivalent at the time the patent
issues.2 24 In oral argument, the Court presented Hilton Davis' counsel with a
pertinent hypothetical: a chemical composition with five ingredients, A, B,
C, D, and E, for growing hair.22 5 After fifteen years, new chemicals are
developed which replace each of the ingredients until none of the original
On questioning whether the composition with the new
ingredients remain.
ingredients were equivalent, Hilton Davis answered in the affirmative, which
prompted the Court to respond:
I think the lawyers on the other side are arguing, my goodness,
we're supposed to advise clients, and we have no idea how to do it,
because we read the patent thing and we know with this doctrine
people might discover all kinds of new chemicals in the future, and
for, is
we just don't know how to do it, and so what we're groping
2
7
there then no limitation on this doctrine of equivalents?
Even in the light of these apparently substantial reservations, the Court
summarily rejected the argument that equivalence turned on what was
known at the time the patent issued and held that the proper time for
equivalence analysis was at the time of infringement. 22
B.

No Ruling in the Judge-Jury Question

The Court declined to rule on the question of whether the doctrine of
equivalents was for the jury or for the judge. The issue need not be resolved,
the Court stated, to answer the question presented in the case, and declined
to rule on it.229 However, the Court hinted that it was in likely agreement

223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Transcript, supra note 181, at 39 (oral argument of David E. Schmit, Esq.).

226. Id.
227. Id. at 40.
228. Hilton Davis I, 117 S. Ct. at 1053.
229. Il
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30 ruling did
with the Federal Circuit and that
231 the Court's recent Markman
outcome.
different
not suggest a

C.

Markman v. Westview

In one of the most anticipated decisions of patent law in recent years,
the Supreme Court, in 1996, affirmed a Federal Circuit en banc decision in
Markman.2 2 There, a jury had found a patent for a dry cleaning inventory
system infringed and thus found for the patentee.233 The trial judge,
however, based on his interpretation of the term "inventory" in the patent
claims in question, entered judgment against the patentee, notwithstanding
the jury verdict to the contrary. 3 4 The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc,
affirmed the trial judge and held that he had correctly taken the claim
interpretation from the jury.
The unanimous Supreme Court also agreed and held that patent claim
construction was "exclusively within the province of the court."236 The
decision affirmed three basic tenets of patent law, namely that patent
infringement was subject to the right of jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment;23 7 that the historical test of the right to jury trial did not compel
a conclusion that terms of art and the claims were interpreted by the jury; 2 8
and that precedent, judicial efficiency, reviewability issues, and policy
considerations compelled a finding that claim interpretation was exclusively
for the judge.239 Citing to potential uncertainty in reviewing jury verdicts
and, particularly, to the virtual impossibility of establishing issue preclusion
even within a given jurisdiction, the Court concluded that "treating
interpretive issues as purely legal will promote (though it will not guarantee)
intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis on those
questions not yet subject to' 24
interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority
of the single appeals court. 0

230. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
231. Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1053.
232. Markman, 52 F.3d at 967.
233. Id. at 973.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 979.
236. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1387 (1996).
237. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law.., the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved ....).
238. Markman, 116 S.Ct. at 1393.
239. Id. at 1396.
240. Id.
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1. The Markman Hearing

The decision in Markman soon spawned the creation of the so-called
Markman hearing, a pretrial bench hearing during which the questions of
claim interpretation are settled. 241 Following the Markman hearing, the trial
judge decides on the proper scope and interpretation of the patent claims
and, if the trial is to a jury, instructs the jury accordingly. The jury then, in
the second phase of an infringement trial under the Markman doctrine,
decides whether or not the accused product or process indeed infringes the
claims as interpreted by the trial judge.242
The decision in Markman was not specific with regard to the issues to
be resolved in the Markman hearing and with regard to the type of evidence
to be admitted into the hearing. 243 The Federal Circuit has recently shed
some light on these issues. 2 4 For instance, the court held in Vitronics 5 that
intrinsic evidence such as the patent claims, the specification, and the file
history were dominant over extrinsic evidence such as prior art documents,
dictionaries, and expert testimony. 246 Extrinsic evidence should be allowed
only if ambiguities remain after considering all of the
into the hearing 247
intrinsic evidence.
2. Reconciling Hilton Davis II with Markman
Markman was primarily concerned with ensuring predictability and
reviewability in infringement actions and thus took all of the claim
interpretation from the jury.248 Hilton Davis II, on the other hand, appears to
have affirmed the jury's role in claim interpretation where literal
infringement could not be shown. 249 Referring to the seminal Supreme Court
decision in Winans v. Denmead,2 0° which hinted at the proposition that
241. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996); General
Am. Transp. Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied., 117 S. Ct.
1334 (1997); Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572 (Fed.

Cir. 1996).
242. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
243. Marknan, 52 F.3d at 967.
244. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1576.

245. Id.
246. Id. at 1583.
247. Id.
248. See Marknan, 52 F.3d at 967.
249. See Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1053.

250. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
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equivalence was a question for the jury, 25 1 the Court in Hilton Davis II
opined that Markman did not appear to necessitate a different result.25 2 With
regard to the reviewability issue, the Court suggested that procedural
vehicles such as partial or complete summary judgment, judgment as a
matter of law, special verdict forms, interrogatories on each claim element,
and post verdict judgments as a matter of law should be considered by the
Federal Circuit.y
In a realistic context, there is a curious interplay between the Markman
hearing and the proposition that the doctrine of equivalents lies within the
province of the jury. Assume, for instance, that the trial court decides on
close of a Markman hearing for a certain construction of the patent claims
and that the claims so interpreted were not literally infringed. The entire
case would now be tried to the jury, including the question of equivalence
and the interpretation of the specific claim element for which no literal
infringement could be found. However, claim interpretation necessarily
requires a review of the combination of elements and the interaction among
the individual elements. The issue of claim interpretation as a whole is thus
back in the jury's hands and the importance of the Markman hearing is
effectively reduced to having a minor impact on the outcome of the
infringement action. In the alternative situation, of course, where the
Markman hearing results in an interpretation of the claims which literally
encompasses the accused product or process, the jury's role is substantially
reduced and infringement can often be found immediately as a matter of law.
It is also quite telling that the jury instructions in Hilton Davis I
included several issues which, according to Markman, would not be given to
the jury in literal infringement 2 4 The trial judge instructed the jury to
interpret the claims as one with ordinary skill in the pertinent art would read
the claims.2 5 He further instructed the jury to consider intrinsic evidence
such as the patent specification, other claims of the patent, the prosecution
history, extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony, "the circumstances
surrounding the inception of the patent application," technical literature, and
the prior art256 Allowing the jury to consider extrinsic evidence to such a
degree-and indeed the fact finding function of the jury can only be met by
allowing the jury to look to extrinsic evidence-suggests that the concern

251.
252.
253.
254.
970-71.
255.
256.

Id. at 344.
Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1053.
Id. at n.8.
See generally Hilton Davis 1, 62 F.3d at 1520-21, 1538; Marknan, 52 F.3d at
Hilton Davis!, 62 F.3d at 1556 (Nies, J., dissenting).
Id.
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with a lack of reviewability due to black-box jury verdicts257 has fallen
victim to the broader proposition that the doctrine of equivalents must be
given to the jury. s
D. The Re-'and
On remand, the Federal Circuit held that Hilton Davis, in light of the
new rebuttable presumption rule, should be given an opportunity to proffer
evidence in their favor. 9 The prosecution history of the Hilton Davis patent
was silent with regard to the reasons for the amendment. Accordingly,
Hilton Davis was faced with the presumption that the pH was limited from
6.0 to 9.0 for patentability reasons. The court held that even if the patentee
can show that the amendment was not related to patentability, the court must
still settle the issue of whether that reason is sufficient to overcome
prosecution history estoppel. 26 Finally, the court specifically cautioned the
district court to carefully balance between the interests of public notice and
the dependability of prosecution history on the one hand, and the preliminary
purpose of the doctrine of equivalents of assuring fairness to the patentee
and of preventing fraud on the patent, on the other hand.261
E.

The Argument Warner-JenkinsonFailedto Make

The primary case at hand is quite simple. Yet, Wamer-Jenkinson failed
to make the very argument which won their case. Hilton Davis obtained a
patent with claims calling for clear and unambiguous numerical
boundaries. As noted above,262 the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel
is not a recent creation by any stretch of the imagination. Hilton Davis made
a mistake.263 Warner-Jenkinson, on the other hand, acted prudently and

257. Hilton Davis 1I, 117 S. Ct. at 1053 n.8.
258. Id. at 1054 n.8.

259. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (per curiam), enforcing Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997) [hereinafter Hilton
Davis III].
260. Id. at 1163.

261. Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040,

1051 (1997)).
262. See supra Part IV.A.

263. Transcript, supra note 181, at 31. On questioning by the Court, counsel for Hilton
Davis quipped: "[H]ad I written the claim today knowing what I know, it would have been
written differently." Id.
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compared their process with the Hilton Davis patent. 264 Relying on the
notice content of the Hilton Davis patent, Wamer-Jenkinson's patent counsel
advised that apH of 5.0 in his client's process was not equivalent to a pH of
6.0 or more. z65 Nothing in the file wrapper of the patent indicated
otherwise. 266 Yet, the Federal Circuit would have punished WarnerJenkinson without faulting Hilton Davis for their mistake.
The doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine and it has been
devised to protect the patentee against unscrupulous copycats. 267 Here, the
accused infringer did not act on inequitable principles and should therefore
not be punished. Short of abolishing the doctrine of equivalents, the
Supreme Court found the proper demarcation 268 which will probably absolve
Warner-Jenkinson from a holding of infringement. Whether or not the new
rebuttable presumption rule is a good rule, remains to be seen. As
acknowledged by the Federal Circuit, prosecution before the Patent Office
will be quickly adapted to the new rule in that applicants and the Patent
Office will add express statements with reasons for amendments or
remarks. 269 It appears, however, that such statements may not render the
scope of equivalents easier to apply. The Patent Office, naturally, will tend
to add statements which would support estoppel, while the applicant will try
to add statements to the contrary. Questions of this nature are often dealt
with just prior to the allowance of the application at a time when both the
patent examiner and applicant's counsel are satisfied to have concluded the
adverse examination phase and to have come to a mutually satisfactory
agreement. Naturally, neither will at that point risk aggravating the situation
and endangering the allowance.

264. Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728). Upon learning of Hilton
Davis' patent in late 1986, Wamer-Jenkinson immediately had their patent counsel prepare an
infringement opinion. Id. Counsel came to the conclusion that the patent was invalid and the
claims were not infringed primarily because of the fact that Hilton Davis had added the pH
range of 6.0 to 9.0 by amendment. Id. at 6.
265. Id. at 6.
266. Id.
267. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
268. See Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1040.
269. Hilton Davis III, 114 F.3d at 1163.
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VI. A PROPOSAL

One may safely assume that the doctrine of equivalents will remain
applicable into the foreseeable future, whether under judicial precedent or
The Supreme Court decision, while
under statutory codification.27 0
appropriately strengthening the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel as a
balancing tool against the doctrine of equivalents, has not provided any
guidance with regard to the division within the Federal Circuit. To the
contrary, the Court essentially offered the Federal Circuit carte blanche for
further clarification of the doctrine.27 1 The difference between the functionway-result test and the insubstantial changes test does not appear to be
significant beyond specific fact-driven application to a particular claimed
element. Based on this premise, the courts will now have to define the
interplay between the jury-exclusive Markman hearing and the jury-inclusive
claim construction under the doctrine of equivalents. Besides the Supreme
Court's suggestion towards more particularized jury verdict forms and
.27
special interrogatories,2 it would appear that a more gradual approach to
infringement could further aid in devising a more equitable doctrine which
exhibits concern for both parties' positions. Such a gradual approach could
define various levels of equivalence, ranging from virtual identity to
substantially outside the range of equivalence.
By way of example, assume that following a Markman hearing the court
comes to the conclusion that one element of the claim in question is not
Thereupon, the patentee shifts his allegation to
literally infringed.
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. At this point, the court
conducts a further hearing during which equivalence is defined in various
degrees. In Hilton Davis, for instance, the court could have held that a pH of
5.8 was squarely equivalent to the claimed lower limit of 6.0 and the court
270. The former situation appears to be more likely than the latter. Judge Newman

wrote:
The doctrine of equivalents has neither greatly excited the centers of legal
scholarship, nor seriously stirred action-oriented industry. Indeed, there

remains a telling silence on the part of the technology community, for or
against. Despite the controversial changes proposed in opinions of this court,
there has been little objective policy exploration, economic analysis,
legislative proposal, or even a search for consensus. There has, of course,
been a good deal of speculation flowing from the inconsistency of our
decisions.
Hilton Davis 1, 62 F.3d at 1529 (Newman, J., concurring).
271. Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1054. "[W]e see no purpose in going further and
micro-managing the Federal Circuit's particular word-choice for analyzing equivalence." Id.
272. Id. at 1053 at n.8.
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could have thus assigned 100% equivalence to that expanded range; a lower
pH of 5.5 could be assigned 80% equivalence, a pH of 5.2 could be assigned
60% equivalence, etc. The jury, however, will not learn of these discrete
levels, but will determine the facts as to which pH level is prevalent in the
infringing process. The jury is then regularly charged following the trial,
with the various fact questions, including the graduated scale of equivalence.
The foregoing graduated equivalence model appears to be applicable in
the mechanical, chemical, and electrical arts. Whether or not the model may
be properly utilized in the pharmaceutical and biochemistry arts cannot be
easily answered. However, it is evident that the graduated equivalence
model will not apply where the question regards two discrete elements not
subject to a gradual differentiation. By way of example, one chemical may
be substituted for a claimed chemical in a composition; or in a mechanical
device, a two-part hinge of the claim may be replaced with a weakened
material structure, which allows bending similarly to a hinge, or a screw
connection may be replaced with a glue connection. Similarly to an
independent examination or a reexamination, 3 the accused product or
process may thereby be subjected to an independent review, whether by jury,
judge, Patent Office, or an independent, specifically established panel. That
review must be made without considering the prior art. Instead, only the
claimed invention is compared with the accused product or process. If it is
found in that review that the added feature 274 renders the claim describing
the accused product or process patentable over the patented invention, then
the accused party will be presumed to have carried its burden of proving non
equivalence. In other words, did the accused infringer substitute his own
invention which would, had he filed an application, have resulted in the
issuance of his own patent? The independent review could thereby utilize
the same examination guidelines as used by patent examiners in obviousness
questions with only slight modifications. 2 75 The determination of the prior

273. Any patent may be reexamined upon the request of the patent owner or a third
party and the patentability of the claims may thereby be reviewed in light of additional prior

art. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1994).
274. The element or elements which are the subject of the equivalence determination.
275. The practice with respect to determining whether an invention, as claimed, is
obvious, generally follows the decision in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966),
wherein the Court stated:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained;
and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this
background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is
determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt
but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to
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art, as required in the first prong of the Graham v. John Deere276 test would
be limited to determining the content and disclosure of the patent. The
second prong, namely the determination of the difference between the claims
and the accused device, 277 goes to the heart of the equivalence determination.
The third prong, namely the determination of the level of skill in the aft8
satisfies the requirement that equivalence be determined at the time of
infringement.27 9 If the review is given to the jury, each of the three prongs
may be separately listed on a jury verdict0 form, thus facilitating specific and
itemized appellate review of the verdict.2
The independent examination review model and the graduated
equivalence model may be applied separately and independently of each
other, depending on the facts of a specific case. The two models may also be
used in conjunction with one another, with the independent examination
review model defining the outer boundaries of the range of equivalence and
the graduated equivalence model defining discrete levels within that range.
VII. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of equivalents is here to stay. The Federal Circuit will
probably adhere to the insubstantialchanges test for the doctrine within the
near future. Whether or not district court decisions that retain the functionway-result test will be reversed on this ground remains to be seen. The
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel has been slightly fortified with the
new rebuttable presumption rule. However, its impact will fade within the
next few years as the Patent Office and applicants will ensure that explicit
statements concerning the reasons for a claim amendment become part of the
prosecution history.
As the interplay between the jury-exclusive Markman hearing and the
jury-inclusive fact-finding issues surrounding the doctrine of equivalents is
further defined in the courts, the doctrine of equivalents and the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel will continue to inject a certain amount of
ambiguity and uncertainty into patent protection and patent
infringement. Nevertheless, the additional protection afforded diligent
inventors who contribute to the arts and further science against unscrupulous
the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be

patented.
Id. at 17-18.
276. Id. at 17.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See supra Part V.A.5.
280. See Hilton Davis 1I, 117 S. Ct. at 1053 n.8.

Published by NSUWorks, 1998

145

Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 1

820

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 22:783

copycats and against fraud on the patent may be well worth the price for that
uncertainty.
The graduated equivalence model and the independent
examination review model proposed above may further aid the equitable
principles involved in patent protection and patent infringement without
offending the notice function of the patent system.
Werner Sterner

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss3/1

146

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

Sentenced to Life? An Analysis of the United States
Supreme Court's Decision in Washington v. Glucksberg
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................
11. HISTORY OF WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG ............................................

822

822
822
A. Factsof the Case..............................................................................
822
1. Defendant State of W ashington ......................................................
823
2. Plaintiff Patients ..............................................................................
824
3. Plaintiff Physicians .........................................................................
825
4. Plaintiff Compassion in Dying ........................................................
826
B. ProceduralHistory..........................................................................
C. Analysis of the Western Districtof Washington Decision ............... 827
827
1. Due Process/Liberty Interests .........................................................
828
2. Undue Burden Test .........................................................................
829
3. Equal Protection ..............................................................................
D. Analysis of the Ninth Circuit............................................................ 830
830
1. Majority Opinion ............................................................................
832
2. Dissenting Opinion .........................................................................
832
3. En Banc Opinion .............................................................................
833
]II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ..........................................................
A. Plaintiffs' Argument before the Supreme Court.............................. 833
B. Defendants' Argument before the Supreme Court........................... 833
834
C. Majority Opinion .............................................................................
840
.......................................................................
D. ConcurringOpinions
1. Justice O'Connor: State Interests Outweigh Individual Liberty ..... 840
2. Justice Stevens: Placing Values on Human Life ............................. 840
3. Justice Souter: Physician's Role in M inistering Patient ................. 842
4. Justice Breyer: Right to Die with Dignity ....................................... 844
IV. ANALYSIS OF A RECENT SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE ............. 845
848
V. CONFLICTS W HICH REQUIRE RESOLUTION ...........................................

Liberty InterestAccording to History and Tradition.......................
1. Distinguishing Casey ......................................................................
2. Distinguishing Cruzan ....................................................................
B. State Interests are Insufficient to Outweigh IndividualLiberty .......
A.

VI. CONCLUSION .........................................................................................

Published by NSUWorks, 1998

848
848
850
852
853

147

Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 1

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 22:821

I. INTRODUCTION

In the recent landmark decision of Washington v. Glucksberg,' the
United States Supreme Court upheld a Washington statute criminalizing
assisted suicide for terminally ill patients. 2 The Supreme Court declined to
find a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and further found that the prohibition on assisted
suicide survived a rational basis test. 3 In examining the Supreme Court's
decision, Part II of this case comment sets forth the factual and procedural
history of the case. The parties' arguments and an analysis of the Supreme
Court decision are explored in Part III of this comment. Part IV discusses a
recent Supreme Court of Florida case. Part V suggests that there are several
conflicts with this recent decision which require resolution. Finally, the
conclusion suggests possible recommendations to the legislature.
II. HISTORY OF WASHINGTON V. GLUCKSBERG
A.

Facts of the Case
1. Defendant State of Washington

Despite the fact that the State of Washington does not have any law
prohibiting suicide, the legislature enacted a statute which prohibits aiding or
causing the suicide of another person and provides that a violation of the
statute will result in im4 risonment for a maximum of five years and a fine
not to exceed $10,000. Furthermore, existing law in Washington, such as
the Natural Death Act, immunizes a physician from liability for carrying out
a directive from a competent, terminally ill patient to withdraw hydration and
nutrition. 5 In the case at hand, the plaintiffs consisted of three patients, five
1. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997) [hereinafter Glucksberg].
2. Id. at 2261.
3. Id. at 2261-62.
See section 9A.36.060 of the
4. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(1)(c) (1994).
Washington Revised Code on assisted suicide, which provides that: "(1) [a] person is guilty of
promoting a suicide attempt when he knowingly causes or aids another person to attempt
suicide[, and] (2) [plromoting a suicide attempt is a class C felony." Id. § 9A.36.060. In
1854, the State of Washington prohibited "'assisting another in the commission of selfmurder."' Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261 n.1 (citation omitted).
5. Brief for Respondent at 1, Glucksberg (No. 96-110); see also WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.122.010 (1994) (providing that "adult persons have the fundamental right to control the
decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical care, including the decision to have
life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condition").
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physicians, and a nonprofit organization that assists and counsels terminally
ill patients and family members. 6
2. Plaintiff Patients
After enduring procedures such as chemotherapy, radiation, and
surgery, Dr. Jane Roe, a retired pediatrician, was losing her life to breast
cancer at the age of sixty-nine. 7 During this time, Dr. Roe experienced
extreme pain and suffering, which she tried unsuccessfully to relieve with
massive doses of morphine.8 After several counseling sessions, and with the
knowledge that there was no chance for recovery, Dr. Roe decided that she
wanted to use medication prescribed by her physician for the purpose of
hastening her impending death. 9
John Doe, a forty-four-year-old painter who was diagnosed with
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS") in 1991, was losing his
battle and was advised by his doctors that he was in the terminal stage of his
sickness.10 Mr. Doe had sustained pneumonia, excessive fatigue, seizures,
skin and sinus infections, seventy-percent blindness, and a decreased ability
to care for himself.11 However, he was mentally competent and aware of the
pain he would have to endure since he had cared for his companion who had
died from AIDS.12 Mr. Doe, understanding that the virus was incurable,
wished to take drugs prescribed by his doctor to hasten his death. 3
James Poe, a sixty-nine-year-old retired sales representative who was in
the terminal phase of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, experienced
constant suffocation, which required a permanent connection to an oxygen

6. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1456 (W.D. Wash. 1994),
aff'd en banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. 2258 (1997) [hereinafter Compassion]. The following parties were the plaintiffs: Jane
Roe, John Doe, James Poe, Dr. Harold Glucksberg, Dr. John Geyman, Dr. Thomas Preston,
Dr. Abigail Halperin, Dr. Peter Shalit, and Compassion in Dying. Id. at 1456-58.
7. Id. at 1456.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Compassion,850 F. Supp. at 1456.
11. Id.; see also Brief for Respondent at 3, Glucksberg (No. 96-110) (explaining that
Mr. Doe was susceptible "to all manner of infection" and was expected to experience total
blindness).
12. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1456; see also Brief for Respondent at 3, Glucksberg
(No. 96-110) (illustrating that Mr. Doe had observed the "pain, suffering, and loss of bodily
function, integrity, and personal dignity" typically caused by Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome ("AIDS")).
13. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1456-57.
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tank. 14 He endured extreme leg pain, painful swelling, and immobility due to
a lack of blood flow, which resulted in the administering of morphine on a
regular basis.15 Because the suffering was intolerable and the illness
incurable, Mr. Poe, a mentally competent patient, wished to accelerate his
impending death with the assistance of his physician.1 6 Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision, all three of the plaintiffs died from their terminal
illnesses.17
3. Plaintiff Physicians
Dr. Harold Glucksberg practices oncology at the Pacific Medical Center
in Seattle and is an assistant professor at the University of Washington
School of Medicine.1 8 He has published several articles in various medical
journals concerning cancer. 19 In his declaration to the United States District
Court for the Ninth Circuit, Dr. Glucksberg stated that cancer patients
experience "excruciating, unrelenting pain" and that the massive dosage of
medication, which is administered to alleviate pain, impairs
consciousness. 20 Dr. Glucksberg declined the request, in accordance with the
criminal statute, to prescribe lethal medication for one of his terminally ill,
though competent, suffering patients who wished to self-administer the drugs
to hasten his death. 21 After this refusal, the patient, wishing to commit
suicide by jumping from a bridge, recruited a family member to help him do
SO.22

Dr. John Geyman, a professor emeritus at the University of Washington
and a practitioner of family medicine, has written numerous articles and

14. Id. at 1457; see also Brief for Respondent at 3, Glucksberg (No. 96-110) (describing
that Mr. Poe was fearful due to his "'constant sensation of suffocation' and that he had
trouble sleeping for more than two or three hours).
15. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1457; see also Brief for Respondent at 3, Glucksberg
(No. 96-110) (describing that Mr. Poe took these medications to "calm his 'terror"').
16. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1457.
17. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd en
banc, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258
(1997) [hereinafter Compassion in Dying].
18. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1457.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citation omitted).
21. Brief for Respondent at 5, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).

22. Id.
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books in the field of family medicine.23 He has declared that his patients
experience unnecessary extended deaths filled with suffering and
humiliation, and that they attempt unsuccessful suicides, which often worsen
their mental and physical conditions.2 4
In addition, the following doctors were plaintiff physicians in the matter
of Washington v. Glucksberg: Dr. Thomas Preston, Dr. Abigail Halperin,
and Dr. Peter Shalit. Dr. Thomas Preston is the chief of cardiology at Pacific
Medical Center and has written numerous articles and books in the field of
cardiology?2 On a regular basis, Dr. Preston treats patients who are in the
terminal phase of cardiopulmonary diseases.26
Dr. Abigail Halperin
occasionally treats AIDS and cancer patients.27 On one occasion, a mentally
competent breast cancer patient requested that Dr. Halperin _provide
assistance in hastening her death so that she could die with dignity.' After
the rejection of this request, the patient used a plastic bag to suffocate
herself.2 9 Dr. Peter Shalit, who practices internal medicine, was forced to
decline a similar request for lethal medication. 30 This patient was suffering
from pain as a result of "[o]ozing lesions," causing immobility and inability
to urinate and was further forced to endure gangrenous fingers.31 As a result
of these horrific sights, family members refused to visit because
they could
32
not tolerate observing their loved one's "physical torture."
4. Plaintiff Compassion in Dying
Compassion in Dying is a nonprofit organization located in Washington,
which provides information, counseling, and emotional support for
terminally ill patients and their families, but does not provide lethal
medication.3 3 The organization has stringent requirements for eligibility
which include the following: 1) a determination by the patient's physician
that the patient is terminally ill; 2) a mental health evaluation indicating that

23. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1457. A professor emeritus is one who is "retired or
honorably discharged from active duty because of age, infirmity, or long service, but retained
on the rolls." TIE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 432 (rev. ed. 1984).
24. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1457.
25. Id. at 1458.
26. Id.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Brief for Respondent at 5, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

33. Compassion,850 F. Supp. at 1458; see also Compassionin Dying, 49 F.3d at 588.
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the patient is not suffering from mental abnormalities; 3) a finding that the
demand for assisted suicide does not result from inadequate medical care or
economic concerns; 4) a finding that the request must originate from the
patient either in writing or by videotape; and 5) a finding that the request has
been repeated three times with at least forty-eight hours between the second
and third requests.34 The organization has implemented other safeguards,
which include the denial of services for uncertainty, family member
disapproval, and a showing that the patient is not terminally ill, or has
inadequate pain management.3 5 Compassion in Dying, although a plaintiff in
the federal district court and appellee in the appellate court, was not a party
in the Supreme Court case.
B.

ProceduralHistory

The issue in this case was whether the State of Washington's statute
prohibiting physician-assisted suicide was constitutional. 36 The plaintiffs
sought a declaratory judgment declaring the statute to be unconstitutional and
37 In Compassion in
an injunction preventing
38 enforcement of the statute.
Dying v. Washington, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington held that the statute was unconstitutional. 39 The State
thereafter appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
the lower court. 4° When the Ninth Circuit reversed on rehearing en banc, the
plaintiff physicians petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, and
the Supreme Court, in Washington v. Glucksberg, reversed, holding the
statute to be constitutional.4 ' In the plaintiffs' initial brief to the Supreme
Court, the following challenges were made: 1) Whether "The Clear Line
Between Permitting Refusal Of Treatment And Prohibiting Action Intended

34. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1458.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 1455-56. The issue is whether "Washington's prohibition against 'caus[ing]'
or 'aid[ing]' a suicide offends the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261.
37. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1456.
38. Id. at 1454.
39. Id. at 1467. Compassion in Dying v. Washington was brought in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington. The decision was appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Compassion in Dying v.
Washington. The Ninth Circuit reheard the case en banc. Finally, the case was appealed to
the United States Supreme Court.
40. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 588.
41. 117 S. Ct. at 2258.
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To Cause Death Is Based On Well-Settled Legal Doctrines"4 2; 2) "Whether
That Line Should Be Disturbed To Allow Physician-Assisted Suicide Is A
Complex And Controversial Issue Of Public Policy Which Is Vigorously
Debated Throughout The Landa 3; 3) Whether "State Legislatures Should Be
Allowed To Resolve The Issue Without Having Their Policy Choices
Limited"44; 4) Whether "The Decision Below [Was] A Radical Departure
From Our Nation's Legal' ' Traditions" a5 and "[The] Court's Fourteenth
Amendment Jurisprudence."
C. Analysis of the Western Districtof Washington Decision
1. Due Process/Liberty Interests
The Western District of Washington examined liberty interests under
Planned Parenthood v. Casey4 7 and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health.48 In Casey, the Supreme Court explained that a
terminally ill person's decision to terminate his or her life "'involv[es] the
most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime' and
constitutes a 'choice[] central to personal dignity and autonomy. ''49 In
Compassion, the federal district court held the suffering of a terminally ill
patient to be as important and worthy of protection from governmental
intrusion as that of a pregnant woman.50 The federal district court
distinguished Casey by determining that the life interests of the pregnant
woman and the potential life "which cannot speak for itself' are at risk
concerning an abortion, whereas there is only one life at stake, which can
"voice his or her wishes," in the present case.51 Therefore, according to the

42. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 16.
46. Id.

47. 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (upholding a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy
pre-viability without undue influence from the government, establishing the state's authority
to restrict abortions post-viability, and acknowledging the state's interest in protecting both the
health of the fetus and woman).
48. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (recognizing
that a mentally competent, terminally ill adult has the right to refuse unwanted life-sustaining
medical treatment).
49. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1460 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)).

50. Id.
51. Id.
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federal district court, because it was decided that there is a liberty interest
with respect to a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, a dilemma which
brings about more complex issues concerning governmental competing
interests than does physician-assisted
suicide, there should be a fundamental
52
liberty interest in assisted suicide.
The federal district court next focused on Cruzan, where the- Supreme
Court assumed that a mentally competent individual has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in declining "'the artificial delivery of food and
water.' ''53 The federal district court reasoned that liberty interests which
warrant protection by the Fourteenth Amendment concern matters "which are
essential to personal autonomy and basic human dignity" and that "[tihere is
no more profoundly personal decision, nor one which is closer to the heart of
personal liberty, than the choice which a terminally ill person makes to end
his or her suffering and hasten an inevitable death. 54 The federal district
court noted Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Cruzan which
explained that requiring a mentally competent adult to sustain unwanted
procedures burdens his or her "'liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine the
course of her own treatment"' and that the liberty protected under the Due
Process Clause must at least guarantee a patient's right to reject medical
treatment.55 The federal district court could not find a differentiation
between the refusal of life-saving treatment and
the request for assisted
56
suicide by a voluntary, mentally competent adult.
2. Undue Burden Test
The Western District of Washington used the standard set forth in
Casey, in which the court must determine whether the questionable statute
would operate as "a substantial obstacle" for an individual who is seeking to
commit physician-assisted suicide. 7 The federal district court reasoned that
the Washington statute "not only places a substantial obstacle in the path of a
terminally ill, mentally competent person wishing to commit physicianassisted suicide, but entirely prohibits it," thus placing an undue burden on
the individual's constitutionally protected liberty interest.5 8 The federal
district court responded to the State's argument, that there are legitimate state
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1461 n.4 (quoting Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
54. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1461.
55. Id. at 1461 n.4 (citation omitted).
56. Id. at 1461.
57. Id. at 1465 (citation omitted).
58. Id.
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interests in preventing suicide and protecting vulnerable individuals at risk
for suicide from undue influence, by holding that the legislature can
formulate safeguards and define the limitations of physician-assisted
suicide.59 These regulations would provide a mechanism which would
guarantee that individuals are not acting according to "abuse, coercion or
undue influence from third parties." 60 The federal district court pointed out
that the Supreme Court of Washington and Washington law have not only
acknowledged the right of a mentally competent, terminally ill patient to
withhold life-sustaining treatment, but have further recognized the authority
of a surrogate or representative to withhold treatment, acting on behalf of the
patient's interests.
The federal district court reasoned that the potential
abuse for disconnection from a life support system might be even greater
than that suspected of physician-assisted suicide when the patient is
competent and a surrogate is acting on his or her behalf.62
3. Equal Protection
In the federal district court, the plaintiffs argued that the Washington
statute denied two similarly situated groups of terminally ill adults equal
protection of the law as guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. 63 The defendants argued that there is no
distinction because death resulting from the withdrawal of life-sustaining
systems is natural, whereas death resulting from other means is
artificial. 64 The federal district court found, according to Washington case
law and the Washington Natural Death Act, that the state has taken the first
step in acknowledging that "its interest in preventing suicide does not require
an absolute ban." 5 The federal district court was not convinced that the
distinction between "natural" and "artificial" death justified "disparate

59. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1465.
60. Id. at 1465 n.10.
61. Id. at 1466 n.11 (citing In Re Guardianship of Grant, 747 P.2d 445, 446 (Wash.
1987), amended by 757 P.2d 534 (Wash. 1988) (holding that the legal guardian of an
incompetent patient suffering from Batten's disease had the right to terminate life supporting
medical procedures)); see also In Re Guardianship of Hamlin, 689 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Wash.
1984) (holding that an incompetent, terminally ill patient may be withdrawn from life support
by an immediate family member or an appointed guardian ad litem); Natural Death Act,
WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122.010 (1994) (describing the legal prerequisites a person must fulfill

for carrying out a written request for refusal of life-supporting procedures).
62. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1465.
63. Id. at 1459.

64. Id. at 1467.
65. Id.
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treatment" among the two groups in that both individuals are terminally ill,
both individuals are enduring pain and humiliation, and both individuals
would be exposed to a prolonged death process without medical
interference. 66 The federal district court concluded that the Washington
statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
allowing the withdrawal of life-support systems, but prohibiting physicianassisted suicide for mentally competent, terminally ill adults. 67 The federal
district court subsequently entered final judgment declaring the Washington
statute unconstitutional and the court declined to grant injunctive relief. 68
D. Analysis of the Ninth Circuit
1. Majority Opinion
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the federal district court's
decision and held the Washington statute, which prohibits assisted-suicide, to
be constitutional. 69 First, the Ninth Circuit explained that the federal district
court relied on language from the Casey opinion and applied this out of the
context for which these principles were originally intended within the
meaning of abortion. 70 The court reasoned that "[i]t is commonly accounted
an error to lift sentences or even paragraphs out of one context and insert the
abstracted thought into a wholly different context. 71 Second, Cruzan did
involve the cessation of life; however, the Ninth Circuit noted that the federal
district court improperly declined to differentiate between those individuals
withdrawing life support and those seeking medical assistance to assist in
self-killing.' 2 Third, the Ninth Circuit accused the federal district court of
"invent[ing] a constitutional right unknown to the past and antithetical to the
defense of human life. 73 Fourth, with respect to the federal district court's
undue burden analysis, the Ninth Circuit found that the quotation from Casey
regarding the abortion issue was again extended to a field where it has no

66. Id.
67. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1467.
68. Id. at 1467-68.
69. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 588.
70. Id. at 590.
71. Id.
72. Id. at591.
73. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that the lower court's decision was groundless in the
history and traditions of the United States. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 591. According
to the Ninth Circuit: "In the two hundred and five years of our existence no constitutional
right to aid in killing oneself has ever been asserted and upheld by a court of final
jurisdiction." Id.
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application and that the conclusion that the statute was facially invalid was
unfounded. 74
Next, the Ninth Circuit focused its examination on the interests of the
State of Washington and concluded that these interests outbalanced any
asserted liberty interest.75 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that preserving the
integrity of the medical profession and preventing physicians from
participating in the suicide of their patients was an important state interest,
which if ignored, could result in impeding the physician's continual quest for
cures.76 The Ninth Circuit claimed that patients will be unduly influenced by
their physicians because of "pressure to consent to their own deaths., 77 The
Ninth Circuit further alleged that the poor, handicapped, and underprivileged
and abuse if there are laws permitting physicianwill suffer exploitation
78
assisted suicide.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit explained that there exists disagreement
among the states as to the definition of "terminally ill" and that the federal
district court, in not certifying a class, failed to identify the persons for which
judgment was entered.79 The Ninth Circuit stated that the plaintiffs did not
meet the burden of proving "'that the legislature's actions were irrational"' in
enacting the statute and that there was no foundation in criminal or tort law
that supported the federal district court's decision. 0 The Ninth Circuit
further explained that a license does not grant a physician the right to expose
a patient to unwanted medical procedures and that an individual has "'the
right to be let alone"' if he or she desires.8 1 According to the Ninth Circuit,
the distinction between the patient who directs that lifesaving treatment be
terminated and a patient who seeks assisted suicide is rooted in the common
law and tradition of the United States; more specifically, there has not existed
an acknowledged right to have another "enslave you, mutilate you, or kill
you., 82 The court characterized assisted suicide as having the right to seek
out another individual to cooperate in one's self-killing as opposed to seeking

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 592.
77. Compassionin Dying, 49 F.3d at 592.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 593. The district court had entered judgment for Jane Roe and John Doe even
though they had already died. The judgment of James Poe lapsed upon his death; thus, the
judgment was entered on behalf of the respondents' future terminally ill patients. Id.
80. Id. (quoting Kadramus v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450,463 (1988)).
81. Compassionin Dying, 49 F.3d at 594 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).

82. Id.
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the termination of unwanted medical treatment.8 3 The Ninth Circuit did not
decide the question of whether the Washington statute violated equal
protection. 84
2. Dissenting Opinion
In the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Eugene Wright dissented,
finding that the Washington statute violated the "plaintiffs' privacy and equal
protection rights. 85 Judge Wright explained that the federal district court's
application of Casey was entirely appropriate and not limited only to abortion
cases, but originates from Supreme Court precedent and involves matters
concerning intimate decisions which deal with "'marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.' ' 86 Judge
Wright further agreed with the federal district court that there cannot be a
distinction between refusing unwanted treatment and seeking physicianassisted suicide. 7
3. En Banc Opinion
A limited en banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the threejudge panel's decision and affirmed the federal district court.88 The court
focused on Casey and Cruzan, holding that there is a constitutionally
recognized right to die.8 9 Upon a petition, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 9° In Compassion in Dying II, Judge Beezer dissented,
finding that mentally competent, terminally ill individuals do not have a

83. Id.
84. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2262 (citing Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d
790, 838 (9th Cir. 1996)) [hereinafter Compassion in Dying II].
85. Compassionin Dying, 49 F.3d at 594 (Wright, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 595 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). Judge

Wright explained that an individual's right to privacy consists of "'the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."' Id. (quoting Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589,599-600 (1977)).
87. Id. Judge Wright commented that "[s]uch a distinction yields patently unjust
results." Id. at 596. According to the majority view, if an individual is dependent on a
respirator and the suffering is intolerable, that person may direct the physicians to withdraw
life-support. Compassionin Dying, 49 F.3d at 596. However, a similarly situated patient who
does not depend on life-sustaining medical treatment, does not have that same right. Id.
88. Compassionin Dying II, 79 F.3d at 839.
89. Id. at 799-801.
90. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2262.
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fundamental liberty interest, and that the state's interests "are sufficiently
strong to sustain the constitutionality"9 ' of the statute.

III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A.

Plaintiffs' Argument before the Supreme Court

The plaintiffs urged that the Ninth Circuit ignored the Supreme Court's
analytical approach to substantive due process claims and invented a liberty
interest which has no foundation in our nation's tradition, characterizing it as
a "radical departure." 92 The plaintiffs further argued that there is a distinct
difference between allowing the withdrawal of medical treatment and
disallowing conduct which brings about death, and that this distinction is
rooted in "well-settled legal doctrines." 93 This argument is based on the fact
that, at common law and in most states today, treatment without informed
consent is considered a battery, whereas an individual who causes another's
death would be criminally liable.9 4 Additionally, there are existing statutes in
the majority of states which criminalize assisted suicide.95 The plaintiffs
argued that Cruzan stands for the proposition that one has a constitutionally
recognized right to refuse unwanted life-sustaining medical treatment, which
allows the illness to "follow a natural course to death. 96
B.

Defendants' Argument before the Supreme Court

The defendants argued that the Supreme Court has, on prior occasions,
acknowledged that an individual has a liberty interest in making personal
decisions regarding the manner of one's death. 97 They claimed that the
individual has a right to decide this matter according to his or her beliefs and
values and that he or she should have the option of declining to endure
suffering and loss of dignity.98 The defendants argued that there is
discrimination between mentally competent, terminally ill patients requiring
life-sustaining medical treatment and those patients who do not necessitate

91. Compassionin Dying 11, 79 F.3d at 857 (Beezer, J., dissenting).

92. Brief for Petitioner at 9, Glucksberg (No. 96-110).

93. Id.
94. Id. at 11.
95. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,280 (1990)).
96. Id. at 12.
97. Brief for Respondent at 7, Glucksberg (96-110).
98. Id. In permitting this right, the State argued that safeguards may be enacted to
prevent abuse and undue influence. Id.
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it. 99 They alleged that there is a violation of equal protection because those
individuals who are dependent upon constant medical procedures to sustain
life are presented with the option of directing a physician to withdraw or
withhold this support, whereas those terminally 0ill
0 patients who do not
require such care may not exercise the same option.'
C.

Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on January 8,
1997.0' William L. Williams presented on behalf of the defendants, Walter
Dellinger as amicus curiae on behalf of the United States supporting
Defendants, and Kathryn Tucker on behalf of the plaintiffs. 0 2 For the
Supreme Court's review, amicus curiae briefs were filed on behalf of several
organizations.'0 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion, holding that the
99. Id. at 8.
100. Id.
101. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2258.
102. Id. at 2261.
103. The following briefs are the amicus briefs which were filed: Brief for Physicians
for Compassionate Care, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 647921; Brief for Members of
the New York and Washington State Legislatures, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
648005; Brief for the United States Catholic Conference, New York Catholic Conference,
Washington State Catholic Conference, Oregon Catholic Conference, California Catholic
Conference, Michigan Catholic Conference, Christian Life Commission of the Southern
Baptist Convention, National Association of Evangelicals, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod,
Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod-Lutherans for Life, Evangelical Covenant Church, and
American Muslim Council, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 650919; Brief for Gary Lee,
M.D., William Petty, M.D., Fritz Beck, June Beck, Willows Residential Care Facility, Sister
Geraldine Bernards, Maryville Nursing Home, Inc., Janice Eisner, Claudine Stotler, Jeffrey M.
Weinkauf, and Physicians for Compassionate Care, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
647921; Brief for the States of California, Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
York, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia, and the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 650921; Brief for the Schiller Institute,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656260; Brief for the American Medical Association,
American Nurses Association, and American Psychiatric Association, Glucksberg (No. 96110), 1996 WL 656263; Brief for Family Research Council, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996
WL 656275; Brief for Choice in Dying, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656277; Brief for
the American Hospital Association, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656278; Brief for
American Geriatrics Society, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656290; Brief for Richard
Thompson Oakland County Prosecuting Attorney, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
656291; Brief for the National Association of Prolife Nurses, National Association of
Directors of Nursing Administration in Long Term Care, Philippine Nurses Association of
America, Scholl Institute of Bioethics, California Nurses for Ethical Standards, Glucksberg
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(No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656299; Brief for the Southern Center for Law and Ethics,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656302; Brief for the Legal Center for Defense of Life,
Inc. and the Prolife Legal Defense Fund, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656314; Brief
for the National Right to Life Committee, Inc., Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656315;
Brief for the International Anti-Euthanasia Task Force, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
656322; Brief for the American Association of Homes and Services for the Aging, et al.,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656324; Brief for the Institute for Public Affairs of the
Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (UOJCA) and the Rabbinical Council of
America, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656330; Brief for the National Legal Center for
the Medically Dependent & Disabled, Inc., the Disabilities Perspectives, Ethics and Advocacy
Task Force of the Nursing Home Action Group, and Michigan Handicapper Cau.,-js,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656336; Brief for the Christian Legal Society, Christian
Medical and Dental Society, Christians Pharmacists Fellowship International, Nurses
Christian Fellowship, and Fellowship of Christian Physician Assistants, Glucksberg (No. 96110), 1996 WL 656337; Brief for the National Hospice Organization, Glucksberg (No. 96110), 1996 WL 656338; Brief for the Catholic Medical Association, Glucksberg (No. 96-110),
1996 WL 656339; Brief for the American Center for Law & Justice, Glucksberg (No. 96-110),
1996 WL 656340; Brief for the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, Glucksberg (No.
96-110), 1996 WL 656341; Brief of the National Catholic Office for Persons with Disabilities
and Knights of Columbus, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656342; Brief of the Catholic
Health Association of the United States, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 656343; Brief for
Bioethics Professors, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 657754; Brief of Senator Orrin
Hatch, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Representative Henry Hyde, Chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee, and Representative Charles Canady, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the House Judiciary Committee, Glucksberg (No. 96110), 1996 WL 657755; Brief of the District Attorney of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 657807; Brief of the Project on Death in America, Open
Society Institute, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 658736; Brief for the United States,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 663185; Brief of the State of Oregon, Glucksberg (No.
96-110), 1996 WL 663194; Brief for the National Spinal Cord Injury Association, Inc.,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 664997; Brief of the American Suicide Foundation,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 665436; Brief of the American College of Legal
Medicine, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 668827; Brief of the Center for Reproductive
Law & Policy, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708943; Brief for Council for Secular
Humanism and International Academy of Humanism, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
708950; Brief for Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas
Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708956; Brief of the
Washington State Psychological Association, the American Counseling Association, the
Association for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Issues in Counseling, and a Coalition of Mental
Health Professionals, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 708960; Brief of the American
Medical Student Association and a Coalition of Distinguished Medical Professionals,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709332; Brief of Americans for Death with Dignity and
the Death with Dignity Education Center, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709335; Brief
of Bioethicists, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709337; Brief of State Legislation,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709339; Brief for the National Women's Health Network
and Northwest Women's Law Center, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709341; Brief of
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Washington statute, which prohibits the act of causing or aiding a suicide,
does not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 1°4
The opinion begins by examining a history of suicide law in the State of
Washington, including section 9A.36.060 of the Revised Code of
Washington, enacted in 1975, and Washington's Natural Death Act, enacted
in 1979.105 After Washington voters had declined an initiative which would
have allowed a form of physician-assisted suicide, the legislature amended
the Natural Death Act to specifically exclude it.1°6 The Court, in Part I of the
opinion, explored the historical and legal doctrines of the United States,
noting that in forty-four states, the District of Columbia, and the two
territories, it is a crime to assist in suicide.' °7 The Court commented that
these laws reflect the commitment of the states in preserving and protecting
life and that the Anglo-American common law for over 700 years has either

the Coalition of Hospice Professionals, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 709342; Brief of
36 Religious Organizations, Leaders and Scholars, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL
711178; Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of
Washington, National Gray Panthers Project Fund, Gray Panthers of Washington, Gray
Panthers of New York, Japanese American Citizens League, Pacific Northwestern District of
the Japanese American Citizens League, Humanists of Washington State, Hemlock Society
USA, Hemlock Society of New York State, Hemlock Society of Washington State, Euthanasia
Research Guidance Organization, AIDS Action Council, Northwest AIDS Foundation, Seattle
AIDS Support Group, Local 6 of the Service Employees International Union, Temple De
Hirsch Sinai Social Action Committee, Seattle/King County Chapter of the Older Women's
League, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 711194; Brief of Julian Whitaker, M.D.,
Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 711203; Brief for the Gay Men's Health Crisis and
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 711205;
Brief of Wayne County, Michigan, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 722030; Brief of
Surviving Family Members in Support of Physician-Assisted Dying, Glucksberg (No. 96110), 1996 WL 722032; Brief for John Doe, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 743345;
Brief of the Rutherford Institute, Glucksberg (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 752715.
104. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2266. Initiative 119 provided for an amendment to Washington's Natural
Death Act and allowed for "aid in dying." Id. at 2266 n.13. "Aid in dying" is:
[A]id in the form of a medical service provided in person by a physician that
will end the life of a conscious and mentally competent qualified patient in a
dignified, painless and humane manner, when requested voluntarily by the
patient through a written directive in accordance with this chapter at the time
the medical service is to be provided.
Id. (citation omitted).
107. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2263 n.8 (quoting Compassion in Dying II, 79 F.3d at
847).
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penalized or objected to suicide and assisted-suicide.0 8 In fact, the Court
points out that the first state to prohibit assistance in suicide was New York
in 1828, which was followed by many other states enacting similar
laws.1 9 The Court noted that each state has submitted numerous proposals to
permit physician-assisted suicide, but they are continually rejected by the
state legislatures1 10 As evidenced by the New York State's Task Force,
some states are actively involved in studies regarding physician-assisted
suicide."' In conclusion, the Supreme Court was unconvinced that it should
tradition. The Court then focused
depart from centuries of well settled legal 12
its attention toward the due process claim.'
The Court explained that not only does the Due Process Clause
"'protect[] individual liberty against 'certain government actions regardless
of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them,"" but it also
affords protection against intervention with fundamental liberty interests. 1
These interests have been defined through an extensive series of United
States Supreme Court cases and include the right to marry,1 14 the right to
procreate, 15 the right to bodily integrity, 1 6 the right to control the education
and upbringing of one's children,117 the right of privacy during one's
marriage,"' the right to use contraception,' 9 and the right to terminate one's

108. Id. at 2263 (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 294-95
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
109. Id. at 2265 (citations omitted).
110. Id. at 2266 n.15. The following states have submitted proposals: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Nebraska, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
111. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267. The New York State's Task Force on Life and the
Law is "an ongoing, blue-ribbon commission" which consists of attorneys, physicians,
ethicists, religious leaders, and other interested individuals and was convened in 1984. Id. It
was created to make public policy recommendations on questions of medical technological
developments. Id. It has determined that the potential risks of permitting physician-assisted
suicide would outweigh any benefits, thus exposing vulnerable individuals to a tremendous
amount of abuse. Id.
112. Id.
113. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267 (citations omitted).
114. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
115. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
116. Id. (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
117. Id. (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401, 403 (1923); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,534-35 (1925)).
118. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485-86 (1965)).
119. Id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,443 (1972)).
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pregnancy. 20° Particularly relevant to the case at hand, the Supreme Court
has strongly implied
121 that one has the right to refuse "unwanted life-saving
medical treatment."
The Supreme Court explained that it must "'exercise the utmost care"'
when examining liberty interests afforded protection by the Due Process
Clause and turned its discussion to Casey and Cruzan.'22 The liberty interest
inferred from Cruzan, to refuse unwanted medical treatment, was grounded
in the nation's historical and legal doctrines in that coerced treatment was
traditionally considered a battery; however, the Supreme Court distinguished
the instant case because states have always declined to permit assisted
suicides.1 23 The Court replied to the plaintiffs' argument, explaining that not
all personal and intimate decisions are sheltered by the Due Process Clause
just by virtue of the fact that most liberties and rights have their basis in
personal autonomy.124 Finally, the Supreme Court concluded that the right to
die is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment and turned its attention to whether the Washington statute could
nonetheless pass a rational basis test.25
The Supreme Court next explained that the Washington statute must be
rationally related to legitimate government interests and then referred to the
federal district court's decision identifying these interests. 26 The Court
commented that the state has a legitimate interest in preserving life and
preventing suicide, as illustrated by laws protecting human life, and that
permitting physician-assisted suicide would subject especially vulnerable
people to suicidal deaths. 27 The Court suggested that legalization of assisted
suicide would complicate the treatment of depressed, mentally unstable, or

120. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
121. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79
(1990)). However, the Supreme Court held that the State of Missouri could require clear and
convincing evidence of an incompetent patient's wishes regarding the termination of life
support. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280-81 (1990).
122. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. at 2268 (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 2270.
124. Id. at 2271 (citation omitted).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2271-72 (citing Compassion in Dying II, 79 F.3d at 816-17). The interests
are as follows: 1) preservation of life; 2) prevention of suicide; 3) avoiding undue influence
from third parties; 4) protecting the family members of terminally ill patients; 5) preserving
the righteousness of the medical profession; and 6) avoiding trends towards euthanasia and
abuse. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. at 2271 n.20.
127. Id. at 2273. The Supreme Court notes that research has suggested that depression
and inadequate pain management highly contribute to requests for physician-assisted suicide.

Id. (citations omitted).
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suicidal individuals. I28 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the state has an
obligation in preserving the integrity of the medical profession and that
permitting physician-assisted suicide is completely contradictory to a
physician's interests in healing their patients. 129 The trust between a patient
and the patient's doctor, the Supreme Court claimed, may be greatly
jeopardized as a result of legalizing physician-assisted suicide.
The State
argued that it had interests "in protecting vulnerable groups-including the
poor, the elderly, and disabled persons-from abuse, neglect, and
mistakes.' 131 Although the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, the
Supreme Court focused on this interest, stating that terminally ill and
disabled individuals need protection from the abuse associated with the right
to assisted suicide. 32 With respect to the final state interest, the Court noted
that extending a constitutional right for mentally competent, terminally ill
patients to direct physicians to assist in their suicides may prove to be a
"much broader license" which would be an impossibility for the state to
control.133 In addition, the Supreme Court examined various studies that
were conducted in the Netherlands and in New York, and commented that
there is a great potential for abuse and undue influence, and that the
Washington statute banning assisted suicide is, at a minimum, rationally
related to the state's legitimate interests. 34 Thus, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision3 5of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded for
further proceedings.'

128. Id.
129. Id. (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS, § 2.211 (1994)).
130. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2273 (quoting Assisted Suicide in the United
States: Hearing before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 355-56 (1996)). The hearing before the Subcommittee
explained that ."[t]he patient's trust in the doctor's whole-hearted devotion to his best interests
will be hard to sustain."' Id.
131. Id. at 2273.
132. Id. (citing Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 592-93); see also Physician-Assisted
Suicide and Euthanasiain the Netherlands. A Report of Chairman Charles T. Canady, at 9,
20 (discussing biases towards disabled individuals and negative messages resulting from
assisted suicide). Specifically, the Supreme Court reasoned that it is necessary to prevent
actions based on financial incentives to decrease "end-of-life health-care costs" and to avoid
the danger of adopting policies which may favor the "young and healthy." Glucksberg, 117 S.
Ct. at 2273.
133. Id. at 2274.
134. Id. at 2274-75.
135. Id. at 2275.
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D. Concurring Opinions
1. Justice O'Connor: State Interests Outweigh Individual Liberty
Justice O'Connor framed the question before the Court as whether "the
'liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes a right to
commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing
so.' 36 Although sympathetic to the idea that death may be painful and
humiliating, Justice O'Connor explained that there is great difficulty in
determining the boundaries of terminal illness and that some decisions to
hasten death may result from mistake or pressure. 37 Justice O'Connor
concluded that Washington's interests in protecting vulnerable individuals
from hastening death "are sufficiently weighty" to warrant the state's
banning of assisted suicide.138 Justice Ginsburg also concurred in the Court's
judgment for the foregoing reasons.139
2. Justice Stevens: Placing Values on Human Life
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens analogized those cases in
which courts have concluded that a state has the authority to allocate lesser
values on certain lives, specifically referring to capital punishment
cases.' 4° According to these decisions, "there is no absolute requirement that
a state treat all human life as having an equal right to
preservation.' ' 41 Although the state was engaged in the valuation of human
life, the state legislatures "had sufficiently narrowed the category of lives"
deserving termination by establishing safeguards to ensure that the
defendants actually "belonged in that limited category."' 42 Although the
Supreme Court has found that the statute is not facially invalid, Justice
Stevens did not restrict the prospect that some operations of the statute may

136. Id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Concurring opinions were filed at 117 S.

Ct. 2302 by Justices O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer for both Washington v. Glucksberg and
Vacco v. Quill.
137. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2303.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2310 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 2304 (Stevens, J., concurring). See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). The

Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of capital punishment in these three cases by
placing lesser values on the lives of criminals as opposed to non-criminals. Glucksberg, 117
S. Ct. at 2304.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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prove to be unconstitutional.' 43 In authorizing punishment of the death
penalty, the State of Washington has determined that "the sanctity of human
life does not require that it always be preserved," and it must recognize that
there will be circumstances where accelerating death will be
justifiable. 44 Justice Stevens next focused on Cruzan, referring to the
freedom which encompasses an individual's "interest in dignity" and
deciding "the character of the memories that will survive long after her
death." r4s Although in Cruzan the Court did not decide the issue at hand, it
acknowledged a liberty interest in deciding the manner in facing an
impending death. 46 Justice Stevens brilliantly explained that the deceased
plaintiffs in the present case "may in fact have had a liberty interest even
stronger than Nancy Cruzan's because, not only were they terminally ill, they
were suffering constant and severe pain."1 47 Justice Stevens further opined
that eluding unbearable pain and loss of dignity is undoubtedly "'[at] the
heart of [the] liberty . . . to define one's own concept of48 existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.'"1
Next, the state's interests are discussed and Justice Stevens pointed out
that the prevention of abuse is not applicable, as in the case at hand, to a
mentally competent person who makes a voluntary choice.

49

Confusion will

surely arise as a result of permitting physician-assisted suicide with respect to
the physician's traditional healing role.150 However, Justice Stevens noted
that there is already a significant amount of friction between the established
role and present practice because physicians are already engaged in
withholding life-sustaining medical treatment, and, more relevant to the
present case, administering "terminal sedation."'151 Justice Stevens concluded
that it "is not itself sufficient to outweigh the interest in liberty that may

143. Id. Justice Stevens comments that the Ninth Circuit en banc court did not have to
decide the case based on a particular plaintiff who had violated the statute for assisting a
patient's suicide; thus, the court's finding was not confined to "a particular set of plaintiffs
before it." Id.
144. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2305.
145. Id. at 2306.

146. Id. at 2305.
147. Id. at 2307.
148. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
149. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2308.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 2309. Terminal sedation is the "administration of sufficient dosages of painkilling medication to terminally ill patients to protect them from excruciating pain" even
though this will bring about a hastened death. Id. at 2310. The argument is that the "intent
and causation" are both identical to the circumstances addressed in the case at bar; that is, both
deal with the advancement of death in efforts to mitigate pain. Id.
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justify the only possible means of preserving
a dying patient's dignity and
52
alleviating her intolerable suffering."'
3. Justice Souter: Physician's Role in Ministering Patient
Justice Souter agreed that there was no showing that the statute was
unconstitutional, but he first examined the history of the United States
Supreme Court in deciding due process claims from the Slaughter House
Cases153 through the Lochner'54 era, to Griswold5 5 and Casey.156 Focusing
much on the notion of "'ordered liberty,' comprising a continuum of rights to
be free from 'arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,"' Justice
Souter analyzed the due process claim accordingly. 157 Acknowledging that
there is no precise formula with which one may use in examining liberty
interests, Justice Souter commented that due process involves a balancing
test between the individual's liberty and that of "'organized society."" 58 The
boundaries of substantive due process are derived from "'careful 'respect for
the teachings of histor [and] solid recognition of the basic values that
underlie our society.""' 9 Next, Justice Souter examined the state's interests
and stated that "[i]t is only when the legislation's justifying principle,
critically valued, is so far from being commensurate with the individual
interest as to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied that the statute must give
way. ' ' 6° The fate of determining if an individual has a protected liberty
interest demands "explicit analysis" when that asserted right could be
portrayed as "belonging to different strands of our legal tradition requiring
different degrees of constitutional scrutiny."' 6' For example, the abortion
debate could have been considered according to a woman's freedom of
reproduction, requiring a "substantial burden of justification on the [s]tate,"

152. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2310.
153. 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
154. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
155. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
156. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2275-80 (Souter, J., concurring); see also Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment includes the
"right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all
lawful ways; to live and work where he will... [and] to enter into all contracts which may be
proper, necessary, and essential").
157. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2281-82 (citations omitted).
158. Id. at 2282 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)).
159. Id. (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted)).
160. Id. at 2283.
161. Id. at 2285 n.11.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss3/1

168

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

1998]

Testa

feticide except by the mother, requiring
or according to laws prohibiting
1 62
rationality on the state's part.
In his analysis, Justice Souter explored the legal doctrines which have
"long condemned" suicide and its assistance, noting that the deceased's
survivors were once punished by forfeiture of property to the state. 63 Most
states today have enacted statutes which are similar to the Washington
statute, namely criminalizing assistance in the suicide of another
person. 164 Justice Souter brilliantly explained that a physician's assistance is
encompassed in the recognized role not as "a mechanic of the human body
whose services have no bearing on a person's moral choices, but one who
does more than treat symptoms, one who ministers to the patient." 165 The
Casey Court determined that "physicians are fit assistants" with respect to the
decision to abort potential life, which includes the abuses associated with
assisted suicide; specifically, there exists the possibility of irresponsibility
and influence from others. 66 Without the assistance of a physician, "the
woman's right would have too often amounted to nothing more than a right
to self-mutilation," and similarly, without the assistance of a physician in the
162. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2285 n.11 (citing Lawrence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf,
Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1057, 1091 (1990)
(suggesting that "reasoned judgment" is necessary in determining which principle suits the
specific claim)).
163. Id. at 2286 (citations omitted). This was abolished because it was unfair to expose
the innocent survivors to such penalties. Id. (citation omitted).
164. Id. at 2287 n.14. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120(a)(2) (Michie 1996); ARiz.
REV. STAT. § 13-1103(A)(3) (1996-97); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-104(a)(2) (Michie 1993);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-104(1)(b) (Supp. 1996);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-56(a)(2) (1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 645 (1995); FLA. STAT.
ch. 782.08 (1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-5(b) (1996); HAW. REv. STAT. § 707-702(1)(b)
(1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 720, § 5/12-31 (1993); IND. CODE §§ 35-42-1-2 to 35-42-1-2.5
(1994 and Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE § 707A.2 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3406 (1995); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 216.302 (Michie 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.12 (West Supp.
1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 204 (West 1983); MICH. COMP. LAws § 752.1027
(1997-98); Minn. STAT. § 609.215 (1996); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-49 (1994); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 565.023.1(2) (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-105 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28307 (1995); N. H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:4 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-6 (West 1995);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-4 (Michie 1996); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1987); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-04 (Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 813-15 (1983); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 163.125(1)(b) (1991); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 2505 (West 1983); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 11-60-1 through 11-60-5 (Supp. 1996); S.D. CODFED LAWS § 22-16-37 (Michie
1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-216 (Supp. 1996); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.08 (West
1994); WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.36.060 (1994); Wis. STAT. § 940.12 (1993-94); see also P. R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 33, § 4009 (1984).
165. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2288 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
166. Id.
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suicide of a terminally ill individual, the dying patient's privilege will also be
restricted "to crude methods of causing death, most shocking and painful to
the decedent's survivors. 1 67 As set forth in the plaintiffs' case, for example,
the physicians' patients were compelled to self-kill in crude manners,
sometimes enlisting the assistance of their loved ones to commit
suicide.1 68 Justice Souter further illustrated that physicians are generally
allowed to provide terminal sedation to their patients even though this
"medication is so powerful as to hasten death. 16 Justice Souter concluded
that the State of Washington's interests are "sufficiently serious" to
overpower the assertion that the statute is "arbitrary or purposeless" but also
acknowledged that the legislative process is "preferred" to handle these types
of claims. 170
4. Justice Breyer: Right to Die with Dignity
Justice Breyer joined the concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor,
excepting the parts which join the majority, and chose to call this asserted
right the "right to die with dignity.' 171 Justice Breyer explained that it is not
necessary to decide whether there is a recognized fundamental liberty interest
because "the avoidance of severe physical pain (connected with death) would
have to comprise an essential part of any successful claim."'172 New York
and Washington have enacted laws which allow physicians to administer
pain-alleviating medication "despite the risk that those drugs themselves will
kill.' 173 Justice Breyer concludes by stating that the Court may find the need
to "revisit its conclusions in these cases.

167. Id.
168. Compassion, 850 F. Supp. at 1457.
169. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2289. The following states have authorized pain
treatment which hastens death: Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Mexico, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia. Id. at
2289 n.15.
170. Id. at 2290-93.
171. Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
172. Id. Justice Breyer, in expressing Justice O'Connor's ideas, states that the "laws
before us do not force a dying person to undergo that kind of pain." Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at
2311 (emphasis omitted). Justice Breyer further explains that the statutes under review do not
ban physicians from administering such medication which alleviates pain, but, at the same
time, which hastens death. Id.
173. Id. (citation omitted).
174. Id. at 2312 (expressing Justice O'Connor's opinion).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF A RECENT SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA CASE
On July 17, 1997, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld the
constitutionality of a Florida statute that prohibits assisted suicide.1 5 Charles
E. Hall and his physician, Cecil McIver, M.D., sought a declaratory judgment
that section 782.08 of the Florida Statutes offended the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as the Privacy Clause
of the Florida Constitution. 76 The plaintiffs brought the action for injunctive
relief against the prosecution of a physician for providing assistance to a
patient in committing suicide.17 7 Mr. Hall was a mentally competent, thirtyfive-year-old who had contracted AIDS from a blood transfusion.1 7 8 The
trial court determined that Dr. McIver found, in his professional judgment,
that "it was medically appropriate and ethical to provide Mr. Hall" with
assistance in committing suicide. 7 9 The trial court further determined that
the statute could not be "constitutionally enforced" against the physicians
and that the prosecutor was enjoined from enforcement of the statute. 180 The
trial court set forth guidelines to ensure that any fatal medication was to be
administered only upon a showing that: 1) Mr. Hall was competent; 2) he
was "'imminently dying;"' and 3) he was "'prepared to die." ' 1 The State
Attorney appealed the decision of the trial court and the Supreme Court of
Florida accepted jurisdiction. 82
The Supreme Court of Florida focused on the recent United States
Supreme Court cases of Vacco v. Quill 183 and Washington v.
Glucksberg.'8 4 In Vacco, the Supreme Court had distinguished Cruzan by
175. Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997). The statute provides that "[e]very
person deliberately assisting another in the commission of self-murder shall be guilty of
manslaughter." FLA. STAT. ch. 782.08 (1995).
176. Krischer,697 So. 2d at 99.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. The trial court grounded its decision upon the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Privacy Clause of the
Florida Constitution. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 99. The trial court, in accordance with the
Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Glucksberg, did not find a federal liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause. Id.
181. Id. at 100 (quoting McIver v. Krischer, No. CL-96-1504-A.F., 1997 WL 225878,
at *11 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 1997), rev'd, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997)).
182. Id.
183. 117 S.Ct. 2293, 2296 (1997) (reversing the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit and upholding New York's ban on assisted suicide).
184. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. at 2262 (reversing the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit and upholding Washington's ban on assisted suicide).

Published by NSUWorks, 1998

171

Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 1

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 22:821

finding that there was a significant distinction between the right to have
assistance in committing suicide and the right to refuse life-sustaining
medical procedures. 85 The Supreme Court of Florida then reasoned in
Krischer that the assistance which Mr. Hall requested was not "treatment in
the traditional sense of that term;" rather, the administration of lethal
medication is equivalent to "an affirmative act designed to cause
death."' 86 Thus, the court explained that its prior decisions concerned only
the rejection of medical procedures, 187 whereas the present case involved
medical interference which will bring about death in a manner other than the
"natural course of events.' 8 8
The court next focused its attention to whether Mr. Hall had a right to
assisted suicide under the Privacy Clause of the Florida Constitution. 18' It is
evident that the public policy of the State of Florida looks upon assisted
suicide with disfavor.' 9° The court then concentrated on Donaldson v. Van
de Kamp 191 and explained that there are state interests in preserving the lives
of those persons who desire to live, and in protecting members of society

185. Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2299.
186. Krischer,697 So. 2d at 102.
187. See In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 828 (Fla. 1993); In re Guardianship of
Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 7-8 (Fla. 1990) (recognizing surrogate asserted right of woman who
was vegetative but not terminally ill to remove nasogastric feeding tube); Public Health Trust
v. Wons, 541 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. 1989) (holding that a mentally competent individual may
refuse blood transfusions for religious reasons); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla.
1980) (recognizing that a patient may withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment).
188. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 102. The American Medical Association described the
distinction by stating:
When a life-sustaining treatment is declined, the patient dies primarily
because of an underlying disease. The illness is simply allowed to take its
natural course. With assisted suicide, however, death is hastened by the
taking of a lethal drug or other agent. Although a physician cannot force a
patient to accept a treatment against the patient's will, even if the treatment is
life-sustaining, it does not follow that a physician ought to provide a lethal
agent to the patient. The inability of physicians to prevent death does not
imply that physicians are free to help cause death.
Id. at 102-03 (quoting AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Report 1-93-8, at 2).
189. Id. at 100. See FLA. STAT. ch. 782.08 (1995) (banning assisted suicide); see also
FLA. STAT. ch. 458.326 (1995) (allowing pain treatment but barring euthanasia and mercy
killing).
190. Krischer, 697 So. 2d at 100.
191. 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
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from abuse. 92 Several Florida organizations which are highly opposed to
assisted suicide filed amicus briefs in regard to this matter.
There is the
concern that persons with physical and mental disabilities will be exposed to
undue influence as well as mistake.1 94 The court mentioned the New York
State Task Force on Life and the Law, which had framed the risks associated
with the legalization of assisted suicide.1 95 The court concluded that the State
of Florida's interests "clearlyr outweigh" any benefit which would arise from
permitting assisted suicide.
First, because the state has "an unqualified
interest in the preservation of life," the state must prevent the "affirmative
destructive act" of allowing a physician to administer a "'death producing
agent' with the intent of causing certain death." 197 Second, the state has "a
compelling interest in preventing suicide," and must protect those individuals
who may be affected by mistake or pressure to commit suicide. 198 Moreover,
research has demonstrated that there are a great deal of individuals who have
requested assisted suicide, but who would retract their requests if they
received adequate pain management and treatment for depression.19 9 Finally,
the state has an interest in preserving the integrity of the medical profession

192. Krischer,697 So. 2d at 101 (quoting Donaldson v. Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d
59, 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that "the nature of Donaldson's right of privacy" cannot
be extended to "provide a protective shield for third persons who end his life")).
193. Id. at 102. The following organizations strongly object to assisted suicide: the
Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, Inc.; the American Disabled for Attendant
Programs Today; Not Dead Yet; and the National Legal Center for the Medically Dependent
and Disabled, Inc. Id. The Advocacy Center, in its amicus curiae brief, stated that "[i]f
assisted suicide is permitted in Florida, Floridians will be put on the so-called slippery slope of
determining the relative value of life." Id.
194. Id.
195. Krischer,697 So. 2d at 101. The task force grouped the following risks:
(1) undiagnosed or untreated mental illness; (2) improperly managed physical
symptoms; (3) insufficient attention to the suffering and fears of dying
patients; (4) vulnerability of socially marginalized groups; (5) devaluation of
the lives of the disabled; (6) sense of obligation; (7) patient deference to
physician recommendations; (8) increasing financial incentives to limit care;
(9) arbitrariness of proposed limits; and (10) impossibility of developing
effective regulation.
Id. (citation omitted).
196. Id. at 103.
197. Id. In Perlmutter,the Supreme Court of Florida distinguished the removal of a
respirator from an "'unnatural death by means of a 'death producing agent."" Id. (quoting
Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
198. Krischer,697 So. 2d at 103.
199. Id. (citations omitted).
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and the physician's role as a healer.2 ° The court explained that principal
healthcare associations are unified in objecting to physician-assisted suicide
and posed the question: "Who would have more knowledge of the dangers
of legalizing assisted suicide than those intimately charged with maintaining
the patient's well-being?" 20 1 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the
"Hippocratic Oath" itself illustrates that physician-assisted suicide is
completely incompatible with a physician's purpose.2°2 The oath states that a
physician "'will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it,
nor... make a suggestion to this effect.' 20 3 The court concluded that it does
"not hold that a carefully crafted statute authorizing assisted suicide would be
unconstitutional," and explained that if the court viewed the Privacy
Amendment of the Florida Constitution to include a right to assisted suicide,
it "would run the risk of arrogating to [themselves] those powers to make
24
social policy that as a constitutional matter belong only to the legislature."
V. CONFLICTS WHICH REQUIRE RESOLUTION

A.

Liberty InterestAccording to History and Tradition
1. Distinguishing Casey

In Washington v. Glucksberg, the majority opinion examined the
nation's legal history and tradition and found that because suicide and
assisted suicide have always been looked upon with disfavor, as evidenced
by prohibition laws, there was no liberty interest in the right to die by the
hand of a physician. °5 It is interesting to note that many states outlawed
abortion until the decision of Roe v. Wade, but yet a liberty interest
was
2 6
found with respect to a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. 0

200. Id.
201. Id. at 104. These organizations include: the American Medical Association, the
Florida Medical Association, the Florida Society of Internal Medicine, the Florida Society of
Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgeons, the Florida Osteopathic Medical Association, the
Florida Hospices, Inc., and the Florida Nurses Association. Id.
202. Krischer,697 So. 2d at 104.
203. Id. (citation omitted).
204. Id. (citation omitted).
205. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. at 2263 (citation omitted).
206. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). The following states had abortion laws
which were effective in 1868 and remained effective as of August 1970: Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at 176-77 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The decision of a woman to have an abortion affects not only the life of
the mother but also the life of the fetus. 2 7 In that situation, there is more
than one interest at stake and yet the Supreme Court has still declined to
protect the liberty interest of the fetus which appears to be stronger than a
mother's right to seek an abortion. °8 In the case of assisted suicide there is
one life involved which can "voice his or her wishes," 2w as opposed to
abortion where there is the unspoken voice of potential life.2 10 It seems
unreasonable and illogical to conclude that the right to determine one's own
fate is not afforded that same protection. These terminally ill individuals are
making decisions which affect their own lives and there is the absence of
other interests; that is, the fetus or potential life.211 As the United States
District Court for the Western District of Washington pointed out in
Compassion in Dying, there is surely a stronger argument with respect to the
right to die issue. 1
Furthermore, the Casey Court found that "physicians are fit assistants"
It is interesting to note that
concerning the decision to abort potential life.
the abuses associated with assisted suicide are similar to those associated
with abortion; that is, irresponsibility and undue influence from
others. 214 The Roe Court found that the liberty interest in terminating a
woman's pregnancy would have resulted in "self-mutilation" if a woman
were not permitted to enlist the assistance of a physician. 21 5 Following this
reasoning, terminally ill patients who are denied the assistance of a physician
will surely resort to other "crude methods" of dying, as exemplified in the
plaintiffs' case where a physician's terminally ill patient, who was denied
assistance, requested a loved one to help him in jumping from a bridge. 2 16 It
is enough that family members have to watch their loved ones both suffer
and lose all sense of dignity; however, it is even more appalling that these
family members are now forced into awkward and difficult situations in
providing assistance.
To further illustrate this point, it is disturbing to note that a Florida
company is offering something called an "Exit Bag" kit to assist in

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Compassion, 850 F. Supp at 1460.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Compassion,850 F. Supp at 1460.
Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2288 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
Brief for Respondent at 5,Glucksberg (No. 96-110).
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committing suicide.1 7 For thirty dollars, terminally ill individuals can
purchase a durable plastic bag with a soft elastic neckband and Velcro
clasps.218 For an additional ten dollars, these individuals can purchase a book
which describes exactly how to commit suicide. 219 Even for right to die
organizations such as Washington's Compassion in Dying, this concept is
horrifying. Denying terminally ill patients the right to assisted suicide forces
these individuals to consider hideous measures such as the "Exit Bag. 220
There comes a time when a physician has exhausted all possibilities to
cure his patient. The doctor's role should then transform into that of making
the patient more comfortable. Physicians are more qualified and better able
to comfortably treat their patients during these excruciatingly painful periods
of terminal disease. If treatment should include complying with a mentally
competent person's desire to die, then that individual should have the right to
control his own life.
2. Distinguishing Cruzan
In Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court recognized a liberty interest
to refuse unwanted medical treatment protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 22' In that case, the legal
history and tradition was grounded in the fact that coerced medical treatment
was always considered a battery. 222 Likewise, in Compassion in Dying, the
majority in the Ninth Circuit explained that there has never existed a right to
have another "enslave you, mutilate you, or kill you." 223 What physicians
would actually do is prevent harm by respecting the wishes of their patients
when both the physician and patient have faced the reality that there is
absolutely no chance for recovery. Physicians are looking out for their
patients' best interests in relieving their agonizing pain and loss of
dignity. As Justice Souter eloquently explained in Glucksberg, a physician is
not simply "a mechanic of the human body," but he is "one who ministers to
the patient. 2 24 The physician provides comfort and support for the patient
even when all hope is lost with respect to a chance for recovery. The
"Hippocratic Oath," which states that a physician will not administer a
217. Diane C. Lade, Society Defies Courts With Offer of Exit Bag, SUN-SENTINEL, July
19, 1997, at IA.
218. Id. at 12A.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 262 (1990).
222. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2770.
223. Compassion in Dying, 49 F.3d at 594.
224. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. at 2288 (citations omitted).
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deadly drug,= was written on the basis of outdated medicine and not on the
medical technological advancements
which have occurred
to
date.Y 6 Consequently, patients are able to live longer than they would have
absent this technology. 7 Thus, to argue that there is a distinction between
the refusal of life-sustaining measures which allow the natural progression of
death and the affirmative act of intending to cause death by lethal medication
is groundless in common sense.'
Absent these technological
breakthroughs, patients would be able to let their diseases take a natural
course. However, due to medications which prolong life, terminally ill
patients are living longer, thereby suffering miserably. Although there has
been a great deal of discussion concerning this distinction, both acts produce
the same result.229 In both cases, medical personnel are intending to bring
about death. In the case of the withdrawal of medical treatment, the
physician is certain that artificial means are the only sustenance for their
patient and that if these medical procedures are terminated, the patient will
surely die. In the case of physician-assisted suicide, doctors are carrying out
their patients' wishes by providing medication which will bring about their
death. There is no doubt about the intended result. In both cases, the
physician is carrying out the directive of the patient and causing that patient's
death.
Another troubling aspect of the right to die issue is that terminal
sedation is already permitted in New York and Washington;230 that is,
physicians are empowered to provide dosages of medication which alleviate
pain, but at the same time cause the patients' death to occur
prematurely.2 3I Most of the time, the levels of painkilling medication which
will mitigate the dying patient's pain will result in unconsciousness and
ultimately, a shortened death. z 2 It is ludicrous that physicians are able to
provide these medications while fully aware of the consequences of a
hastened death, yet the Supreme Court declines to recognize a right to avoid
the agonizing and humiliating period which patients must endure before their
impending death arrives.

225. MELVIN KONNER, M.D., BECOMING A DOCTOR: A JOURNEY OF INITIATION IN
MEDICAL SCHOOL viii (1988).
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State Interests are Insufficient to Outweigh IndividualLiberty

Several state interests have been found to outweigh any individual
notion of liberty with respect to physician-assisted suicide.233 The first
argument which asserts that the state has an unqualified interest in preserving
life, is carelessly flawed.234 As Justice Stevens explained in his concurring
opinion in Glucksberg, the state already has the power to place different
values on human lives in the context of criminals facing the death
penalty.2 35 The state cannot claim that there is an "absolute requirement that
a State treat all human life as having an equal right to preservation" because
it has already devalued the lives of a certain group of persons by allowing the
death penalty.236 Furthermore, just as there are limitations and safeguards
imposed in capital punishment cases, there should be no concern for
assigning lesser values on terminally ill persons who wish to end their own
lives. 37 By authorizing capital punishment, the State of Washington has in
essence already conceded that there will be times when the state will assign
lesser values on human life. 238 It is utterly absurd to believe that a state has
an absolute obligation to treat all life on an equal playing field.
Second, preserving both the integrity of the medical profession and the
physician's traditional role as a healer were found to be significant state
interests.2 39 The "Hippocratic Oath" states that the physician "will prescribe
regimen for the good of [his] patients according to [his] ability and [his]
judgment and never do harm to anyone. To please no one will [he] prescribe
a deadly drug, nor give advice which may cause his death." 240 Although it
may appear that this solves the dilemma of whether a physician would be
contradicting his oath, it is not so simple. If one were to read on, he or she
would find that the "Hippocratic Oath" further states that "[n]or will [he]
give a woman a pessary to procure abortion." 241 It seems that the
"Hippocratic Oath" is inapplicable to the current law in that physicians may
perform abortions and not face criminal liability.
Furthermore, the
"Hippocratic Oath" specifically states that a physician will use his judgment
in determining the best treatment for his patient and that the physician "will
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enter [houses] only for the good of [his] patients." 242 It hardly benefits a
mentally competent incurable person who is experiencing excruciating pain,
loss of dignity, and humiliation, to deny them the right to assisted
suicide. To deny this right to dying persons is to strip them of their
autonomy and thwart their ability to make decisions which affect "intimate
and personal" matters.243
Third, to address the concern that vulnerable persons, including the
elderly, handicapped, and economically disadvantaged, will be subject to
mistake, abuse, or pressure, the legislature must carefully formulate a statute
which provides limitations and safeguards for assistance with suicide in the
case of mentally competent, terminally ill individuals. 244 Justice Souter's
concurring opinion in Glucksberg, properly suggests that the legislature
245
should deal with these situations because it is not a matter for the judiciary.
VI. CONCLUSION

Nothing could be more devastating than to endure the suffering and
humiliation which accompanies a terminal illness. The ultimate fate of these
patients' lives are put in hands other than their own and they are left without
recourse.
The solution is for state legislatures to formulate detailed statutes which
outline the procedures a terminally ill patient must undergo in order to have
assistance from a physician in committing suicide. 246 State legislatures
should use the following seven criteria as a guideline in formulating a statute:
1) the decision must be a voluntary one that the patient
repeatedly initiates;
2) the patient must be competent and capacitated;
3) the patient must be suffering from an incurable disease;
4) the physician must know that the patient is not suffering
from inadequate comfort care;
5) there must be a meaningful relationship between the
doctor and the patient;
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6) second opinions are necessary prior to the assistance in
suicide; and
7) clear documentation that the above criteria have been
satisfied is both prudent and ethically mandatory.2 47
Carefully constructed statutes, which incorporate the above procedures
and further require clear and convincing evidence that terminally ill
individuals have satisfied these requirements, are the only answer. State
legislatures must devise safeguards to ensure that abuse is prevented and that
only those individuals who satisfy the prerequisites receive assistance in
ending their pain and suffering. The State has a significant interest in
protecting vulnerable individuals, and these cautiously formulated statutes
will provide the necessary protection.
Nicole Testa
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